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RESUMO	Esta	tese	é	baseada	na	minha	prática	alargada	de	fazer	e	ensinar	arte	e	consiste	nas	minhas	reflexões	teóricas	referentes	ao	que	acredito	ser	fundamentalmente	verdadeiro	 sobre	 o	 que	 é	 a	 arte,	 o	 fazer	 da	 arte	 e	 o	 ensinar	 da	 arte.	 Estas	considerações	 são	 sustentadas	 pelas	minhas	 próprias	 obras,	 às	 quais	 o	 texto	também	 vai	 fazendo	 referência,	 e	 também	 num	 anexo,	 por	 um	 livro	representando	 uma	 grande	 parte	 da	 minha	 produção	 artística	 até	 à	 data,	incluindo	 artigos	 sobre	 a	 minha	 obra	 por	 autoridades	 reconhecidas	 no	 meu	campo.	Será	também	exibida	uma	seleção	de	algumas	obras	recentes	durante	a	discussão	da	tese.		de	teoria	acerca	dela	são	práticas	diferentes.	Este	texto	argumenta	que	elas	são	muito	mais	diferentes	do	que	poderíamos	imaginar.	Se	 a	 Natureza	 nos	 falasse	 em	 palavras,	 o	 que	 nos	 diria	 sobre	 a	 nossa	compreensão	dela?	Como,	por	exemplo,	nos	apareceria	uma	das	suas	criaturas,	digamos,	 um	 elefante	 ou	 um	 burro,	 se	 viessem	 trajados	 como	 nós?	 Estas	questões	são	 tratadas	no	 texto	como	se	 fossem	análogas	em	extremo	à	 forma	como	um	artista	explicaria	a	sua	prática	se	seguisse	os	mesmos	procedimentos	prescritos	 para	 historiadores	 ou	 teóricos	 quando	 discutem	 as	 práticas	 desse	mesmo	artista.	Nos	dois	casos,	erguem-se	consideráveis	dificuldades.	O	texto,	consistente	com	o	ditado	“a	forma	segue	a	função”,	 	assume	a	posição	de	 que	 a	 arte	 não	 segue	 os	 mesmos	 caminhos	 que	 são	 tanto	 característicos	como	 necessários	 para	 outras	 práticas.	 A	 lógica	 constitui	 o	 instrumento	essencial	 e	 produto	 desejável	 de	 muitas	 práticas,	 mas	 esse	 não	 é	 o	 caso	 da	prática	 da	 arte.	 Aqui,	muito	 pelo	 contrário,	 é	 a	 Emoção	 que	 constitui	 tanto	 o	veículo	 como	 o	 objectivo.	 Este	 texto	 assume	 um	 caminho	 decididamente	associativo,	 dando	 plena	 ênfase	 à	 posição	 que	 defende	 que	 seguir	 caminhos	lineares	 em	 exclusivo	 quando	 definindo	 ou	 praticando	 arte	 é,	 literalmente,	irracional.		
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		Ocultas	 por	 detrás	 do	 que	 ensinamos	 actualmente	 na	 formação	 artística,	existem,	 na	 minha	 opinião,	 algumas	 narrativas	 falsas	 em	 acção,	 com	consequências	 importantes.	 Quando	 ensinamos	 os	 alunos	 a	 compreender	 e	 a	explicar	 o	 fazer	da	 arte	 como	uma	 sucessão	de	pensamentos	 e	 considerações	analíticas,	 na	 sua	 grande	 parte,	 estamos	 a	 apoiar	 essas	 narrativas.	 Este	 texto	sugere	que	as	nossas	escolhas,	ao	 fazermos	arte,	não	são	deduções	 lógicas,	de	todo,	mas	sim	decisões	enraizadas	directamente	na	intuição	e	em	preocupações	emocionais.	Tal	significa	conhecimento	informado	por	toda	a	nossa	experiência	prévia	 e	 desencadeado	 por	 semelhanças	 que	 conseguimos	 intuir	 através	 de	reinos	muito	diferentes	dessa	 experiência.	 Pensamos	que	 é	muito	 importante	entender	 que	 essas	 conexões	 sentidas	 são	 acedidas	 de	 forma	 primariamente	inconsciente.	Em	primeira	instância,	são	quase	invariavelmente	sentidas,	e	não	conhecidas.	 E	 sugerimos	 que	 é	 apenas	 depois	 de	 actuarmos	 sobre	 essas	conexões	 intuídas	no	 fazer	da	arte	que	estamos	em	posição	de	analisar	o	que	fizemos,	de	considerar	os	resultados	das	nossas	acções	ou	de	extrair	conclusões	delas.	Ocorrem	graves	problemas	quando	alegamos	ou	sugerimos	que	a	análise	consciente	foi	a	base	dos	processos	que	nos	levaram	a	agir	em	primeiro	lugar.	Eu	 afirmo	 que	 este	 não	 é	 o	 caso,	 em	 absoluto,	 e	 que	 teorias	 baseadas	 nesse	princípio	revelar-se-ão	sempre	desadequadas.	Se	 eu	 fosse	 um	 cozinheiro	 e	 desejasse	 criar	 um	 novo	 prato,	 confiaria,	 ao	escolher	os	 ingredientes,	não	no	que	o	meu	pensamento	me	dissesse,	mas,	ao	invés	e	em	primeira	instância,	no	que	o	meu	corpo,	ou	seja,	as	minhas	papilas	gustativas	me	 dissessem.	 A	 base	 sobre	 a	 qual	 agiria	 não	 seria	 o	 raciocínio	 a	partir	 da	 memória,	 mas,	 acima	 de	 tudo,	 a	 capacidade	 de	 a	 minha	 língua	 se	lembrar	 e	 de	 recriar	 experiências	 passadas.	 Uma	 decisão,	 por	 exemplo,	 de	incluir	 noz-moscada	no	meu	novo	prato	não	 seria	 tomada	porque	 eu	 consigo	pensar	 na	 noz-moscada	 como	 sendo	 doce	 e	 aromática,	 mas	 sim	 no	 ligeiro	acrescento	amargo	que	poderia	 trazer	ao	sabor	geral.	É	a	memória,	na	minha	língua,	desse	sabor	que	me	informa	directamente	acerca	do	que	poderia	ser	o	resultado	do	acrescento	da	noz-moscada.	Por	 outras	 palavras,	 ao	 cozinhar	 um	prato	 novo	 ou	 ao	 fazer	 arte,	 falamos	 de	processos	que,	em	primeira	instância,	estão	relacionados	com	o	corpo	e	com	a	intuição	e	não	com	o	pensamento	cerebral.	É	verdade	que	podemos	intuir	um	caminho	 para	 o	 pensamento	 –	 e	muitas	 vezes,	 assim	 o	 fazemos.	 Contudo,	 na	verdade,	não	podemos	pensar	um	caminho	para	intuir.		Se	me	encarregassem	de	propor	uma	única	e	talvez	muito	importante	melhoria,	a	ser	rápida	e	facilmente	implementada	na	formação	artística,	eu	sugeriria	esta:	
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requerer	uma	inclusão	estrutural	e	curricular	de	“trabalhar	com	os	materiais”	no	tipo	de	cursos	que	oferecemos	aos	historiadores	e	teóricos	da	arte	seria	algo	relativamente	 fácil	 de	 conseguir.	 Acredito	 sinceramente	 que	 uma	 melhoria	significativa	na	educação	artística,	tanto	para	historiadores	e	teóricos,	tal	como	para	 os	 artistas	 praticantes	 que	 com	 eles	 estudam,	 seria	 cumprida	 com	 esta	medida.	Um	número	de	confusões	sobre	a	prática	de	arte	que	eu	discuto	neste	texto	 seria	 em	 breve	 grandemente	 resolvido	 por	 esta	 acção.	 Proponho	 que	 a	introdução	 estrutural	 aos	 aspectos	 materiais	 do	 significado	 na	 arte	 deva	 ser	uma	parte	 exigida	na	 educação	 formal	 tanto	de	 artistas	 como	historiadores	 e	teóricos	 de	 arte.	 Pessoas	 que	 tenham	 como	 função	 conhecer,	 ensinar	 ou	produzir	 avaliações	 autorizadas	 a	 um	 alto	 nível	 sobre	 a	 arte	 devem,	verdadeiramente,	ter	um	grau	significativo	de	familiaridade	com	o	que	faz	parte	dessa	actividade.	Existe	alguma	razão	 lógica	pela	qual	a	 “prática	da	arte”,	ou	seja,	o	fazer	da	arte,	não	seja	parte	do	currículo	obrigatório	de	historiadores	de	arte	e	teóricos	da	arte,	enquanto	o	estudo	intenso	da	história	da	arte	faz	parte	do	 currículo	 exigido	 a	 artistas	 praticantes?	 Parece-me	 uma	 situação	desequilibrada	e	ilógica.		O	 significado	 na	 arte	 não	 é	 um	produto	 estritamente	 linear	 das	 intenções	 do	artista,	nem	está	contido	no	material	 físico	que	constitui	a	sua	obra	de	arte.	O	significado	não	é,	com	efeito,	uma	qualidade	intrínseca	das	obras	de	arte,	mas	sim	 uma	 entidade	 emergente.	 As	 obras	 de	 arte	 não	 têm	 significado;	 elas	“assumem	um	 significado”.	 Esse	 significado	não	 é	 singular	 na	 sua	natureza,	 é	pluriforme,	não	sendo	persistente	para	um	observador	nem	consistente	entre	vários	observadores.	O	 fazer	da	arte	pode	 ser	pensado	como	acto	procriador,	em	vez	de	 feito	reprodutivo.	Algo	de	novo	passa	a	existir	e	começa	a	assumir	vida,	 muitas	 vezes	 em	 maneiras	 e	 em	 direcções	 muito	 diferentes	 das	pretendidas	 –	 ou	 esperadas.	 A	 arte	 mostra-nos	 coisas	 que	 conhecemos	 de	formas	diferentes	das	normais.	Quando	um	artista	cria	uma	nova	obra	tal	pode	assemelhar-se	a	um	acto	de	Deus,	a	criação	de	uma	nova	realidade.	O	artista	faz	com	que	uma	nova	ordem	principie	a	sua	existência.	Acrescenta	a	sua	obra,	algo	muito	pequeno	que	ele	 criou,	e	pode	então	considerar	o	mundo	de	uma	nova	maneira.		Se	 esperamos	 entender	 realmente	 o	 que	 é	 o	 fazer	 da	 arte	 e,	 assim,	 entender	melhor	 como	 melhor	 ensiná-la,	 estou	 convencido	 de	 que	 temos	 de	 mudar	algumas	 coisas.	 Devíamos	 despender	 menos	 tempo	 e	 energia	 à	 procura	 do	objectivo	 da	 arte	 ao	 nível	 da	miríade	 de	 significados	 sociais	 que	 imaginamos	para	 ela.	 Correspondentemente,	 deveríamos	 devotar	 mais	 esforço	 à	compreensão	da	natureza	e	da	importância	do	seu	significado	individual	para	o	
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artista	 que	produziu	 a	 obra,	 bem	 como	para	 o	 observador	 que	 se	 emocionou	com	 ela.	 Todas	 as	 outras	 formas	 de	 encarar	 a	 arte,	 na	 minha	 visão,	 são	abstracções,	 meros	 derivados	 disto.	 Não	 podemos	 compreender	 e	 partilhar	conhecimento	sobre	as	árvores	quando	limitamos	o	nosso	estudo	e	discussões	em	grande	parte	à	floresta.	Na	Arte,	o	indivíduo,	o	“Eu”	tem	de	verdadeiramente	ser	entendido	como	a	personagem	principal	dessa	história.	Por	outras	palavras,	a	Arte,	para	o	artista,	é	a	SUA	HISTÓRIA.		A	Arte	e	a	Filosofia,	quando	são	bem	praticadas,	nunca	nos	oferecerão	respostas	simples.	 Ao	 invés,	 dão	 forma	 a	 questões	 inspiradoras	 e	 fundamentais.	 Não	recordam,	 parafraseiam	 ou	 repetem	 o	 que	 já	 sabemos.	 Em	 vez	 disso,	 elas	tornam	manifesta	 a	 nossa	 curiosidade	 com	 respeito	 a	 tudo	 o	 que	 ainda	 não	conhecemos.	A	História,	a	Filosofia	e	a	Arte,	quando	movidas	pela	paixão	pela	descoberta	 e	 acompanhadas	 por	 uma	 disponibilidade	 de	 suspender	 a	 crença,	cumprem	muito	mais	do	que	meramente	a	confirmação	de	teorias	existentes	ou	a	produção	de	novas	teorias.	Elas	motivam-nos	a	explorar	–	ou	seja,	a	descobrir	e	 a	 criar	 fascinantes	 novos	 factos	 vitalmente	 importantes.	 Talvez	 a	 arte	 e	 a	ciência	 devam	 ser	 encaradas	 como	 as	 nossas	 tentativas,	 por	 meios	 muito	diversos,	não	obstante,	de	chegar	a	verdades	fundamentais	que	são	de	grande	importância	para	nós.	Ambas	 são	direccionadas	 às	descobertas	 sobre	nós	 e	 o	universo	que	habitamos,	estudando	e	registando	o	que	encontramos.	A	ciência	entende	e	explica	o	universo	presumindo	causalidade,	tempo	linear	e	a	 existência	 de	 regras	 ou	 padrões	 ocultos	 persistentes	 que,	 se	 se	 for	suficientemente	diligente,	podem	ser	localizados	e	entendidos.	A	arte,	de	forma	muito	 diferente,	 compreende	 e	 explica	 o	 universo	 de	 forma	 intuitiva,	emocional,	por	vezes	até	“mágica”.	A	ciência	confia	no	génio	do	intelecto,	a	Arte	no	génio	do	espírito.	A	Arte	é	o	Bobo	na	Corte	da	Ciência.							Palavras-Chave:		Arte	e	Ciência,	Educacão	artistica,	Subconsciente,	Processualidade	lógica	e	emocional,	História	da	Arte	
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ABSTRACT		This	thesis	is	based	on	my	extensive	practice	in	making	and	teaching	art,	and	consists	of	my	theoretical	reflections	concerning	what	I	believe	to	be	fundamentally	true	about	what	art,	artmaking	and	teaching	art	are.	Those	considerations	are	backed	up	by-	and	make	reference	throughout	the	text	to	my	own	works,	and	also	in	annex	to	a	book	representing	a	large	portion	of	my	artistic	production	to	date,	including	articles	about	that	work	by	recognized	authorities	in	my	field.	A	selection	of	some	recent	works	will	also	be	exhibited	during	the	discussion	of	the	thesis.	Making	art,	understanding	its	history,	or	engaging	in	theory	about	it	are	different	practices.	In	fact,	this	text	argues,	they	are	very	much	more	different	than	we	currently	seem	to	imagine.		If	Nature	could	speak	words	to	us,	what	would	they	tell	us	about	our	understanding	of	her?	How,	for	example,	would	one	of	her	creatures,	let’s	say	an	elephant	or	a	donkey,	both	act	and	appear	to	us	if	they	donned	our	clothes?	These	questions	are	treated	in	the	text	as	highly	analogous	to	how	an	artist	would	explain	his	practice	when	following	the	same	procedures	prescribed	for	historians	or	theorists	of	art	when	they	discuss	their	practices.	Discussed	and	demonstrated	will	be	that	considerable	difficulties	arise.		Consistent	with	the	adage:	“Form	follows	Function”,	the	text	takes	and	defends	the	position	that	art	doesn’t	follow	the	same	paths	that	are	both	characteristic	of-	and	necessary	for	other	practices.	Logic	forms	both	the	essential	tool	and	the	desired	product	of	many	practices,	whereas	the	position	is	taken	that	this	is	fundamentally	not	so	in	the	practice	of	art.	There,	very	differently,	it	is	Emotion	that	constitues	both	its	vehicle	and	objective.	A	decidedly	associative	route	is	taken	in	the	text,	to	give	physical	form	to	the	argument	that	following	linear	paths	alone	when	defining-	or	engaging	in	the	practice	of	art	is	quite	literally	irrational. Key	Words:  Art		and	Science,	Art	education,	Subconscious,	Logical	and	Emotional	Processing,	History	of	Art 	
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THE	BRIDGE-WITH	THANKS	TO	MY	FATHER	Two	old	men,	longtime	friends,	meet	each	other	somewhere	in	Southern	Europe	on	a	small	bridge	that	crosses	the	river	separating	an	old	rural	village	and	the	small	farms	they	work	that	surround	it.	One	of	them,	Pedro,	is	on	his	way	to	town	while	the	other,	Fernando	together	with	his	donkey,	are	returning	from	town	to	his	farm.	“Hello	Pedro,	Greetings	Fernando,	nice	to	run	into	you!”	They	talk	of	this	and	that	for	a	while,	and	then	start	to	take	leave	of	each	other	to	continue	on	their	respective	journeys.	Fernando	however,	before	leaving,	suddenly	grabs	up	a	large	branch	that	serves	as	his	walking	stick,	and	begins	forcefully	to	strike	his	donkey	over	the	back	with	it.	Pedro,	shocked	by	this	sudden	display	of	aggression,	says	“Wait,	stop	Fernando,	why	are	you	beating	
that	poor	beast?!!”	Fernando	replies,	“I’m,	not	beating	him	at	all,	I	just	want	to	go	
home	now,	and	obviously	I	need	the	donkey	to	go	with	me!?”	Pedro	then	says,	“Yes,	yes,	my	friend,	that’s	obvious,	but	why	don’t	you	try	to	make	clear	to	the	
animal	what	you	want	from	him?	Maybe	talk	to	him	or	pull	on	his	reins	or	
something	to	show	that	you	want	him	to	follow	you?!!”		Fernando,	now	clearly	irritated	by	this	questioning	of	his	actions	answers:	“Well	of	course	I	am	going	
to	do	that,	but	first	I	need	to	get	his	attention!”	
-(My	father	told	me	this	story	when	I	was	10	years	old)	
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BEFORE	BEGINNING	My	goals	with	this	text	are	in	some	senses,	perhaps	remarkable.	I	am	hoping	to	demonstrate	knowledge	and	analytical	ability	consistent	with	the	awarding	of	a	formal	PhD	 in	 the	Practice	of	Art.	At	 the	same	time	however,	 it	 is	my	express	purpose	to	argue	that	if	I	am	successful	in	this,	what	I	will	have	demonstrated	are	abilities	not	at	all	essential	 to	my	practice,	 the	practice	of	art.	That	makes	composing	this	 text	a	rather	complex	undertaking	 for	me.	The	same	may	well	also	be	true	for	reading	it!	This	text	is	constituted	largely	by	a	selection	of	a	number	of	my	thoughts	and	writings	from	recent	years	that	when	taken	together,	represent	the	most	important	thoughts	and	beliefs	I	have	related	to	art.	Although	I	have	now	selected,	edited	and	ordered	these	texts,	the	result	does	not	form	a	straight	line	or	a	clear	path.	My	text	will	unavoidably	jump	around	a	bit,	possibly	even	quite	a	bit.	At	the	same	time,	I	imagine	the	meandering	path	of	this	text	as	giving	physical	form	to	my	conviction	that	a	deeper	understanding	of	art	can	never	be	arrived	at	by	simple	paths	or	straight	lines.	It	seems	to	me	that	the	logical	place	to	start	a	discussion	about	Understanding	Art,	is	with	the	question	what	function(s)	making	it	has	for	the	artist	who	makes	it.	In	other	words:	“why	do	we	have	any	art	in	the	first	place?”	It	follows	that	in	first	instance,	it	is	artists	who	must	offer	an	account	of	the	functions	making	art	fulfills	for	them.	They	are,	after	all,	the	most	qualified	and	obvious	source	for	those	answers.	I	am	an	artist,	and	will	attempt	here	to	define	some	of	those	functions.	In	so	doing,	I	will	try	to	make	the	case	that	some	of	our	current	ways	of		considering,	speaking	about-	and	teaching	art	are	inconsistent	with-,	
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even	contradictory	to	those	functions.	What	I	say	about	the	functions	making	art	has	for	an	artist,	will	most	certainly	not	apply	for	all	artists	and	all	art.	That	is	unavoidable	because	my	words	here	do	not	constitute	a	survey,	but	instead,	proceed	very	largely	from	my	own	experience.	Additionally,	I	am	unable	to	place	any	artist	other	than	myself	under	a	microscope	or	dissect	him	in	order	to	offer	solid	evidence.	I	am	however	convinced	that		most	of	what	I	say	would	find	agreement	from	most	experienced	artists.		There	is	an	overarching	and	persistent	current	attitude	regarding	the	teaching	and	understanding	of	art	that	I	believe	is	neither	correct	nor	useful.	That	attitude	proceeds	from	the	notion	that	a	work	of	art	can	be	very	largely	understood	as	an	intelligible	(if	you	are	knowledgable	enough)	message	from	the	artist	to	the	rest	of	us.	As	such,	it	would	stand	to	reason	that	the	message	is	one	meant	to	be	‘read’	and	understood	by	others.	The	proponents	of	that	idea	tend	to	regard	the	message	as	one	that	is	recorded	in	a	kind	of	visual	code	consisting	of	more	or	less	standardized	and	decipherable	symbols,	similarly	to	our	spoken	language.	Those	people	we	normally	imagine	have	the	greatest	ability	to	‘decode’	artists’	messages	for	us,	seem	most	often	to	do	so	on	the	basis	of	an	education	in	art	history	and/or	art	theory.	The	process	of	decoding,	it	seems,	demands	a	very	thorough	working	knowledge	of	art	history	and	art	theory,	and	sometimes	of	philosophy	or	even	of	science,	all	highly	respected	academic	pursuits.	What	those	experts	then	offer	us	as	crucial	for	the	understanding	of	art	is	almost	invariably	analysis	based	on	collections	of	discrete	verifiable	facts.	I	want	to	challenge	this	approach	as	one	I	think	is	logically	untenable,	because	it	fails	to	take	into	account	some	aspects	of	art	I	am	convinced	are	critically	important	ones.	One	of	those	critical	aspects	is	the	artist’s	true	motivations	for	making	art,	i.e.	those	function(s)	making	a	work	of	art	directly	fulfills	for	him.	
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Another	is	the	very	processes	by	which	art	is	made.	Largely	missing	from	the	analyses	of	those	who	don’t	make	art,	is	all	that	happens	before	artworks	are	shown	to-	or	spoken	of	by	others	than	the	artist.	I	submit	that	there	are	a	number	of	fundamental	aspects	of	art	that	people	who	haven’t	made	it,	many	of	those	the	very	‘authoritative	experts’	I	referred	to,	may	well	be	insufficiently	familiar	with.	Regarding	art	primarily	as	communication	for	example,	is	I	think	not	a	useful	way	at	all	to	explain,	understand,	or	appreciate	it.	While	it	is	undeniably	important	for	almost	all	artists	that	they	can	show	their	works	to	others,	that	cannot	be	simplistically	presumed	to	issue	from	the	need	to	tell	others	things		I,	for	example,	do	not	make	art	that	conveys	specific	central	thoughts	or	concepts	that	I	consider	it	important	for	others	to	know	of.		Seldom	if	ever,	am	I	reacting	directly	with	my	work		to	political,	philosphical,	social,	religious,	or	environmental	issues.	Truth	be	told,	I	don’t	‘think	my	way’	to	making	a	work	of	art	at	all.	Instead	I	feel	my	way	to	it.	Those	last	words,	vague	as	they	may	seem,	are	highly	important	ones,	at	the	very	heart	of	a	number	of	the	most	important	arguments	I	will	try	to	develop.	There	exist	very	considerable	differences	between	what	we	come	to	know	by	thinking,	and	what	we	come	to	know	by	feeling.	It	is	my	conviction	that	in	art,	what	we	know	or	do	by	feeling	is	far	more	important	than	what	we	know	or	do	by	thinking	.		Artists	I	am	contending,	cannot	usefully	be	regarded	as	making	art	in	order	to	‘pass	messages’	to	the	rest	of	us,	that	experts	with	entirely	different	training		then	make	understandable	for	us	by	interpreting,	or	decoding	them.	Artists	are	perhaps	not	really	‘speakers’	in	that	way	at	all,	instead	they	are	perhaps	more	akin	to	‘actors’.	By	that	I	mean	that	artworks	can	perhaps	be	far	more	usefully	regarded		as	actions	undertaken,	rather	than	as	messages	being	transmited.		When	I	for	example	make	art,	I	am	extending	myself	physically,	availing	myself	
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of	my	ability	to	act	on	space	outside	my	own	body.	My	artwork,	once	finished	and	coming	to	occupy	space	independently	of	me,	becomes	a	permanent	extension	of	myself.		What	I	have	externalized	however,	is	not	at	all	a	direct	representation	of	myself,	nor	of	any	specific	thought(s)	I’ve	had	that	I	believed	it	important	for	others	to	know	about.	My	artwork	is	more	like	a	memento	I	leave	behind,	indicative	of-,	perhaps	even	celebratory	for	me	of	my	ability	to	act	on	material	that	may	remain	after	I’m	gone.	It	is	a	small	record	of	a	moment	in	my	life	rather	than	a	bold	statement	readily	intelligible	for	all-	or	many	others.	Choosing	to	describe	an	artwork	as	an	act	rather	than	a	thought	is	an	important	distinction.	The	reasons	why	I	think	it	highly	useful	to	do	this,	will	I	hope	become	more	clear	in	the	course	of	this	text.	For	now	I	will	say	that	the	action	of	making	art	can	be	likened	to	the	action	of	lifting	your	arm,	then	moving	it	slowly	outward	through	space	in	an	arc	that	returns	it	to	your	body,	when		describing	for	example,	a	large	expanse	of	land	you’ve	visited.	We	sometimes	choose	to	act	in	such	a	way	because	of	a	bodily	gesture’s	ability	to	encompass	our	experience,	and	in	so	doing,	to	describe	it	in	a	powerfully	distinct	way.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	important	to	realize	that	the	gesture	is	very	different	from	the	experience	it	describes.	The	body	can	very	effectively	generate	metaphor	for	experience.	But	neither	the	gesture	I	described,	nor	making	artwork,	should	be	presumed	to	replace,	directly	communicate-,	or	literally	transmit	the	individual	experiences	they	signify.	In	fact	in	art,	what	we		are	offered	are	very	often	not	specific	representations	at	all.	Instead	we	are	being	offered	impressions,	analogies,	ones	almost	invaribly	taking	on	form	importantly	different	from	the	experiences	they	refer	to.	Our	experiences	are	in	very	large	measure,	retained	in	bodily	memory.	That	kind	of	knowledge		or	content	can	be	accessed	as	‘felt	or	sensed’,	as	opposed	to	the	very	different	type	of		knowledge	we	habitually	reduce	to	verbal	symbols	by	thought,	and	then	transmit	to	others	by	speaking	our	thoughts.	I	submit	that	it	is	very	largely	not	at	all	that	kind	of	
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content	that	art	transmits.	The	mode	of	transmission	in	art	already	very	strongly	indicates	that	it	is	emotional-	rather	than	intellectual	content	that	is	being	transmitted.	In	fact,	without	our	body,	I	don’t	think	we	could	have	any	relation	at	all	to	the	world.	Mind	alone	can	understand	the	world	only	within	very	narrow	and	distinct	limits.	It	is	our	corporeal	existence	in	space	that	allows	us,	in	fact	demands	of	us	that	we	engage	with	the	world	,	and	it	is	that	engagement	that	is	the	basis	for	knowing	in	the	real	sense	of	that	word.	What	we	know,	as	opposed	to	what	we	merely	think,	is	determined	in	critically	important	measure	by	the	size	of	our	body	as	it	relates	to	all	else,	the	movements	and	actions	it	is	capable	of	performing,	and	the	dangers	to	its	integrity	that	exist	in	the	world.	I	think	it	scientifically	accurate	to	say	that	all	emotion	of	any	kind	or	degree	has	its	origin	in	body	rather	than	in	intellect.	I	believe	in	fact	that	it	is	only	because	our	body	knows	movement	and	is	vulnerable	to	pain	and	damage	that	we	are	capable	of	feeling	or	knowing	anything.		It	is	time	I	believe,	to	advance	much	beyond	what	we	are	able	to	understand	about	art	merely	by	comparing	paintings	to	ones	that	preceded	them,		and	comparing	what	people	were	thinking,	doing	and	talking	about	at	those	respective	times	and	now.	It	is	time	to	tackle	some	rather	more	difficult-	but	I	claim,	far	more	fundamental	questions	about	art.	Why	do	we	make	and	value	it,	and	what	is	the	true	nature	of	the	faculties	we	engage	when	we	do	that?	The	notion	that	art	has	its	origin	in	our	ability	to	think,	and	that	its	communicative	value	for	others	is	centered	in	that	same	ability,	is	in	my	view	quite	thoroughly	mistaken.	I	submit	that	Art	both	originates	in-	and	is	understood	by	us	primarily	because	we	have	the	ability	to	act	on	the	world,	on	materials,	on	each	other,	and	literally	to	feel	and	learn	important	things,	wordlessly,	from	what	results	from	those	actions.	
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My	primary	purpose	here	is	to	argue	that	art	and	artists	are	far	more	concerned	with	knowledge	felt	and	sensed,	than	with	facts	or	thoughts	that	we	can	express	in	words.	Approaches	to	art	that	disregard	or	refute	this,	whether	disseminated	in	the	context	of	education	or	outside	of	it	are,	I	believe,	of	very	little	service	to	us	in	coming	to	understand	what	art	really	means	or	offers.		
THINGS	CHANGE	There	is	no	more	readily	discernible	logical-	or	theoretical	basis	for	very	many	of	the	choices	artists	make	in	their	works,	than	there	is	for	the	decison	to	buy	a	chocolate	ice	cream	cone	on	a	warm	summer’s	day	rather	than		a	strawberry	one.	I	think	it	possible	that	that	statement	may	already	seem	a	shocking	one	for	some	who	read	it.	My	point	however,	is	that	both	kinds	of	choices	result	primarily	from	our		feelings,	sensitivities	and	preferences	at	the	time,	rather	than	being	time-independent	or	logical	decisions	we	come	to	at	the	conclusion	of	fact-based	thought	processes.	We	frequently	choose	to	act	in	this	or	that	way,	very	largely	unconscious	of	all	of	the	reasons	for	doing	so.	To	a	limited	degree,	if	we	decide	that	we	must	do	so,	we	can	perhaps	explain	our	choices.	But	far	more	often,	we	feel	no	need	to	do	so,	and	don’t.		After	all,	we	know	very	well	that	tomorrow	we	may	choose	quite	differently,	not	bound	to	do	otherwise	by	our	earlier	choices.	We	are	none	of	us	exactly	the	same	person	through	time,	our	experiences	constantly	change	us.	In	fact	I	think,	we	change	very	much	more	than	we	are	ever	aware	of!		Our	verbal	or	written	explanations	of	the	choices	we	make	as	artists,	I	am	suggesting,	do	not	often	reveal	any	more	useful	or	deeper-lying	truths	than	that	one,	i.e.	“things	change”.		And	there	is	I	add,	precious	little	in	the	form	of	theory	that	can	adequately	formulate	our	responses	to	that	one	omnipresent	condition	of	our	lives.	It	is	largely	for	that	
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reason	that	I	suggest	that	the	role	theory	plays	in	making	or	understanding	art	cannot	be	more	than	a	very	limited	one.				
fig.	1	“Things	Change”-	1997	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	We	change,	what	happens	around	us	changes,	and	our	feelings	and	reactions	to	these	changes,	change	as	well.	Art,	a	pursuit	that	manifests	our	reactions	to	those	many	changes,	is	not	a	process	of	logical	deduction.	In	fact	I	think	it	much	closer	to	the	opposite.	What	I	mean	is	that	like	Life	itself,	art	is	not	deductive	or	reductive,	but	is	instead	an	additive	process,	i.e.	it	is	an	experiential-	rather	than	an	analytical	activity.	We	very	often	make	additions	or	changes,	i.e.	do	
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things,	not	because	we	are	certain	of	positive	outcomes	on	some	theoretical	basis	that	underlies	our	actions.	Instead	we	choose	much	more	often	than	not	to	do	things	because	we	know	that	we	need	to,	in	order	to	find	out	what	happens!	If	looked	at	in	this	light,	neither	living	our	lives	nor	making	art	are	usefully	understood	as	ways	to	communicate	or	pass	on	knowledge.	Instead	I	think	it	far	more	useful	to	imagine	that	we	live	our	lives,	and	some	of	us	make	art,	very	largely	because	both	offer	us	unique	opportunities	to	find	out	things.	Current	paradigm	it	seems	to	me	clearly,	persuades	us	that	artists	make	artworks	in	order	to	communicate	things.	But	the	appealing	simplicity	of	that	supposition	belies	some	very	significant	downsides	it	has.	The	communicative	component	of	the	function	that	art	may	indeed	also	have	is,	I	think,	very	inadequately	understood,	far	too	highly	prioritized	in	discussing	and	teaching	art,	and	as	a	result,	its	usefulness	for	understanding	art	is	very	limited.	There	are	critical	differences	in	both	kind	and	degree,	between	knowledge	we	gain	when	we	consider	clear	topics	and	structurally	related	individual	facts,	or	alternatively,	when	we	decide	to	search	out	and	distil	our	own	points	of	view	from	highly	diverse	ones.	Facts	are	a	little	like	bricks,	i.e.	they	are	individual	elements	that	can	be	highly	useful	for	constructing	things.	Whatever	we	construct	with	them	however,	begins	only	to	take	on	meaningful	and	lasting	form	when	we	use	mortar	to	cement	them	together.		It	seems	both	necessary	and	logical	therefore	to	look	closely	at	what	is	between	facts	or	bricks,	and	to	understand	that	as	determinant	for	the	functional	usefulness	we	can	expect	to	derive	from	their	use.	Clarity	regarding	complex	entities	like	the	nature,	purposes	and	workings	of	art,	I	am	suggesting,	cannot	be	arrived	at	by	microscopic	examination	of	what	we	merely	assume	are	the	most	important		facts	about	it.	Complex	entities	like	art	can	only	be	understood	if	we	take	leave	of	the	naïve	hope	to	fully	understand	in	that	comfortable,	controlled-,	and	
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unvavoidably	highly	limited	way.	That	is	like	expecting	to	understand	the	deep	meaning	a	song	can	have	for	us	when	considering	only	its	lyrics.		The	knowledge	we	accumulate	on	our	journeys	in	art,	i.e.	the	value	art	has	for	us,	is	not	determined	by	the	ease	and	speed	with	which	we	can	describe	or	arrive	at	fixed	clear	conclusions	or	precise	destinations.	The	point	of	that	particular	journey	is	in	fact	not	at	all	where	or	when	we	arrive	at	its	conclusion.	Instead	the	real	value	of	a	journey	in	art,	is	in	far	greater	measure	a	function	of	what	we	encounter,	experience,	and	learn	along	the	way.		
THE	EMPEROR’S	NEW	CLOTHES	Differently	than	the	one	I	cited	at	the	beginning	of	this	text,	I	imgagine	that	we	are	all	familiar	with	another	story.	That	one	tell	us	what	happened,	long	ago,	when	a	certain	little	boy	in	a	crowd	of	onlookers	watched	his	Emperor	parading	in	his	New	Clothes.	The	little	boy,	shocked	by	what	he	was	seeing,	cried	out	loudly	that	the	emperor	had	no	clothes	on	at	all,	was	in	fact	parading	around	quite	naked!	Today	we	know	that	the	boy	had	very	little	reason	to	expect	that	speaking	the	truth	would	result	in	any	immediate-	or	widespread	public	support	for	his	position.		We	don’t	often	see	many	kings	or	emperors	anymore,	and	when	we	do,	they	are	always	carefully	clothed.	It	is	however	still	common	to	hear	Emperors,	kings,	and	also	politicians,	and	academic	researchers	speak	of	themselves	as	we.	But	we	now	know	of	course	that	when	they	do	so,	they	most	often	mean	nothing	more	than	“I”.	The	writer	here,	I,	am	not	an	emperor,	a	king,	a	politician,	or	an	academic	researcher.	Instead	I	am	an	artist.		For	artists,	the	word	‘I’	necessarily	carries	far	more	importance	than	for	people	from	many	other	walks	of	life.	In	an	artist’s	case,	“I”	is	something	the	artist	must	be	able	to	concentrate-	and	
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draw	on	in	his	work,	far	more	so	than	any	kind	of	we.	That	point	is	one	I	also	think	quite	an	essential	one	for	any	understanding	of	what	artists	really	do,	or	what	art	really	is.		Art	is	after	all,	perhaps	the	human	pursuit	that	licenses	and	promotes	a	focused	profession,	even	a	celebration,	of	what	one	individual	I	is	capable	of	seeing,	realizing,	feeling,	and	offering,	quite	independently	of	whether	anyone	else	sees,	does,	-	feels	-or	says	things	similarly.	This	applies	almost	equally	I	believe,	to	both	the	making	of	art,	and	to	its	true	appreciation	by	all	others.	It	is	the	unique	and	personal	experiences	and	points	of	view	of	both	the	artist	and	the	individual	viewer	that	are	at	the	very	center	of	art	experience,	long	before	anything	that	any	larger	group	of	people	suggest-	or	can	agree	they	may	have	in	common	with	each	other.	Communication	is	surely	intended	in	art.	But	very	differently	than	that	kind	of	communication	we	effect	with	words,	it	is	not	a	kind	that	either	aims	at-	or	can	assume	any	high	degree	of	uniformity	in	the	understanding	of	what	is	being	communicated.		
	
TO	SPEND	MY	SEED	I	am	a	professional	artist	and	teacher	of	art.	I	have	made	art,	exhibited	my	works	internationally,	served	as	a	member	of	evaluation	and	advisory	panels,	on	juries	for	art,	and	have	taught	art	at	institutions	of	higher	education	for	some	decades.	Writing	this	text	allows	me	to	give	form	to	a	common	human-,	(or	at	least,	human	male-)	impulse,	to	‘spend	my	seed’.	With	that	perhaps	misleading	phrase,	I	am	referring	in	fact	to	the	tendency	on	arriving	at	a	certain	age,	to	look	back-,	gather	up	and	ponder-,	to	try	to	make	sense	of-	and,	if	possible,	pass	on	some	of	my	life’s	important	experiences.	At	such	a	time,	I	re-examine	all	I’ve	thought	and	done,	experienced,	felt	and	learned.	Doing	so,	I	can	then	begin	to	get	a	sense	of	what	I	know	and	believe,	how	little	or	how	much	I’ve	changed,	when-	and	perhaps	also	why	that	happened.		
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	fig.2	“My	Seed….to	Spend	or	Save?”-2004	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		Doing	that	now,	it	is	admittedly	attractive	for	me	to	imagine	that	my	own	looking-back-and-pondering	may	perhaps	have	value	for	others	embarking	in	life	on	similar	similar	paths.		It	would	be	great	for	example	if	some	students	of	art,	artists,	or	art	educators	are	interested	in	some	things	I’ve	seen,	felt,	and	learned	in	the	course	of	a	lifetime	making	and	teaching	art.	Very	many	of	those	things	remain	consistent	with	what	I	was	taught	long	ago	when	I	was	myself	a	student.	However,	as	I	have	indicated,	a	number	of	things	I	have	come	to	consider	very	important	about	art	seem	difficult	or	impossible	to	rhyme	with	some	of	our	current	practices	and	trends	in	education.	It	is	there,	where	what	I	
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have	learned	and	concluded	about	making	art	seems	very	different	from	current	practices	in	art	education	that	I	try	to	focus	this	text.	My	reason	for	concentrating	on	what	I	fervently	believe	to	be	true	about	art,	which	does	not	accord	with	current	educational	practice	or	theory	is	quite	simple.	I	have	always	found	viewpoints	and	opinion	contrary	to-,	questioning-,	or	challenging	existing	paradigm,	very	much	more	interesting	than	affirmations	of	that	paradigm.	Dissenting	or	divergent	viewpoints	seem	to	offer	me	the	possibility	for	quite	new	and	valuable	insights.	By	hindsight	in	fact,	I	think	this	very	likely	also	one	of	the	main	reasons	I	chose	the	profession	of	artist.	An	artist’s	job,	I	think,	cannot	reasonably	be	imagined	by	anyone	to	consist	of	doing	one’s	best	to	conform	to-	or	confirm	existing	paradigm!	
	
ATHLETES	AND	AWARDS	A	belief	that	is	a	central	one	for	me	is	that	the	degree	of	an	artist’s	competence	cannot	and	should	not	be	determined	in	any	other	way	than	by	evaluating	the	quality	of	his	artwork.	Competence	in	the	practice	of	art	cannot	in	my	view,	at	all	successfully	be	established	through	the	evaluation	of	the	quality	of	an	artist’s	words	about	his	art.	Consider	this:	An	athlete	trying	to	break	a	record	for	the	100-meter	dash	proves	ability	in	his	professional	pursuit	when	he	succeeds.		He	is	not	subject	to	demands	that	he	convince	people	that	he	is	‘potentially’	or	‘theoretically’	capable	of	doing	what	he	has	clearly	just	done!	It	will	not	be	required	that	he	then	explain	in	medical-,	psychological-,	philosophical-	or	other	terminolgy,	how	and	why	he	was	able	to	accomplish	the	feat.	It	will	also	not	be	required	of	him	that	he	prove	the	ability	to	persuasively	compare	what	he’s	done	to	what	others	have	done	before	him.	In	other	words,	it	is	the	deed	itself	rather	than	any	of	his	words	about	it	that	constitute	both	the	measure	and	proof	of	his	ability.	Having	broken	the	record	is	not	looked	at	as	
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qualifying	him	for	a	test	of	his	ability.	Instead,	what	he	has	done	clearly	constitutes	passing	that	test.		Having	accomplished	a	noteworthy	deed,	whether	for	an	athlete,	an	artist,	or	anyone	else	we	can	imagine,	is	not	an	indication	of	that	person’s	potential	ability.	It	is	the	most	consequential	and	clear	proof	possible	of	the	existence	of	his	actual	ability.	It’s	true	that	establishing	that	someone	has	run	a	fixed	distance	faster	than	anyone	before	him	is	a	question	of	exact	measurement.	This	can	be	determined	quickly	and	easily	when	it	happens.	The	same	however	cannot	be	said	for	evaluating	the	performance	of	an	artist.	There	are	no	uniform	and	reliable	units	of	measurement	for	an	artist’s	performance.	We	have	no	chronometer,	measuring	stick,	or	any	other	instrument	we	can	use	to	objectively	determine	any	qualitative	aspect	of	an	artist’s	performance.	That	determination	is	clearly	a	much	more	complex	one.	This	is	a	question	of	judgment,	inarguably	
subjective	in	nature.	Whether	or	not	it	is	convenient	or	comfortable	that	this	is	so,	it	is	a	fact	we	must	learn	to	accept	and	deal	with	intelligently,	honestly,	and	openly.	We	cannot	change	this	by	imagining	that	we	have	invented-	or	will	discover	objective	criteria	for	the	subjective	judgment	we	must	render.	And	yet	I	suggest	that	this	in	many	respects	is	precisely	what	we	currently	do,	i.e.	we	try	to	‘objectify’	judgments	that	are	inherently	and	unavoidably	subjective	ones.		One	manifestation	of	our	attempts	to	use	‘objective’	criteria	for	the	evaluation	of	artists’	performances	that	we	are	currently	witnessing	is	the	intense	focus	in	both	education	and	public	art	fora	on	relating	the	motivation,	intentions	and	deeds	of	artists	working	in	the	present	to	those	of	famous	artists	we	revere	from	the	past.	Let’s	go	back	again	for	a	moment	to	the	athlete	I	just	mentioned.	Preparing	for	a	race	he	must	run,	one	in	which	he	perhaps	hopes	to	break	an	existing	record,	he	
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cannot	be	concerned	with	any	other	race	than	that	one	he	must	now	run.	Although	there	exist	clear	differences	between	running	a	race	and	making	an	artwork,	I	suggest	that	exactly	the	same	is	true	for	artists.	There	seems	a	prevailing	notion	that	a	constant	awareness	of	what	former	and	currently	famous	colleagues	have	done	when	making	an	artwork	is	indispensible	for	the	quality	of	any	artist’s	performance.	I	submit	that	this	is	an	entirely	flawed	notion.	I	think	it	important	to	consider	what	may	have	led	to	that	notion,	what	logical	basis	exists	for	continuing	to	advance	it	as	a	principle	in	the	teaching	and	evaluation	of	art.	Because	this	prevailing	notion	forms	a	very	significant	component	of		current	education	in	art	practice,	I	am	going	to	approach	this	same	notion	from	different	angles	in	the	course	of	this	text.		Being	frequently	asked	by	art	lovers	and	by	authoritative	professionals	to	do	so,	I	have	always	found	it	highly	problematic	to	explain,	place-,	or	motivate	my	work	as	it	relates	to	the	work	of	others.	It	has	always	seemed	to	me	that	if	art	as	we	commonly	understand	that	practice	is	a	means	of	expression,	why	would	there	then	be	an	immediate	need	for	words	relating	that	expression	to	other	expressions,	other	people	or	things?	It	seems	to	me	that	it	is	only	when	we	don’t	succeeded	to	convey	what	we	intended,	that	any	need	exists	to	immediately	relate-,	rephrase-	or	paraphrase	it.	Requiring	artists	to	explain	or	defend	their	works	by	comparing	them	to	the	works	of	others,	as	well	as	a	number	of	other	practices	current	in	art	and	education,	are	approaches	I	intend	here	to	challenge.		As	difficult	as	that	may	perhaps	prove	to	be,	I	believe	this	is	a	discussion	well	worth	having.			
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IN	A	STATE!	(ART)	It	may	well	prove	problematic	that	my	text	now	takes	the	form	of	an	academic	Phd	thesis.	My	words	here	are,	after	all,	not	dispassionate	ones.	I	believe	it	in	fact	essential	that	passion	is	present	in	what	anyone	involved	in	art	brings	to	his	task	if	he	hopes	to	accomplish	that	task	well.	The	tone	of	my	words	here	necessarily	departs	from	what	may	be	considered	‘academic	detachment’	with	respect	to	my	subject	matter.	I	am	presenting	my	opinions	here	as	valid	ones,	doing	so	very	often	without	citing	‘authorities’	who	may	have	expressed	similar-	or	related	views.	In	truth,	I	have	no	academic	detachment	from	my	subject	matter	here	or	any	intention	to	feign	that.	My	subject	is:	making,	appreciating,	understanding,	and	teaching	art.	Those	activities	constitute	an	important	part	of	my	own	life	experience,	are	pursuits	very	dear	to	me.	‘Academic	detachment’	in	my	view,	implies	a	high	degree	of	dispassionate	objectivity	with	regard	to	one’s	subject	matter.	Expecting	objectivity	about	art,	i.e.	an	absence	of	passion	in	an	artist’s	words	about	it,	is	like	expecting	that	from	a	mother	speaking	at	length	of	her	child.	That	is	highly	unrealistic	expectation	to	have,	it	seems	to	me!	Additionally,	I	must	say	now	that	following	some	of	the	existing	procedural	regulations	for	this	text	would	be	inconsistent	with	my	purposes	in	writing	it.	Those	purposes	are	to	call	attention	to	what	I	believe	are	some	increasingly	clear	and	worrying	signs	of	consequential	misunderstandings	of	art	currently	being	propagated	in	education.	A	number	of	those	misunderstandings	are	now	being	formalized	in	policy	by	the	very	institutions	whose	responsibility	it	is	to	promote	and	advance	art	and	education	in	it.	With	respect	to	my	words	here,	I	think	it	useful	to	keep	the	following	in	mind:	What	I	speak	from	is	not	the	few	years	of	highly	concentrated	study	characteristic	of	a	student’s	experiential	base.	For	that	reason	alone,	both	my	
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words	and	my	intentions	with	them	are	unavoidably	very	different	ones	from	those	of	a	young	student	or	researcher	in	an	academic	thesis.	The	thoughts	and	feelings	I	express	here	issue	from	a	formal	education	completed	decades	ago,	followed	by	what	now	approaches	a	lifetime	of	experience	in	both	teaching	and	making	art.	That	background	clearly	constitutes	a	very	different	kind-	and	amount	of	experience	than	a	young	person	can	accumulate	in	a	few	years	of	intensive	study	or	research.	What	I	say	here,	is	considerably	more	informed	by	my	own	experiences,	feelings	and	thoughts,	than	what	can	be	derived	from	a	highly	concentrated-,	but	relatively	brief	study	of	the	experiences	and	thoughts	of	others,	in	other	words,	academic	study.	The	many	years	of	my	experience	also	mean	that	I	can	neither	accurately	or	comprehensively	cite	where	each	of	the	ideas	and	arguments	I	advance	originated.	But	I	submit	that	it	has	never	been	central	or	critical	to	my	practice	as	an	artist	to	be	able	to	cite	the	sources	or	describe	the	evolution	of	what	I	know	and	can	put	to	use.	I	am,	of	course,	very	interested	in	acquiring	knowledge.	But	as	an	artist,	I’m	not	necessarily	concerned	withor	recording	or	maintaining	a	chronology	of	the	sources	of	that	knowledge.	In	my	view,	the	profession	of	artist	simply	does	not	carry	with	it	the	responsibility	to	enable	others	to	either	construct	or	verify	a	chronological	chain	showing	how	and	when	one	has	learned	what	he	knows.		The	ability	to	construct	and	maintain	that	kind	of	causality	chain	is	important	for	art	historians	or	theoreticians	with	respect	to	their	subjects.	But	I	believe	that	historians	and	theoreticians	are	engaged	in	entirely	different	professional	pursuits	altogether	than	practicing	artists.	There	is,	I	am	suggesting,	no	valid	reason	whatsoever	for	anyone	to	imagine	or	prescribe	that	what	an	artist	needs	to	know	and	do,	is	in	substantial	measure,	equivalent	to	or	similar	to	what	art	historians	or	art	theorists	need	to	know	and	do.	For	me,	it	is	the	substance	of	my	knowledge	of	art	rather	than	the	history	of	that	knowledge	that	is	important.	It	is	for	that	reason	that	I	relate	and	discuss	my	experience	and	
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opinions	about	making	art	and	education	in	it,	rather	than	continuously	to	suggest	a	formal	relation	of	those	as	they	relate	to	anyone	else’s.	As	a	result,	I	am	obliged	by	my	own	experience	and	beliefs	about	art	to	take	positions	that	diverge	from	some	of	those	prescribed	for	the	very	process	and	regime	I	now	participate	in,	i.e.	the	process	and	regulations	for	submission	of	a	PhD	text.	My	objective	is	to	defend	the	practice	of	Art	as	I	know	it,	against	what	I	see	as	some	very	persistent	and	consequential	attacks	on	that	practice.	It	is	of	course	imaginable	that	a	more	accomplished	writer	than	I,	by	a	painstakingly	careful	crafting	of	his	words,	might	succeed	in	avoiding	affront	to	anyone,	and	still	effectively	advance	all	of	his	arguments.	Instead	of	attempting	that	very	difficult	feat,	I	will	now	freely	admit	myself	very	likely	unable	to	accomplish	it.	I	have	chosen	instead	to	prioritize	my	arguments,	rather	than	to	prioritize	avoiding	confrontation	in	raising	them	with	the	concurrent	risk	of	obscuring	the	very	arguments	I	am	making.		Training	and	working	as	an	artist	are	focused	on	the	fascinating	but	complex	process	of	developing	one’s	own	unique	and	original	‘voice’,	and	then	continuing	to	learn	ever	better	ways	to	exercise	it.	Everything	I’ve	learned	and	done	as	a	practicing	artist	is	directed	at	this.	Doing	so,	I’ve	discovered	that	many	things	in	common	with	others,	but	also	many	things	that	seem	quite	different	about	me	than	others.	This	particular	reward	that	making	art	offers,	remains	for	me	one	of	the	most	valuable	ones	in	the	exercise	of	my	profession.	Conformity	to	formulae,	to	consensus	opinion,	or	to	inflexibly	prescribed-	but	ineffective	practices	is	quite	simply	inconsistent	with	that	reward.	
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FORM	FOLLOWS	FUNCTION	A	familiar	adage	from	the	field	of	Design	is:	Form	follows	Function.	It	is	intriguing	to	realize	that	the	meaning	of	that	phrase	is	in	fact:	Function	
determines	Form.	The	words	that	compose	the	phrase	literally	follow	each	other	in	the	reverse	order	of	what	they	signify.	Meaning	is	communicated	that	in	fact	is	the	reverse	of	the	literal	meaning	of	the	words	that	compose	it.	I	imagine	this	phrase	as	a	verbal	equivalent	of	René	Magritte’s	painting	below.	Both	the	painting	and	the	design	adage	convey	conceptual	information	that	contradicts	what	the	additional	information	seems	to	tell	us.	The	adage:	Form	Follows	Function	can	be	imagined	as	applying	to	this	text.			
	Fig.	3		Rene	Magritte,	1918.		©	C.	Herscovici,	Brussels	/	Artists	Rights	Society	(ARS),	New	York	consulted	in	http://collections.lacma.org/node/239578,	10/10/2016			
A	BEGIN	AT	THE	BEGINNING	Much	of	what	I	say	here	about	art	relates	to	issues	at	the	center	of	some	current	scientific	research	into	perceiving,	thinking,	feeling,	knowing	and	acting.	i.e.	the	
	 32	
entirety	 of	 our	 conscious	 and	 unconscious	 experience.	 Although	 important	progress	 is	 being	 made	 in	 science,	 these	 are	 issues	 are	 not	 yet-	 and	 may	possibly	never	be	entirely	 resolved.	 In	any	case,	 at	present	we	have	very	 few	simple,	 clear	 answers	 from	 Science	 yet.	 I	 cite	 these	 issues	 nonetheless	 as	important	ones	with	regard	to	understanding	art,	and	will	refer	to	research	in	them	 that	 has	 contributed	 in	 large	 measure	 to	 my	 view	 of	 art	 and	 current	practices	in	art	education.	Those	areas	of	scientific	research	are:	1. Perception	vs.	Awareness-Are	we	aware	of	all	that	we	perceive?	What	is	the	 difference	 between	 perceiving	 things	 and	 being	 aware	 of	 them?	 In	other	 words,	 is	 it	 possible	 that	 we	 ‘know’	 things,	 and	 can	 act	 on	 that	knowledge,	 e.g.	 in	 making	 or	 viewing	 art,	 that	 we	 are	 unaware	 of	knowing?	2. Focused	 attention,	 and	 unfocused	 attention	 (i.e.	 mind	 wandering	 or	incubation)	 	 –to	what	 extent	 are	 creative	 deeds,	 or	 the	 appreciation	 of	them,	 the	 result	 of	 conscious	 consideration,	 i.e.	 thinking?	 Or	 are	 they	perhaps	instead	very	largely	the	result	of	sudden	insights,	i.e.	products	of	the	unconscious	mind?	When	and	to	what	extent	is	it	one	or	the	other?	Is	there	reason	to	assume	that	one	is	more	important	than	the	other?	3.	 iQuantum	Physics	vs.	Classical	Physics—Does	 the	behavior	of	 subatomic											particles	 and	 the	 startling	 conclusions	 already	 reached	 through	 study	 of			them	since	1918,	not	convincingly	demonstrate	that	nothing	is	really	as	we	see	 it	 or	 currently	 understand	 it?	 That	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 we	 see	 and	understand	things	are	no	more	than	convenient	but	often	only	very	limited	ways	of	doing	so,	and	that	other	much	less	clear	and	more	complex	ways	of	understanding	things	must	be	equally	considered	potentially	valid,	or	real?	Does	quantum	physics	not	 in	fact	conclusively	demonstrate	that	the	notion	that	we	can	come	to	understand	anything	by	understanding	only	each	of	its	
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individual	 parts	 is	 false,	 i.e,	 that	 scientific	 reductionism	 is	 a	 limited,	unavoidably	incomplete	methodology?	I	name	here	and	will	refer	in	the	text	to	these	matters	because	they	are	ones	I	consider	important	in	coming	to	understand	art.	In	the	case	of	points	1	and	2,	they	are	issues	I	think	directly	relevant	for	art	and	what	it	is	that	we	understand	through	it.	Point	3	is	differently,	one	I	think	analogically	helpful	in	understanding	what	art	is.	My	intent	is	not	to	fully	describe	or	explain	the	research	I	refer	to,	but	instead	to	name	here	and	later	to	discuss	some	of	those	issues	as	ones	that	have	been	important	for	me	personally	in	coming	to	the	positions	I	take.	
	
BUZZWORDS	and	BUZZPRACTICE	I	think	it	far	to	say	that	there	considerable	confusion,	permeating	all	levels	of	society,	about	the	meaning	of	Art,	i.e	what	exactly	are	the	purposes	intended	and	served	by	it?	Why	do	we	make	art,	why	should	we	bother	spending	time	or	money	on	it?		Why	do	we	think	it	has	great	value	for	us?	Terms	like	‘state	of	art’,	‘research	in	art	practice’	and	‘concept	in	art’,	are	for	me	both	the	consequence	of-,	and	in	turn	function	as	sources	of	that	confusion.	Those	seemingly	precise	terms	we	borrow	from	the	exact	sciences	seem	to	persuade	us	that	we	know	quite	well	what	art	is	and	how	it	works,	and	that	we	advancing	to	a	position	to	fully	understand,	isolate	and	study	concise	aspects	of	it.	But	is	this	true?	In	my	view,	that	what	those	terms	try	to	persuade	us	of,	is	not	remotely	true.	Such	seemingly	precise	terms	as	above	become	in	fact,	vague,	imprecise,	and	confusing	when	we	apply	them	in	art.	The	real	purpose	served	by	them	I	suggest,	is	more	to	mask	our	confusion	about	what	art	is	rather	than	to	usefully	indicate	aspects	of	it	that	are	in	reality,	specific	or	specifiable.	If	we	ask	ourselves	for	example:	“what	is	it	that	constitutes	research	in	art	practice?”	are	
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we	with	any	significant	degree	of	consensus	presently	able	to	answer	the	question?	Is	research	in	art	the	same	thing,	or	even	remotely	similar	to	what	we	refer	to	when	we	speak	of	scientific	research?	Scientists	conduct	experiments	to	isolate	specific	results	they	aim	for	in	order	to	arrive	at	more	full	understanding.	But	if	one	is	a	painter	rather	than	a	scientist,	does	painting	constitute	his	research?	Is	that	research	specific	in	the	same	way?	Are,	consistent	with	the	primary	aim	of	science,	any	of	the	conclusions	we	reach	through	research	in	art	‘universally	valid’?	Or	are	we	perhaps	referring	only	to	our	thoughts,	reading	and	writings	about	art	when	we	use	the	term,	‘research	in	art’?	The	increasing,	and	in	my	view,	erroneous	use	of	scientific	terminology	to	indicate	or	validate	what	we	are	doing	in	art	may,	I	suggest,	be	far	less	indicative	of	our	advancing	understanding	of	art,	than	of	the	naiëve	wish	to	win	for	art	a	level	of	trust	similar	to	that	we	have	in	science.	How,	for	example,	might	my	own	work	be	described	as	relating	to	‘the	state	of	
art’?	I	find	myself	quite	unable	to	imagine,	much	less	formulate	how	my	work	relates	to	a	hypothetical	entity	for	me	as	maddeningly	vague	as	“the	state	of	art	-in	Art”.		And	yet	I	am	formally	here	required	to	do	so.	Because	terms	such	as	these	have	no	clearly	agreed	meaning	in	art,	and	have	already	proven	confusing	for	more	people	than	only	myself,	perhaps	we	should	begin	to	recognise	that	they	may	not	really	have	any	useful	place	in	speaking	of	art.	In	my	view	their	only	function	is	to	convince	us	that	art	can	be	understood	on	the	basis	of	its	presumed	natural	affinities	with	science	and	technology.	Why	I	wonder,	should	we	need	to	look	to	areas	far	removed	from	art	for	ways	to	define-,	practice-	value-	or	understand	it?	I	think	that	the	only	possible	answer	can	be	because,	clearly	we		are	confused	about	art	itself!	As	a	consequence	of	what	I	am	calling	confusion	about	the	purposes	and	value	of	art,	it	seems	to	me	that	a	number	of	other	questionable	approaches	have	
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gained	footing	in	art	education.	One	of	these	is	the	tendency	I	referred	to	earlier,	an	accelerating	one	it	seems,	to	consider	Learning/Knowledge	as	of	value	only	if	we	can	faultlessly	cite	the	entire	chronological	continuum	of	its	‘officially	validated’	sources.	Very	worryingly	for	me,	we	seem	oftentimes	more	concerned	with	memorizing	and	enshrining	the	history	of	knowledge,	i.e.	with	validating	the	individuals	and	institutions	we	consider	its	‘guardians’,	than	with	undertaking	thoughtful	analysis	of	the	knowledge	itself,	or	of	the	ideas	that	issue	from	it.	When	for	example,	a	writer	quotes	his	own	original	previously	published	words,	but	neglects	to	exhaustively	and	correctly	cite	all	the	sources,	dates,	places	and	contexts	of	those	previous	publications,	he	will	suffer	draconian	penalties	for	that	omission.	Why?	That	seems	both	wildly	unfair	and	highly	counter-intuitive	for	me!	If	the	writer	is	merely	repeating	what	he	has	previously	written,	I	must	wonder	what	the	goals	and	interests	served	by	equating	that	with	the	crime	of	plagiarism	are?	Does	that	current	‘rigorous’	academic	convention	not	also	mean	that	an	artist	cannot	use	visual	fragments	from	previous	artworks	he’s	made	unless	he	documents	in	writing	that	he’s	done	so	before,	clearly	stating	where	and	when?	The	term	academic	rigor	denotes	a	lofty,	beautiful,	and	valuable	ideal.	But	it	was	I	think,	never	intended	to	require	rigid	adherence	to	inviolable	procedural	dictates	issuing	from	the	domains	of	Library	Science	or	Patent	Law!	This	is,	I	argue,	is	neither	in	any	way	conducive	to	the	advancement	of	thought	and	learning,	nor	does	it	represent	authentic	academic	rigor.	Instead,	zealous	adherence	to	such	procedural	dictates	in	creative	pursuits,	seems	to	me	a	frightening	symptom	of	something	perhaps	better	regarded	as	academic	rigor	mortis!		Academic	rigor	is	an	important	principle	and	practice,	but	it	is	something	very	different	than	that.	It	requires	a	serious	commitment	to	promoting	honest,	open	
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and	intelligent	analyses	of	existing	knowledge,	as	well	as	encouraging	new	ideas	and	critical	thinking.	That	requires	that	we	actively	promote	the	respectful,	creative	and	fruitful	synthesis	of	new	ideas	and	approaches	with	previously	existing	ones.	It	is	of	course	important	that	we	safeguard	history’s	natural	evolution.	But	that	is	quite	a	different	thing	than	engaging	in	a	crusade	to	armor	the	venerated	past	against	unlicensed	incursions	by	the	present!		Academic	rigor	does	not	oblige	us	to	engage	in	frenzied	witchhunts.	There	is	no	need	to	defend	cultural	ideas	with	electric	fences,	armed	guards,	ferocious	dogs	and	draconian	penalties.	When	we	resort	to	such	tactics,	I	think	it	only	illusion	that	we	are	thereby	preserving	the	valuable	and	original	thoughts	and	deeds	that	precede	us.	There	are	quite	consequential	differences	between	the	purposes	served	by	strict	and	binding	intellectual	patents,	and	those	intended	with-	and	served	by	open	and	constructive	intellectual	discourse.	I	think	it	highly	important	that	we	remain	aware	of-	and	sensitive	to	those	differences,	both	in	general,	and	in	Art	practice	in	particular.		
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	fig..4.	“Courage”,	2006	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
	
	
COURAGE	With	regard	to	that	notion	of	the	rigorous	validation	of	knowledge,	I	want	to	recount	here	something	that	occurred	in	my	life	some	years	ago.	As	I	write	this,	I	have	lived	in	Amsterdam	for	more	than	40	years,	having	first	gone	there	as	an	American	citizen	in	1972,	immediately	following	my	graduation	in	art	practice	from	the	University	of	California	at	Berkeley.	I	became	a	student	at	the	Gerrit	Rietveld	Academy	of	Art	and	Design	in	Amsterdam,	which	qualified	me	to	apply	for	legal	residence	in	the	Netherlands	during	my	study.	After	graduating	from	that	school	3	years	later,	and	over	the	course	of	the	next	5	years,	I	was	obliged	each	year	to	try	to	persuade	the	Dutch	Immigration	authorities	to	grant	me	permission	to	stay	longer	in	the	Netherlands.	5	years	later,	around	1978,	I	
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applied	for-	and	was	granted	official	permission	to	reside	permanently	in	the	Netherlands,	with	no	requirement	to	report	to-	or	apply	to	Dutch	Immigrations	again.	Very	surprisingly	for	me	however,	28	years	later	in	2006,	the	international	trend	towards	more	restrictive	immigration	policies	took	on	form	in	a	new	law	passed	by	Dutch	Parliament.	That	new	law	required	every	person	originally	from	outside	the	European	Union	residing	in	the	Netherlands	to	take	and	pass	written	examinations,	ones	that	in	the	view	of	most	informed	people	were	both	poorly	designed	and	thoroughly	inconclusive.	Ostensibly	those	exams	were	to	ascertain	to	what	extent	the	examinees	both	spoke	Dutch,	and	could	be	expected	to	integrate	successfully	into	Dutch	society.		At	the	time,	there	were	indications	that	a	shockingly	high	percentage	of	native	Dutchmen	were	unable	to	pass	those	exams.	Having	already	lived	in	the	Netherlands	myself	for	more	than	30	years	when	that	law	came	into	effect,	and	having	long	before	then	been	granted	official	and	permanent	permission	to	remain	in	the	country,	I	was	astonished	to	learn	that	I	was	now	also	required	to	take	and	pass	those	exams.	I	protested	this	in	writing,	a	right	granted	me	under	the	new	law,	and	received	some	weeks	later	a	written	response	informing	me	that	my	protest	had	been	formally	registered,	considered,	and	rejected.	The	reason	for	rejection,	the	letter	informed	me,	was	that	everything	I	had	noted	about	already	having	both	proven	all	they	required,	and	also	long	before	been	granted	official	permanent	permission	to	reside	in	the	Netherlands,	did	not	convince	the	authorities	that	my	case	constituted	an	exception.	That	letter	offered	me,	and	I		decided	to	accept	the	option,	to	schedule	a	meeting	with	several	city	council	members	and	an	official	of	the	agency	charged	with	implementing	the	law.	At	that	same	meeting	some	weeks	later,	I	asked	those	officials	why	they	believed	that	passing	written	examinations	proved	that	I	could	adapt	to	Dutch	society	and	customs.	Had	I	not,	I	asked	them,	already	proven	this	in	the	most	direct	and	conclusive	way	imaginable,	by	residing	there	already	for	30+	years	without	
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causing	that	society	any	problems?	Why	I	asked	them	additionally,	did	they	require	that	I	both	pay	for	and	take	a	written	test	of	my	proficiency	in	the	Dutch	language,	while	standing	in	front	of	them	speaking	that	language	as	fluently	as	they	did?	My	questions	it	seemed	clear,	caused	them	noticeable	embarrassment.	I	will	add	that	their	embarassment	felt	gratifying	to	me,	although	clearly	unhelpful	to	the	situation	at	hand.	They	responded	that	I	needed	to	understand	that	this	new	law	had	been	passed	very	quickly	and,	admittedly,	had	not	been	well	formulated.	But	they	added	that	as	a	result	of	its	passage	their	hands	were	tied,	and	they	had	no	choice	but	to	apply	the	law	in	accordance	with	the	exact	terms	of	its	phrasing.	If	I	wanted	to	be	exempted	from	those	examinations,	they	could,	the	said,	offer	me	the	option	to	provide	them	with	a	certified	document	proving	that	I	had	completed	a	course	in	the	Dutch	language	at	an	officially	licensed	language	school.	That	list	of	approved	language	schools,	I	add,	was	compiled	30	years	after	I	had	learned	to	speak	the	language	fluently.	I	explained	that	I	had	learned	Dutch	by	speaking	it,	and	had	never	taken	any	courses	in	the	language.	Shaking	their	heads	ruefully	on	hearing	this,	they	told	me	that	I	had	no	alternative	but	to	pay	for-	and	pass	the	language	and	cultural	assimilation	tests.	Feeling	shocked	and	angry,	I	then	told	them	that	I	considered	their	‘resolution’	of	my	protest	an	embarrassingly	foolish	one.	I	added	that	I	would	really	not	like	to	be	standing	in	their	shoes,	being	obliged	as	they	seemed	to	feel	they	were	to	take	such	clearly	ludicrous	positions.	There	they	stood,	I	said	to	them,	mature	men	of	quite	considerable	social	and	professional	standing,	3	city	councilmen	and	a	senior	government	administrator,	telling	me	that	they	were	not	competent	to	certify	that	I	spoke	their	language,	and	therefore	needed	to	get	a	piece	of	paper	from	someone	else	proving	that!	After	a	few	minutes,	clearly	feeling	frustrated	by	the	absurdity	of	their	position,	they	conferred	briefly	and	then	offered	me	one	more	solution.	Could	I	perhaps	prove	that	I	had	graduated	from	an	officially	recognized	
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educational	institution	in	the	Netherlands	where	Dutch	was	spoken	during	my	study?	They	said	they	were	prepared	to	accept	this	also	as	proof	that	I	could	now	speak	the	language.	I	thought	this	equally	remarkable,	but	was	happily	able	to	answer	that	I	had	not	only	attended	such	a	school,	but	had	also	taught	at	that	same	school	for	nearly	20	years	following	my	graduation.	”Ah,	we’re	sorry,	they	answered,	once	again	surprising	me,	but	teaching	at	a	school	will	not	
satisfy	the	law’s	stipulations,	it	is	only	graduating	from	that	school	that	
constitutes	the	proof	the	law	requires.	Although	it	was	clear	to	me	that	they	would	very	much	have	preferred	to	do	so,	those	authorities	were	quite	unable	to	take	any	positions	other	than	those	completely	irrational	ones.	Shortly	after	that	meeting,	I	enlisted	the	help	of	the	new	director	of	the	Rietveld	Academy.	He	tasked	one	of	his	assistants	to	do	so,	and	after	some	time	spent	searching	in	the	basement	archives,	she	was	able	to	locate	a	decomposing	paper	diploma	(there	were	no	digital	archives	then),	that	attested	to	my	graduation	in	1975.	That	document	was	then	sent	to	me,	and	I	submitted	it	to	the	authorities.	A	month	or	two	later,	I	was	officially	exempted	from	having	to	take	any	examinations,	and	granted	(once	again)	permanent	and	official	permission	to	reside	in	the	Netherlands.	This	story	recounts	a	case	wherein,	with	the	expense	of	considerable	time	and	effort,	I	was	finally	able	to	produce	what	was	patently	indirect-	and	entirely	inconclusive	‘proof’	of	an	ability	I	had.		A	graduate	diploma	from	an	art	school	30	years	ago	was	accepted	as	conclusive	evidence	that	I	could	now	speak	Dutch,	while	a	direct	and	clear	demonstration	of	the	ability	to	speak	the	language	in	the	present,	was	unacceptable.	The	reason	such	an	illogical	procedure	was	followed,	was	quite	simply	because	there	was	no	one		licensed	to	speak	that	language	with	me,	i.e.	to	evaluate	and	officially	attest	to	the	level	of	my	competence	in	the	most	direct	and	conclusive	manner	possible.	
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I	recount	this	story	because	it	bears	for	me	clear	relationship	with	what	I	am	now	tasked	to	accomplish	with	this	text.	My	words	here	are	formally	considered	a	critical	component	for	the	evaluation	of	my	ability	in	the	practice	of	art.	In	my	view	proficiency	in	a	language	(for	me,	art	is	a	language)	can	be	correctly	evaluated	in	one	way	only,	namely	by	speaking	it	with	someone	who	is	qualified	and	licensed	to	make	that	evaluation.	Ability	in	anything	can	only	be	demonstrated	and	evaluated	if	there	are	others	who	are	willing,	able,	and	licensed	to	make	informed-	and	authoritative	judgment	regarding	the	ability	in	question.	In	the	practice	of	art,	the	measure	of	ability	must	be	accomplished	by	evaluating	the	product	of	that	practice,	i.e.	the	artwork.	But	that’s	not	what	we	do	in	art,	is	it?		Instead	of	structurally	and	responsibly	delegating	authority	to	persons	qualified	and	licensed	to	evaluate	artworks,	we	are	gravitating,	just	as	the	officials	in	my	story,	towards	‘less	subjective’	(‘less	risky’?)	procedures,	namely	‘objectively’	evaluating	other	products	of	the	artist.	It	seems	that	more	and	more	these	days,	instead	of	taking	responsibility	for	our	own	judgments,	we	are	opting	to	delegate	judgment	to	‘independent	authorities’.	Those	in	turn	then	promote	and	deploy	evaluation	criteria	often	quite		foreign	to	the	realm	being	evaluated.	What	this	comes	down	to	is	that	our	evaluation	procedures	increasingly	demand	and	measure	quite	different	abilities	than	those	we	are	directly	supposed	to	be	evaluating.		In	art,	the	retreat	from	direct	and	informed	judgment	about	quality	needs	to	be	understood	primarily	and	directly	as	a	fear	of	being	held	responsible	for	our	own	subjective	judgments,	rather	than	an	even	remotely	responsible	approach	to	the	task	at	hand.		I	am	convinced	that	this	tendency	is	highly	detrimental	both	to	art	education,	and	to	art	in	general.	It	will,	I	think,	be	clear	to	anyone	aware	of	evident	current	trends	in	all	education,	that	this	pattern	of	gravitating	towards	‘objective	evaluation	criteria’	is	very	real.	I	consider	it	an	urgent	necessity	in	art	education	that	we	find	the	courage	to	admit	honestly	that	the	evaluation	of	an	artist’s	ability	simply	cannot	
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in	any	important	measure	be	based	on	his	words	about	art,	or	by	testing	his	knowledge	of	theory	or	history.	Responsible	evaluation	in	the	practice	of	art	must	be	based	on	the	unavoidably	subjective	evaluation	of	the	quality	of	what’s	being	evaluated,	i.e.	the	artwork.		I	believe	like	many	others	that	we	are	putting	far	too	much	faith	in	stamped	documents,	written	words,	standardized	tests,	and	the	opinions	of	independent	experts.	Increasingly	often	it	seems	to	me	that	those	independent	experts	hold	authority	in	very	different	fields	than	the	ones	we	ask	them	to	evaluate.	While	this	trend	I	speak	of	is	of	course	characterstic	of	broader	social	and	political	developments,	we	should	not	imagine	that	we	can	avoid	subjective	judgment	everywhere	and	always.	In	my	view,	most	emphatically,	we	cannot	avoid	subjective	judgment	in	a	creative	pursuit	like	art.	The	primary	product	of	art	cannot,	I	am	suggesting,	be	understood	as	any	other	one	than	individual	subjective	expression.	In	turn,	the	goal	of	art	cannot	reasonably	be	imagined	to	be	any	other	one	than	individual	subjective	response!		Is	there	any	such	thing	as	‘objective’	response	to	art’?	I	believe	that	no	such	thing	exists.	For	that	reason,	tendencies	in	art	to	borrow	and	canonize	terms	and	methodologies	borrowed	from	exact	science	or	philosophy,	or	sometimes	even	much	farther	afield,	e.g.	public	administration,	are	for	me	highly	suspect.	Science,	philosophy	and	public	administration	are	very	different	pursuits	altogether.	Policy	that	suggests	that	the	primary	goals	of	those	different	pursuits	are	in	any	important	way,	common	ones,	and	that	consequently	procedure	for	qualitative	evaluation	in	them	should	be	the	same	or	similar,	is	either	badly	misinformed,	or	worse	still,	is	intended	to	misinform.	
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SPEAKING	WITH	AUTHORITY	I’m	no	longer	young	now.	I’m	not	starting	out	in	life,	am	not	without	experience.	This	means	unavoidably,	that	I	am	no	longer	naturally	predisposed	by	youth	to	accept	dogma	or	authority	uncritically.	I’d	like	to	think	that	I	am	both	willing	and	able	to	engage	in	informed	discussion.	However,	quite	naturally	I	believe,	I’m	unable	a	priori	to	regard	those	with	very	different	training	or	less	experience	than	my	own,	as	greater	authorities	than	I	myself	am	with	respect	to	my	own	profession.		I	think	this	quite	natural	and	believe	that	the	same	would	be	true	for	anyone	in	a	pursuit	they	have	undertaken	with	dedication	and	some	success	for	a	very	considerable	amount	of	time.	In	this	context,	the	Nobel	Prize	winning	physicist	Richard	Feynman,	in	a	book	that	collects	a	number	of	his	writings	and	lectures,	said	some	things	I’d	like	to	quote.	What	his	words	here	tell	us	about	science,	is	for	me	equally	true	of	art:	
ii“Authority	may	be	a	hint	as	to	what	the	truth	is,	but	is	not	the	source	of	
information.	As	long	as	it’s	possible	we	should	disregard	authority	whenever	the	
observations	disagree	with	it”.	
iii“Science	is	the	belief	in	the	ignorance	of	experts”	
iv“You	must	here	distinguish-especially	in	teaching,	the	science	from	the	forms	or	
procedures	that	are	sometimes	used	in	developing	science.	It	is	easy	to	say	we	
write,	experiment,	and	observe	and	do	this	or	that.	You	can	copy	that	form	
exactly.	But	great	religions	are	dissipated	by	following	form	without	
remembering	the	direct	content	of	the	teachings	of	the	great	leaders.	In	the	same	
way	it	is	possible	to	follow	form	and	call	it	Science,	but	it	is	pseudoscience.		In	this	
way	we	all	suffer	from	the	kind	of	tyranny	we	have	today	in	the	many	institutions	
that	have	come	under	the	influence	of	pseudoscientific	advisers.	“	
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Those	statements	echo	remarkably	well	my	own	attitude	with	respect	to	Art.	My	observations	about	making,	teaching	and	understanding	art,	disagree	in	important	respects	with	some	things	authorities	in	art	and	education	are	currently	saying	and	doing.	For	that	reason,	I	am	obliged	to	challenge	a	number	of	those	views	and	practices	in	art.	Additionally,	I	must	bring	recent	developments	in	how	authority	is	now	being	determined	and	assigned	in	the	practice	of	art	into	question.	With	respect	to	the	delegation	of	authority	in	art,	both	within	education,	and	in	government	policies	for	it,	an	academic	degree	is	very	rapidly	becoming	structurally	designated	as	the	indicator	of	one’s	ability,	accomplishments,	and	authority	in	that	practice.	For	me,	this	is	both	highly	irrational,	and	quite	detrimental	to	education	in	Art.	A	decision	taken	in	Portugal	regarding	membership	of	the	evaluation	committees	that	decide	grants	for	both	individual	and	group	projects,	and	additionally,	also	that	evaluate	research	in	all	higher	education	in	Portugal,	serves	to	illustrate	this	point.	The	agency	overseeing	those	matters	in	Portugal	is	the	FCT,	(Fundação	para	a	Ciência	e	a	Tecnologia).	Their	v	membership	rules	for	evaluation	panels	exclude	participation	by	persons	not	holding	a	PhD	followed	by	5	years	of	professional	experience.	The	consequence	of	that	stipulation	is	that	the	evaluation	of	art	projects	is	done	by	art	historians	and	theoreticians	primarily.		Panel	members	can	possibly	also	be	selected	from	a	highly	limited	number	of	very	young	PhD	graduates	in	art	practice.	Why	is	that	number	a	strongly	limited	one?	The	first	record	of	a	PhD	thesis	for	art	practice	in	Portugal	I	could	find	was	in	2003	at	the	University	of	Oporto	by	J.R.	Vaz. So	if	5	years	of	professional	experience	must	follow	that	for	a	person	to	be	considered	qualified	for	membership	of	a	jury,	it	is	only	starting	in	2008	that	the	very	first	artist-candidate	for	the	FCT	evaluation	committee	became	eligible.	That	means	that	participation	by	a	practicing	artist	in	an	FCT	committee	evaluating	art	is	resticted	to	a	quite	
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limited		number	of	people.		Inclusion	of	a	practicing	artist	in	an	evaluation	committee	is	impossible	for	anyone	other	than	those	few	relatively	young	and	inexperienced	graduates.	I	don't	of	course	wish	to	say	that	recent	graduates	of	art	schools,	or	young	people	in	general,	are	incompetent.	But	it	is	undeniably	so	that	by	virtue	of	youth,	beginning	professionals	do	not	yet	have	much	experience.	To	structurally	limit	participation	in	the	highest	evaluatory	organ	in	Portugal	to	people	only	from	other	professions,	then	possibly-	but	not	necessarily	augmented	by	a	few	relatively	inexperienced	practicing	artists,	is	quite	an	irrational	thing	to	do!	All	artists	who	currently	carry	recognized	authority	and	a	great	deal	of	diverse	professional	experience,	but	don’t	have	a	PhD,	and	are	for	that	reason	then	considered	‘unqualified’	according	to	this	FCT	regulation.	Consider	that	a	PhD	degree	in	art	practice	did	not	exist	when	those	artists	attended	school.	As	an	example,	I	finished	my	formal	academic	studies	in	art	some	decades	before	any	PhD	in	art	practice	existed,	in	Portugal	or	anywhere	else.	I	think	it’s	a	safe	guess	that	worldwide,	of	all	of	the	artists	we	might	agree	are	among	the	most	influential	and	respected,	less	than	2%	have	a	PhD.	If	my	guess	is	even	remotely	accurate,	the	question	then	arises:	what	logic	can	we	cite	for	a	policy	that	rigidly	excludes	98%	of	those	artists	with	experience,	proven	track	records,	and	world	standing,	from	exercising	authority	in	evaluating	art?	What	makes	sense	about	structurally	delegating	authority	in	a	practice,	any	practice,	only	to	people	from	other	professions,	and	to	people	without	much	experience?		I	suggest	that	the	government	policy	I	refer	to	here,	prima	facie,	structurally	relegates	authority	in	art	practice	to	only	those	largely	without	the	combination	of	expertise	and	experience	on	which	authority	has	always	been	based.	In	no	other	realm	of	endeavor	that	I	know	of	has	such	a	policy	been	adopted.	I	think	it	additionally	very	probable	that	there	is	no	research	that	supports	either	the	conception	or	implementation	of	that	policy	as	one	that	in	any	way	can	be	expected	way	to	be	beneficial	for	art	
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practice.	I	point	out	that	regulation	this	is	a	measure	taken	by	the	very	institution	responsible	for	promoting,	evaluating	and	funding	not	only	art,	but	additionally,	all	the	sciences	and	the	humanities	in	Portugal.	Is	this	example	of	an	increasingly	structural	insistence	on	academic	authority,	indicative	of	intellectual	rigor?	Or	are	there	perhaps	some	other	factors	that	may	explain	this	tendency	to	structurally	exclude	existing	and	acknowledged	experts	from	exercising	authority I	believe	that	the	motivation	for	the	practice	I	just	cited	is	not	to	be	found	in	rational	deliberation	regarding	the	betterment	of	the	field	that	the	institution	adopting	them	is	meant	to	serve.	Instead	the	real	motivations	must	be	looked	for	elsewhere,	for	example,	in	the	strengthening	of	the	degree	of	institutional	control	such	a	measure	effects.	When	a	PhD	is	designated	as	the	only	path	to	authority	in	art	practice,	authority	is	thereby	conferred	exclusively	to	graduates	of	those	few	universities	that	offer	that	PhD	study.	A	monopoly	is	created	in	the	power	to	both	exercise	and	delegate	authority	in	a	practice,	c.q.		Art,	and	even	to	redefine	it,	where	that	state	of	affairs	did	not	previously	exist.	Having	earned	a	PhD	degree	is	long	accepted	as	an	essential	qualification,	a	very	reasonable	one	for	most	other	domains	of	human	knowledge	and	ability.	But	whe	that	same	requirement	is	abruptly	introduced	in	the	practice	of	art,	that	constitutes	a	very	different	case	altogether.	It	can	easily	be	statistically	demonstrated	that	authority	in	most	professional	pursuits	is	concurrent	with	the	experience,	reputation	and	demonstration	of	abilities	that	follow	the	conferral	of	a	PhD.	That	however,	is	a	very	different	story	in	the	practice	of	art.	I	suggest	that	in	art,	it	can	be	just	as	easily	shown	that	a	high	level	of	experience,	reputation,	and	demonstration	of	consistent	professional	ability	have	no	(or	perhaps	even	an	inverse-)	statistical	relationship	with	the	conferral	of	a	PhD.		In	other	words,	in	the	practice	of	art,	quite	differently	than	in	many	other	professions,	there	is	no	causal	relation	between	earning	a	PhD	and	recognized	authority,	substantial	
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experience,	or	consistently	demonstrated	ability	in	that	practice.	None.	Most	of	those	who	at	present	have	a	PhD	in	the	practice	of	art	do	not	yet	have	much	experience,	have	not	built	a	substantial	reputation,	nor	have	they	consistently	demonstrated	ability	in	their	practice.	And	those	are	the	very	criteria	that	are	logically,	prerequisites	for	the	exercise	of	authority.	
	fig.	5			“Pushing	the	Point-Art	in	Glass”-2004	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
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PUSHING	THE	POINT?	It	is	my	sincere	hope	that	some	of	the	arguments	I	offer	here	may	contribute	to	more	discussion	about	art	practice.	When	I	say	‘discussion’,	I	imagine	that	centered	on	fundamental	questions	such	as:	“what	is	art,	and	what	is	it	not,	what	is	its	purpose	and	value	for	humanity?	And	by	extension	then,	which	are	logical	and	productive	measures	we	can	implement	in	art	education,	and	which	are	not	logical	or	productive	ones?”		I	am	in	favor	of	balanced-	and	honest	ways	of	understanding	and	advancing	art	practice.	And	I	believe	that	in	many	ways	today,	a	number	of	our	current	attitudes	and	practices	in	art	education	pose	significant	dangers	for	the	profession.	I	believe	they	also	threaten	the	extent	to	which	we	can	expect	the	‘general	public’	to	take	or	retain	a	serious	interest	in-,	and	continued	willingness	to	support	the	profession	of	Art.	One	of	the	most	central	aspects	of	our	current	practices	in	art	education	I	think,	is	that	we	are	tending	towards	defining	and	teaching	art	practice	and	its	appreciation	as	primarily	intellectual	activities,	i.e.	‘art	as	food	for	thought’.	Art	practice	and	the	appreciation	of	art	increasingly	seem	presumed	to	address	distinct	realms	of	our	factual	knowledge	and	experience,	giving	rise	to	the	resulting	intellectual	considerations	of	those.	My	view	is	a	very	different	one.	It	can,	perhaps	irreverantly,	be	formulated	as:	“thinking	in	Art,	is	seriously	
overrated”.	By	that	I	mean	that	it	is	my	sincere	conviction	that	art	is	formed	and	informed	more	immediately	and	far	more	importantly	by	what	we	are	capable	of	intuiting,	sensing,	and	feeling,	than	by	our	conscious	and	directed	thoughts.	There	are	clear	and	very	important	differences	between	what	we	can	come	to	know	and	experience	at	the	culmination	of	one	or	the	other	of	those	two	very	different	pathways.		I	believe	that	it	is	primarily	our	ability	to	feel,	sense	and	evoke	emotion,	rather	than	to	stimulate	or	exercise	intellectual	consideration,	
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that	art	both	originates	from-	and	is	also	first	and	foremost	directed	at.	When	in	large	measure,	we	ignore	emotion	in	art,	and	promote	instead	that	thinking,	speaking	and	writing	about	art	are	what	artists	must	learn	to	do	well,	then	I	believe	we	have	not	understood	what	art	is,	how	it	works,	or	what	it’s	good	for	at	all.	Approaching	art	very	largely	through	thinking,	will	I	fear	destroy	it.	Is	it	not	yet	clear	to	us	that	a	too	narrow	focus	on	only	our	rational	human	capacity,	on	thinking,	i.e.	on	the	technological	advances,	organizational	efficiency,	and	resulting	economic	worth	that	seem	currently	thinking’s	most	highly	prized	products,	while	ignoring	the	importance	of	emotion	and	spirit,	has	brought	us	to	the	brink	of	very	evident-,	perhaps	cataclysmic	societal	failures?	Do	we	believe	that	analytical	thought	and	logical	procedures	are	the	principle	avenues	by	which	we	will	arrive	at	deeper	understanding	of	our	very	existence,	at	a	harmonious,	sustainable	and	fulfilling	conduct	of	our	lives?	I	am	suggesting	that	promoting	the	systematic	gathering,	retention	and	analysis	of	facts	as	the	substance-	or	the	motor	of	art,	is	a	‘rationalist’	approach.	Currently,	it	seems	to	me,	we	are	actively	engaged	to	promote	reflections	on-	and	statements	about	art	that	speak	and	write	about	it	as	if	it	were	largely	analogous	to	Science	or	Philosophy.	In	my	view,	that	is	not	so.		Another	set	of	regulations	adopted	in	2013	by	the	FCT,	a	guideline	for	the	evaluation	of	the	research	groups	they	fund,	offers	a	vivid	illustration	of	the	tendency	I	speak	of.	viThe	Evaluation	Guide	for	R	&D	units	2013,	issued	in	July	of	that	year	states:		
Mission	Statements	
FCT’s	mission	statements	aim	to	guide	the	FCT’s	action	for	each	scientific	domain	
and	to	define	guidelines	for	the	evaluation	of	each	scientific	domain,	taking	into	
account	its	specificities 	
	
	Arts	and	Humanities	
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-To	promote	research	that	significantly	adds	to	knowledge	and	critical	
understanding	of	the	arts	and	humanities,	exploring	interdisciplinary	and	
transdisciplinary	approaches;	
	-To	enhance	the	study	of	Portugal’s	history,	language,	arts,	and	culture,	in	a	
comparative	and	global	frame;		
-To	use	the	different	forms	of	knowledge	in	arts	and	humanities	in	order	to	
develop	a	more	general	scientific	culture	-	inspired	by	scientific	criteria,	rigorous	
methods	of	inquiry,	and	creative	attitudes	of	innovative	discoveries.-		(emphasis	in	
yellow	is	mine-RCM)	
	Looking	at	what	is	said	in	these	regulations,	two	things	seem	striking.	The	first	is	that	the	FCT	seems	to	have	no	second	thoughts	before	committing	to	print	that	they	understand	both	Arts	and	Humanities	to	be	‘scientific	domains’.	That	for	me	is	nothing	short	of	an	astounding	misstep!	The	second,	as	evidenced	by	the	last	mission	statement	under	Arts	and	Humanities,	is	that	all	knowledge	in	Arts	and	Humanities	should	be	directed	towards-,	and	will	only	be	valued	by	the	FCT	to	the	degree	in	which	it	can	be	seen	to	be	in	service	of	the	
“development	of	a	more	general	scientific	culture”.	The	FCT	is	unambiguous	in	these	regulations,	leaving	no	room	for	doubt	about	their	position.	This	guideline	makes	it	crystal	clear	that	art	is	presumed	by	the	FCT	to	be	practiced-,	and	should	therefore	be	evaluated	consistent	with	the	criteria	and	methodologies	proper	to	science.	But	are	there	not	some	very	large,	obvious	and	highly	consequential	differences	between	science	and	art?	Science,	for	example,	is	a	pursuit	whereby	quantitative	measurement	and	evaluation	is	both	central	and	critical,	whereas	in	art,	it	is	qualitative	evaluation	that	is	equally	critical	and	central.		As	difficult	as	it	may	be	for	some	to	evaluate	quality	in	art,	it	cannot	continue	to	offer	us	what	it	does	if	we	allow	art,	as	the	FCT	is	here	clearly	trying	to	do,	to	be	morphed	into	something	that	should	be	practiced	and	can	be	evaluated	quantitatively!	This	evaluation	guideline	of	the	FCT,	the	authority	in	Portugal	responsible	for	the	evaluation	of	all	higher	education,	constitutes	in	fact	nothing	short	of	an	attempt	to	radically	redefine	
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art.	That	new	definition	bears	no	resemblance	to	any	standpoint	regarding	art	I’ve	ever	heard	seriously	advocated	by	anyone	knowledgable	about	it.	I	am	therefore	obliged	here	to	say	equally	unequivocally,	that	I	consider	this	standpoint	a	dangerous	and	shockingly	uninformed	one.	I	cannot	imagine	that	any	serious	artist,	or	indeed	any	qualified	scientist,	on	carefully	considering	that	standpoint	of	the	FCT,	could	agree	that	it	makes	any	sense,	either	with	respect	to	art	or	to	science!	This	in	my	view	is	not	a	small	thing,	it	is	a	serious	matter,	one	that	should	motivate	anyone	who	cares	about	science,	humanities,	art	or	culture,	to	challenge	and	discredit	it.	I	point	out	also	that	the	FCT	with	reference	to	Science,	Arts	and	the	Humanities,	fails	here	quite	dramatically	to	accomplish	the	very	basic	goal	they	set	out	in	their	own	mission	statement:	“to	
take	into	account	the	specificities	of	those	domains.”	How	and	why	did	we	arrive	here,	at	a	point	where	such	a	fantastical	relationship	is	being	structurally	forced	between	arts,	humanities,	and	scientific	culture?	Science	could	perhaps,	if	we	wish	to	wax	romantic,	be	regarded	as	a	brother	or	sister	of	Art,	that	is	true.	But	certainly	not	as	its	parent!	Art	is	neither	Science’s	child	nor	its	servant,	in	fact,	no	hierarchy	of	importance	or	causal	relationship	whatsover	exists	between	them.	There	exists	no	logical	basis	whatsoever,	I	am	saying,	for	claiming	that	Art	is-	or	should	be	in	service	of	the	
development	of	a	Scientific	culture!	Efforts	to	redefine	art	like	the	one	I	just	cited,	seem	to	indicate	a	fervent	desire	to	establish	that	the	purposes	of	art	are	closely	related	to	those	of	Science,	and	that	they	can	therefore	be	discussed	with	analytical	precision,	using	scientific	terms	and	ciphers	to	describe	and	evaluate	them.	I	think	it	is	clear	that	from	a	bureaucratic	point	of	view,	such	an	approach	offers	very	considerable	time-	and	cost-saving	benefits.	Proceding	in	this	way	also	promotes	the	naïeve	idea	that	art	can	be	quantitatively	evaluated,	thereby	neatly	sidestepping	the	need	for	
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difficult	or	lengthy	discussions	about	quality.	It	is	clear	that	this	offers	advantages	to	administrators	in	education	and	politicians	in	government	charged	with	policy	for	it.	I	am	in	fact	here	directly	suggesting	that	it	is	in	large	measure,	only	the	bureaucratic	and	political	advantages	gained	by	blurring	or	confusing	the	distinctions	between	art,	science	and	other	pursuits,	that	form	the	primary	motivation	for	attempts	to	reposition	art,	influence	how	and	why	we	make	it,	and	redefine	its	value	for	society.	It	is	contrariwise,	not	the	result	of	any	thoughtful	or	responsible	analysis	of	how	to	better	the	understanding,	the	conduct,	or	the	qualitative	output	of	the	pursuit	itself.	If	we	think	of-,	teach-,	and	evaluate	art	as	a	largely	logical/analytical	pursuit,	as	‘the	product	of	‘research’,	as	subservient	to	Science,	if	we	believe	that	we	can	evaluate	it	using	objective	criteria,	I	am	convinced	that	we	are	well	on	the	way	to	understanding	very	much	less-	rather	than	more	about	it,	or	why	society	should	value	it	at	all.		And	then,	quite	soon	I	think,	society	won’t.	I	maintain,	in	direct	opposition	to	the	tendency	I	just	sketched	and	gave	an	example	of,	both	with	respect	to	its	making	and	to	our	ability	to	appreciate	and	value	it,	that	art	is	not	a	logical/analytical	undertaking	at	all.	Art	is	almost	never	characterized	by	the	objectivity	of	its	statements,	by	the	systematic	methodologies	of	common	research	practices,	nor	can	it	be	evaluated	or	appreciated	by	any	objective	measurement.	I	submit	that	much	of	what	we	are	witnessing	happen	in	art	education,	are	attempts	to	redefine-,	to	change	art,	in	overwhelming	measure	so	that	we	can	more	easily	administer,	inexpensively	teach	and	simplistically	evaluate	it.	If	our	goal	in	art	education	is	to	guide	and	graduate	artists	able	to	produce	artworks	of	real	value	for	themselves	and	for	society,	I	suggest	that	we	must	very	soon	openly,	honestly,	indeed	rigorously	re-examine	some	of	our	current	policies,	thinking,	and	practices	in	art	education.	Some	of	those	in	my	view	are	quite	thoroughly	misguided	and	patently	contraproductive.	
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ACTIONS	SPEAK	LOUDER	THAN	WORDS	We	can’t	make	art	by	talking,	writing,	speaking-	or	thinking	about	it.	Making	art	requires	taking	actions,	those	actions	being	decisive	for	both	the	kind	and	quality	of	the	results.	Although	the	two	activities	are	very	different	ones,	one	can	imagine	that	the	performance	of	actions	in	art	is	just	as	central	to	that	undertaking	as	is	the	case	for	a	professional	athlete.	Conscious	and	deliberate	reflection	about	the	activity	involved,	i.e.	thought,	whether	when	making	art	or		for	example,	running	a	race,	no	matter	how	comprehensively	and	intelligently	it	is	undertaken,	is	an	activity	of	a	very	different	kind,	one	only	marginally	related	to	the	resulting	performance.	Conscious	reflection	about	art	or	a	race	to	be	run	is	not	a	bad	thing	to	undertake	by	any	means.	But	it	is	never	the	primary	process	by	which	success	in	either	activity	is	achieved,	nor	does	it	constitute	the	primary	avenue	by	which	those	results	will	be	appreciated	by	the	public.	Both	making	and	enjoying	art	are	very	inadequately	described	or	undertaken	as	the	product	of	‘thinking’.	Instead,	art	originates	in	very	different	processes	altogether.	Art	is	human	expression	of	a	kind	that	could	perhaps	be	called	‘embodied	expression’.	By	that	I	mean	that	Our	Body,	(i.e.	all	of	the	very	extensive	knowledge,	memories,	and	abilities	contained	within	it),	is	critical	and	central	both	in	making	art,	and	for	understanding	it.	The	immediate	physicality	of	art,	I	suggest,	is	far	more	important	for	our	attraction	to-,	enjoyment-	and	understanding	of	it,	than	all	of	the	intangible	mental	constructs	we	try	to	erect	around	it.	With	the	term	‘mental	constructs’,	I	refer	among	other	things	to	formulations	that	are	presumed	to	convey	very	concise,	highly	important	information.	
‘Concept	in	art’	is	one	of	those.	I	want	to	cite	here	once	again	from	“The	Pleasure	of	Finding	Things	Out”	by	Richard	Feynman.	In	the	following	two	related	
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passages	he	speaks	of	the	difference	between	‘words	about	science	and	science	itself’,	i.e.	between	talking	about	science	and	doing	science.	For	me,	what	he	says	applies	equally	to	‘words	about	art’	and	‘doing	art’.	In	the	first	quote,	Feynman	uses	an	example	from	a	science	lesson	about	the	movement	of	a	mechanical	dog.	In	the	second,	he	speaks	about	the	word	‘friction’	in	connection	with	what	happens	to	the	soles	of	our	shoes	when	we	walk:	
vii	“I	finally	figured	out	a	way	to	test	whether	you	have	taught	an	idea	or	you	have	
taught	only	a	definition.	Test	it	this	way:	You	say	“Without	using	the	new	word,	
try	to	rephrase	what	you	have	just	learned	in	your	own	language”	“Without	using	
the	word	‘energy’	try	to	tell	me	what	you	know	about	the	dog’s	motion.	You	
cannot.	So	you’ve	learned	nothing	except	the	definition.	You	learned	nothing	
about	Science.	That	may	be	all	right.	You	may	not	want	to	learn	something	about	
Science	right	away.		You	have	to	learn	definitions.	But	for	the	very	first	lesson,	is	
that	not	possibly	destructive?”	–“I	think	to	learn	a	mystic	formula	for	answering	
questions	is	very	bad…………“the	soles	of	your	shoes	wear	out	because	of	friction”.	
Shoe	leather	wears	out	because	it	rubs	and	bumps	against	the	sidewalk	and	the	
little	notches	on	the	sidewalk	grab	pieces	and	pull	them	off.		
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		fig.	6		”Body	Cognition”	-2013	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
	
EMBODIED	COGNITION			Here,	I	want	to	go	back	to	something	I	stated	earlier	(pg	14):		Without	our	body,	I	don’t	think	we	would	have	any	relation	at	all	either	to	the	world	around	us,	or	to	each	other.	Mind	alone	can	understand	the	world	only	within	very	narrow	and	distinct	limits.	It	is	instead	our	corporeal	existence	in	space	that	allows	us,	
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in	fact	requires	us	to	engage	with	the	world	.	And	it	is	that	engagement	that	allows	knowing	in	the	real	sense	of	that	word.	What	we	know,	as	opposed	to	what	we	merely	think,	is	determined	by	the	size	of	our	body	as	it	relates	to	all	else,	the	movements	and	actions	it	is	capable	of	performing,	and	the	dangers	to	its	integrity	that	exist	in	the	world.	I	think	it	is	correct	to	say	that	all	emotion	of	any	kind	or	degree	has	its	origin	in	body	rather	than	in	intellect.	Without	body,	without	knowing	movement	and	being	vulnerable	to	pain	or	damage,	we	would	not	be	capable	of	feeling	anything	at	all.		If	this	is	true,	then	my	emphasis	here	on	what	we	can	feel,	what	we	know	and	do	bodily,		on	the	criucial	importance	of	the	very	movements	that	we	use	to	create	art,	should	be	clear.	Art	would	literally	have	no	meaning	at	all	if	we	fail	to	take	into	account	those	most	critical	consituents	of	art’s	physical	existence	and	the	means	by	which	meaning	in	it	is	transmitted	and	received.	Art	is	an	action	on	material	by	the	body,	and	that	action	is	understood	very	largely	because	we	are	all	capable	of	such	action.	A	painting	would	mean	nothing	at	all	to	us	unless	we	are	in	some	sense	familiar	with	the	actions	on	material	that	were	needed	to	create	it.	There	would	be	no	essential	difference	in	meaning	for	us	between	an	Yves	Klein	painting	and	a	dark	patch	of	sky.		It	is	high	time	I	think,	to	advance	beyond	what	we	are	able	to	understand	intellectually	about	art	through	the	comparison	of	paintings	to	ones	that	preceded	them,	and	the	consideration	from	a	historical	standpoint	of	what	people	were	thinking,	doing	and	talking	about	in	earlier	times,	compared	to	later	times.	We	must	now	urgently	tackle	quite	different	questions,	ones	that	in	my	view	are	both	far	more	fundamental-	and	far	more	rewarding	ones	.	Why	do	we	make	art	or	value	it,	and	what	is	the	true	nature	of	the	faculties	we	engage	when	we	do	that?	Art	has	both	its	genesis	in-	and	is	understood	by	us	because	we	have	the	ability	to	act	on	the	world,	on	materials,	on	each	other,	and	literally	
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to	feel	and	learn	from	what	results	from	those	actions.		The	thinking	that	then	follows	those	processes	can	be	very	interesting,	useful,	and	enlightening,	often	very	highly	enjoyable.	But	I	argue	that	we	should	not	mistakenly	believe	or	teach	that	intellect,	i.e.	thinking,	is	primary	in	art.	Instead	we	need	to	understand	and	come	to	agree	that	it	is	only	secondary.	To	support	why	I	am	strongly	suggesting	that	thinking	is	not	as	important	as	we	imagine	and	teach	in	art,	why	I	insist	that	feeling	and	sensing	are	very	much	more	important,	I	need	to	make	reference	to	some	current	research	and	theory	in	Cognitive	Neuroscience.	That	is	a	branch	of	science	concerned	primarily	with	how	our	brains	enable	Knowing.	Discoveries	and	recent	theories	in	cognitive	neuroscience	have	been	tremendously	helpful	for	me	in	coming	to	better	understand	what	I	experience	through	art.	Because	I	believe	that	enhanced	understanding	may	be	quite	useful	for	more	people	than	only	myself,	I	believe	it	important	to	understand	what	some	recent	neuroscience	theory	implies	for	the	understanding	of	art.	The	discoveries	and	theories	in	cognitive	science	I	refer	to	pertain	to	how	we	physically	process	the	experiences	offered	us	by	works	of	art.		In	particular,	one	increasingly	important	school	of	thought	within	the	Cognitive	Sciences	called	viiiEmbodied	Cognition,	provides	the	basis	for	what	I	think	is	true	of	Art	and	believe	that	it	is	quite	important	that	we	understand	about	it.		Embodied	cognition	proposes	that	our	direct	bodily	responses	to	external	stimuli	precede	any	conscious	thought	about	those	stimuli,	and	moreover,	that	those	responses	are	very	often	of	decisive	influence	in	determining	our	subsequent	thoughts.		Recent	research	into	the	workings	of	the	human	brain	offers	very	persuasive	evidence	that	both	the	kind	of	information	and	the	manner	of	its	processing	to	arrive	at	‘the	meaning’	of	things,	are	very	different	ones	in	the	case	of	spoken	and	written	words	and	symbols,	than	is	the	case	
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when	we	process	the	stimuli	provided	us	by	visual	art.	Scientific	studies	and	theories	regarding	mirror-	and	canonical	neurons	in	the	human	brain,	indicate	that	for	a	real	understanding	of	what	we	derive	from	making,	viewing	and	appreciating	art,	we	both	can-	and	should	look	much	more	closely	at	what	Science	is	currently	telling	us.		Science,	I	am	convinced,	is	already	telling	us	that	the	immediate-,	and	perhaps	the	most	important	‘meaning’	we	derive	from	the	things	we	see,	e.g.	artworks,	is	the	product	of	a	complex	chain	of	the	body’s	immediate,	automatic-	but	quite	unconscious	reactions,	those	already	going	very	far	towards	determining	‘meaning’	,	before	that	information	ever	reaches	the	level	of	our	conscious	intellectual	consideration.	ixAccounts	of	the	discovery-	and	function	of	mirror	and	canonical	neurons	in	the	brain	explain	for	me	what	happens	when	I	make	art.	In	fact,	some	years	before	I	heard	or	read	about	mirror-and	canonical	neurons	and	embodied	cognition,	on	looking	back	at	a	number	of	the	works	I’d	made,	I	had	been	struck	by	the	realization	that	a	number	of	them	had	something	in	common.	What	I	noticed	was	that	in	every	one	of	those	works,	I	had	provided	somewhere	a	physical	shape	or	protrusion	that	seemed	to	both	invite-	and	enable	physically	grasping	the	work	at	that	point.	In	other	words,	I	had	integrated	into	each	of	those	works	a	kind	of	‘handle’.	On	thinking	about	this,	it	occurred	to	me	that	I	had,	quite	unconsciously,	provided	a	way	to	‘grasp’	the	work	physically,	but	I	then	imagined,	perhaps	also	grasp	it	in	the	sense	of		‘meaningfully’.		Some	time	later	when	I	read	about	mirror	neurons	in	the	brain	which	cause	a	monkey	watching	another	monkey	grasp	a	banana,	to	immediately	and	without	thinking,	activate	his	own	grasping	muscles	in	a	similar	way,	even	though	he	had	no	banana	to	grasp,	it	was	something	of	a	‘Eureka	moment’	for	me!	Additionally,	some	time	later	I	discovered	that	another	type	of	neuron	in	the	brain	called	a	canonical	neuron,	responds	directly	by	activating	grasping	muscles	on	merely	seeing	an	object	that	is	invitingly	graspable,	without	the	need	to	see	another	grasp	it.		
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Accounts	of	such	discoveries	and	the	evolution	of	cognitive	theory	based	on	them,	were	able	to	explain	for	me	why	I	had	unconsciously	started	to	develop	that	device,	that	graspable	protrusion	in	my	works,	without	being	aware	of	the	existence	of	any	concrete	physical/neural	bases	underlying	its	effectiveness.	When	our	muscles	are	automatically	engaged	to	perform	a	specific	function	by	something	we	are	looking	at,	we	will,	it	seems	to	me,	also	feel	it.	That	feeling	will	then	form	an	important	constitutent	of	the	meaning	of	the	object	we	look	at	that	has	activated	that	process.		This	must	apply	also	logically	it	seems	to	me,	to	an	art	object,	very	likely	even	to	a	painting	or	drawing,	i.e.	the	2	dimensional	representation	of	a	physical	object.	What	I	have	learned	about	embodied	cognition	has	become	central	to	my	understanding	of	art.	That	is	not	to	say	that	what	I	believed	or	felt	about	art	changed	significantly	as	a	result.	Instead	embodied	cognition	seemed	to	both	explain	and	offer	confirmation	for	much	of	what	I	have	always	believed,	what	I	sensed	about	art.		I	am	convinced	that	study	and	consideration	of	some	scientific	theory	and	research	about	how	our	brains/bodies	work,	can	offer	us	important	new	insights	into	how	and	why	art	works,	and	consequently,	can	be	of	considerable	assistance	in	learning	how	to	better	teach-,	appreciate-	and	evaluate	art.		A	number	of	studies	and	papers	by	xFreedburg	and	Gallese,	and	later	by	other	researchers,	form	for	me	a	very	convincing	body	of	evidence	for	the	very	clear	-,	indeed	the	urgent	need	to	reconsider	the	presumed	centrality	of	‘thinking’	in	art.		Imagining	for	example	that	our	reactions	to	external	stimuli,	e.g.	artworks,	are	overwhelmingly	the	product	of	conscious	thought	about	them,	and	that	our	emotional	reactions	then	follow	those	thoughts,	is	in	fact,	precisely	the	reverse	of	what	really	happens.	Embodied	cognition	indicates	that	of	primary	functional	importance	in	art,	as	it	is	in	our	reactions	to	almost	all	external	
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stimuli	we	encounter,	is	all	that	happens	directly	in	our	bodies	before	we	start	thinking,	i.e.	the	automatic	activation	of	the	body’s	very	extensive	and	complex	physical/emotional	response	system.	That	differentiation	is	the	basis	for	my	claim	that	it	is	important	to	distinguish	what	results	from	emotion,	i.e.	being	unexplainably	‘moved’	by	something,	as	very	different	altogether	from	what	results	from	just	thinking	about	things.	Does	that	mean	that	I	therefore	believe	that	thinking	in	art	is	bad	or	unimportant?	No,	that	is	very	definitely	not	the	case!	The	very	words	I	write	here	are	entirely	the	product	of	thinking,	and	obviously	I’d	not	like	to	believe	that	what	I’m	writing	is	either	wrong	or	unimportant.		However,	what	I	write	is	not	art,	it	is	words	about	art.	Teaching	the	making	or	the	understanding	of	art	as	conducted	and	directed	either	first	or	foremost	by	thinking	is,	I	am	suggesting,	in	the	light	of	current	scientific	knowledge,	a	flawed	model.	It	ignores	that	aspect	of	art	that	I	am	now	convinced	is	far	more	immediate	and	important	than	all	the	thinking	we	can	do	about	it.	That	aspect	is	formed	by	our	immediate	and	profound	bodily	responses	to	what	we	make	if	we	are	artists,	and	to	what	we	can	see,	feel,	and	derive	from	art	if	we	are	viewers	of	art.		
	
THE	INCONVENIENCE	OF	ART	Quite	differently	than	the	communications	we	accomplish	through	reading,	writing	and	speaking	words,	visual	art	does	not	offer	us	the	convenience	of	being	able	to	refer	to	sources	defining	for	us	each	term	we	encounter.	In	reference	books	like	dictionaries,	we	can	find	very	concise	information	explaining	the	terms	used	in	verbal	language,	in	mathematics,	or	even	in	music.	These	resources	we	consult	about	words	or	symbols,	often	tell	us	even	when	and	where	the	terms	originated	and	how	they	have	evolved.	The	words	and		symbols	that	we	can	find	such	concise	information	about	are	the	habitual	terms	
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of	academic	discourse,		and	they	relate	overwhelmingly	to	objectively	verifiable,	usually	singular-	and	standardized	concepts.		In	sharp	contrast	to	this,	contemporary	visual	art	requires	each	viewer	to	decide	individually	if-	and	how	he	will	respond	to	the	images	he	sees,	with	the	necessity	to	accomplish	that	alone.	The	viewer	of	art	does	not	have	the	convenience	of	reference	books	that	offer	him	singular,	exact	definitions	for	the	visual	information	of	art.	That	is	simply	because	the	images	that	are	the	terms	of	art	discourse	don’t	represent	objectively	verifiable	meanings	at	all.	They	are	neither	singular	in	meaning,	nor	are	they-,	or	can	they	be	standardized	or	verified.	Visual	images	in	art,	I	submit,	are	in	fact	not	merely	limited	to-,	they	are	in	fact	intended	to	initiate	
subjective	discourse,	always!	With	the	term,	‘subjective	discourse’,	I	mean	that	the	communication	effected	through	art	is	of	an	entirely	different	kind	than	that	accomplished	through	words.	That	choice	we	make	when	we	decide	to	communicate	through	art	rather	than	in	words	is	of	no	small	consequence,	both	with	respect	to	the	language	by	which	communication	is	effected,	and	to	the	goals	we	can	realistically	expect	to	achieve	by	doing	so.	In	fact	we	have,	I	suggest,	an	entirely	different	purpose	when	speaking	through	art	than	when	we	use	spoken	and	written	language.	We	are	simply	not	at	all	speaking	of-	or	conveying	Meaning	of	the	same	kind	in	both	cases.		What	I’ve	just	suggested	is	very	difficult,	perhaps	impossible	at	present	to	conclusively	prove.	Nonetheless,	I	offer	the	idea	and	the	reasoning	behind	it	as	suggestive	of	substantial	and	highly	consequential	differences	between	the	language	and	goals	of	art,	and	those	of	academic	discourse	and	reasoning.	I	consider	it	critically	important	that	we	are	aware	of	very	serious	problems	that	result	when	we	confuse	those	two	pursuits	and	the	methodologies	proper	to	them	with	each	other.		
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In	the	interest	of	Art,	we	really	need	to	examine	the	degree	to	which	we	have	good	reasons	for	using	terminology	and	adopting	approaches	that	are	issue	from	very	different	realms	altogether.		There	is,	I	think,	a	discernible	trend	to	move	education	in	the	practice	of	art	into	realms	that	are	properly	those	of	the	History	of	Art,	of	Art	Theory,	of	technology,	or	even	of	Philosphy	and	Science.		It	goes	without	saying	that	contact	between	differing	pursuits,	cross-fertilization,	can	at	times	be	a	very	useful	thing	to	undertake.	But	this	doesn’t	mean	that	every	instance	of	‘cohabitation’	we	encourage,	or	merely	facilitate	by	inattention,	results	in	happy	partners	and	healthy	offspring!		
	
HOW	WE	SOLVE	PROBLEMS	I	think	it	revealing	to	look	at	that	tendency	I	speak	of	here	to	teach	art	less	autonomously,	i.e.	increasingly	often	as	it	relates	to	other	pursuits,	as		‘a	way	to	solve	problems’.	The	first	and	seemingly	most	troublesome	of	those	problems	we	imagine	to	solve	in	this	way	is	that	art	doesn’t	offer	us	meanings	or	uses	we	all	agree	about.	Clearly	we	can’t	speak	about	the	meaning	of	art	as	easily	as	we	can	speak	about	the	meaning	of	facts,	or	of	those	thoughts	we	express	in	words.	Additionally,	it	is	quite	difficult	to	name	and	justify	the	societal	benefits	we	derive	from	art.	And	if	those	two	problems	were	not	enough,	we	have	the	difficult	task	of	needing	to	evaluate	quality	in	art,	to	monitor	it	in	education,	and	to	compare	and	agree	on	our	evaluations.	So	what	do	those	problems	give	rise	to,	what	might	be	done	about	such		‘problems’	as	these?		We	are	all,	I	think	familiar	with	the	effect	that	fear	or	embarrassment	can	have	on	us	when	we	are	confronted	with	situations	that	stimulate	those	states	in	us.	At	such	times	we	often	find	ourselves	strangely	inclined	to	start	talking	fast,	
	 63	
perhaps	then	changing	subjects	and	directions	rapidly.	Doing	so,	we	are	in	fact	just	‘trying	to	find	the	emergency	exit’,	i.e.	a	quick	way	out	of	that	uncomfortable	situation.	We	feel	at	such	moments	the	urge	to	proceed	with	haste,	very	often	without	much	direction	or	reason	guiding	what	we	say	or	do.	There	is	an	urgency	to	resolve	our	unfortunate	predicament,	we	feel	then	decidedly	and	uncomfortably	uncertain.	I	am	suggesting	that	the	increasing	tendency	to	speak	and	to	write	(academically,	incessantly,	divergently)	about	art	is	related	to	an	‘embarrassed	state’.	Are	we	not	perhaps	acutely	embarrassed	by	the	fact	that	we	cannot	pinpoint	the	meaning	of	art,	accurately	define	or	evaluate	with	consensus	its	quality,	or	clearly	formulate	the	‘value’	it	has	for	us?	Is	it	not	perhaps	largely	because	we	have	not	yet	been	successful	enough	at	those	very	basic	tasks	that	we	are	experiencing	great	difficulties	deciding	how	best	to	teach	students	the	practice	of	art,	what	’meaning	in	art’	is,	or	how	it	should	be	evaluated?	Might	it	be	that	our	increasing	resort	to	other	pursuits,	the	place	art	has	within	the	context	of	those	pursuits,	not	perhaps	merely	symptomatic	of		‘an	embarrassed	state’?		In	art	practice	education	I	am	suggesting	that	at	present,	excessive	talking	and	writing	about	art,	and	the	forcing	of	relationships	with	fields	quite	removed	from	it,	may	well	stand	directly	in	the	path	of	understanding	art,	seriously	obstructing	that	path	I’m	suggesting	that	we	may	currently	be	looking	for	meaning	in	art	‘in	all	the	wrong	places’.	But	if	there	is	truth	to	that,	where	should	we	be	looking?	What	are	the	‘right	places’	to	look	for	meaning	in	art’?		Meaning	in	art,	I	suggest,	must	in	first	instance,	always	be	looked	for	on	the	
individual	level.	In	direct	opposition	to	our	current	approaches,	I	am	here	suggesting	that	Meaning	in	Art	is	not	‘societal’,	‘political’,	‘philosophical’	or	‘universal’	in	nature	at	all.	Quite	the	reverse,	it	is	personal,	highly	individual,	and	very	subjective	meaning	that	art	carries	and	offers	us.	As	such,	meaning	in	art	should	perhaps	not	be	imagined	to	be	academic	at	all,	in	any	sense	of	that	
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word!	An	academic	undertaking	or	pursuit,	I	think,	must	be	understood	in	important	measure	as	a	product	of	the	active,	directed	and	successful	effort	to	find-	or	work	towards	consensus.		Very	differently	in	my	view,	Meaning	in	art	can	only	be	correctly	thought	of	as	the	one(s)	it	carries	for	one	person	viewing	a	work	of	art	at	one	moment,	whatever	that	meaning	is.	If	this	is	in	an	important	degree	true,	it	constitutes	a	highly	inconvenient	fact	for	the	institutional	or	organizational	administration	of	Art.	It	would	seem	to	make	art	uncomfortably	‘vague’,	exceedingly	difficult	to	define,	teach,	evaluate,	administrate,	or	defend.	Be	that	as	it	may,	this	is,	I	believe,	the	only	way	we	can	correctly	describe	the	kind	of	communication	art	facilitates.	Meaning	in	art	is	individually	determined,	and	must	be	looked	for	and	understood	first	and	foremost	on	that	level.	That	is	why	I	argue	that	attempts	to	center	or	locate	meaning	in	art	in	realms	that	are	societal	(e.g.	philosophy,	science,	politics,	morality,	etc.)	in	nature	are	largely	doomed	to	fail.	Unless	that	is,	we	realize	that	in	art,	we	have	the	language	that	enables	one	particular	societal	function,	a	quite	different	one	that	has	quite	profound	importance!	Art	is	a	pursuit	that	both	enables	and	encourages	the	expression	of	a	highly	personal,	individual	point	of	view,	as	equal	in	weight	and	importance	to	all	others	in	society.	We	assign	that	role	and	status	to	art.	An	unwritten	convention	in	art	is	that	if	an	artist	is	able	to	portray	his	subject	matter	very	differently	than	others	have	done	that,	that	might	well	be	taken	seriously,	sometimes	highly	seriously,	possibly,	by	very	many	others!	The	artist’s	different	way	of	seeing	things	in	his	work	can	be	very	powerful,	in	spite	of	its	constituting	only	one	lone	point	of	view	in	a	veritable	human	sea	of	them.	There	will	be	no	formal	‘vote’	concerning	that	alternative	view	point,	its	capacity	to	influence	or	affect	viewers	does	not	depend	on	economic	or	political	factors,	or	on	consensus	of	any	kind.	Art,	I	am	saying	here,	offers	a	potentially	powerful	voice	to	one	lone	individual	speaking	to	one-	or	all	the	rest	of	us.	And	that	in	turn,	constitutes	a	
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highly	significant	societal	function.	Through	artworks,	the	‘value	and	weight’	of	one	individual	point	of	view	is	presented	as	equivalent	to	all	the	points	of	view	represented	in	society	as	a	whole.	That	function	I	here	claim	art	fulfills	however,	diverges	strongly	from	those	we	seem	currently	to	be	promoting	in	formal	art	education.	We	seem	instead	to	be	encouraging	artists	to	read,	speak	and	think	about	meaning	in	art	very	largely	on	societal	levels.	We	imagine,	teach	and	speak	about	art	largely	as	giving	voice	to-	or	commenting	on	OUR	
points	of	view.	Students	are	being	systematically	taught	that	art	critically	reflects	or	examines	our	notion	of	history,	our	idea	of	philosophy,	our	view	of	society	and	reality.	In	other	words,	we	are	promoting	works	of	art	as	expressing	or	commenting	on	things	we	all	share,	but	which	most	of	us	are	perhaps	merely	incapable	of	noticing,	understanding,	or	expressing	until	‘visionary’	artists	bring	them	to	our	attention.	I	believe	that	teaching	future	artists	to	imagine	and	conduct	their	practice	in	this	way	and	role	is	mistaken.			Another	manifestation	of	what	I	refer	to	as	‘confusion	about	art’,	takes	the	form	of	the	pressure	we	exert	on	artists	to	motivate	their	works	as	directed	at	the	expectation	that	these	will	take	up	their	rightful	place	on	the	existing	historical/chronological	continuum.		In	fact,	the	official	xiregulations	applying	to	this	very	text	require	of	me	that	I	now	do	that	here	with	respect	to	my	own	works.	The	relevant	passage	I	refer	to	is	this	one:	“Por	uma	obra	ou	conjunto	de	obras	ou	realizações	com	carácter	
inovador,	acompanhada	de	fundamentação	escrita	que	explicite	o	processo	de	
concepção	e	elaboração,	a	capacidade	de	investigação,	e	o	seu	enquadramento	na	
evolução	do	conhecimento	no	domínio	em	que	se	insere”.		I	think	it’s	correct	to	translate	that	passage	of	regulations	applying	to	this	text,	as	requiring	of	me	that	I	place	my	works	in	their	rightful	place	on	the	timeline	
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of	the	evolution	of	knowledge	in	art,	i.e.	somewhere	on	“the	art	historical	continuum”.		In	response	to	that	requirement,	I	pose	the	questions:	“how	and	why	I	am	
supposed	to	accomplish	that	task?”	A	continuum,	historical-	or	any	other	kind,	according	to	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary,	is	defined	as:		“a continuous 
sequence in which adjacent elements are not perceptibly different from 
each other, although the extremes are quite distinct”		It	follows	from	that	definition	that	I	must	place	my	work	(assuming	entirely	counter	to	the	facts	that	all	of	my	work	is	similar),	somewhere	on	what	is	undeniably	a	chronological	(because	‘evolutionary’)	sequence	that	represents	the	history	of	art,	where	it	does	not	perceptibly	differ	from	what	precedes	or	what	follows	it.	Logically,	there	is	no	place	I	can	find	such	a	location	other	than	in	the	present	time.	And	the	present	time	where	I	therefor	must	locate	my	artwork,	because	history	is	chronological,	is	at	the	end	of	the	continuum,	at	one	of	the	two	‘extremes’,	i.e.	now.		If	I	tried	to	situate	my	work	anywhere	else	on	that	continuum	of	art	history,	I	would	most	certainly	be	mistaken,	because	my	work	would	differ	very	markedly	from	what	preceded-	and	what	follows	it.	So,	not	wishing	to	be	mistaken,	and	if	the	present	time	is	the	only	place	on	the	historical	continuum	where	my	work	belongs,	what	could	I	then	say	about	it’s	relationship	to	‘the	continuum’?	I	have	no	idea	what	will	follow	it	on	the	continuum!	I	am	most	certainly	not	a	competent	historian,	and	now	find	myself	quite	unable	to	accomplish	this	feat	credibly	or	usefully.	I	must	wonder	in	fact,	if	even	a	very	highly	competent	and	authoritative	art	historian	would	ever	attempt	in	this	way	to	usefully	qualify	something	that	happens	in	the	present,	about	which	he	cannot	possibly	know	what	will	follow?	I	think	no	competent	historian	would	do	so!	For	that	reason,	I	see	this	exercise	as	no	more	than	pointless	conjecture,	here	masquerading	as	a	legitimate	theoretical	
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consideration	belonging	to	the	domain	of	art	history.	My	position	is	that	my	ability	or	value	in	art,	my	competence	in	that	pursuit,	cannot	be	evaluated	by	testing	or	challenging	what	I	am	able	to	accomplish	in	an	entirely	different	pursuit,	c.q.	Art	History!	Art	is	a	very	different	pursuit	than	Art	History	I	must	insist.	They	are	not	at	all,	I	am	saying,	related	in	the	degree	to	which,	for	example,	that	regulation	applying	to	this	text,	indicates	that	some	of	us	are	all	to	uncritically	assuming!		Quite	apart	from	the	impossibility	to	credibly	complete	the	requirement	to	place	my	work	on	an	art	historical	continuum,	the	second	question	that	poses	itself	is:	what	motivation	could	I	possibly	have	for	undertaking	such	a	thing?	What	benefit	might	I	or	anyone	else	derive	from	the	attempt	to	satisfy	it?	There	is	when	I	consider	the	question,	no	answer	I	can	offer.	There	exists	for	me	no	rational	motivation	for	undertaking	the	conjecture	dictated	by	this	regulation.	Let	me	try	here	to	explain	more	fully	why	that	is	so.		As	an	artist,	I	am	far	more	interested	in	striving	for	specificity	rather	than	generality	in	my	work.	By	that	I	mean	that	I	am	far	more	interested	in	the	uniqueness	of	what	I	can	imagine,	see,	and	give	form	to,	than	in	its	presumed	likeness	to-	or	relationship	with	anything	that	others	have	produced,	now	or	in	the	past.	I	very	definitely	don’t	make	artworks	in	order	to	refer	to	other	artworks	or	artists,	to	discuss	styles	or	movements	in	art,	either	past	or	present	ones.	My	work	neither	offers	support	for-	nor	attempts	to	refute	such	categories.	In	fact	I	am	not	engaged	in	making	art	as	discourse.	Instead	my	works	are	more	like	a	monologue.	Their	purpose	is	not	to	arrive	at	generality	or	relate	to	category,	but	in	fact,	precisely	the	opposite,	i.e.	to	arrive	to	the	maximum	degree	possible,	at	specificity,	uniqueness.	In	other	words	my	motivation	is	very	largely	formed	by	the	wish	to	do	or	‘say’	something	only	I	can	do	or	‘say’.	Describing	in	this	way	what	is	most	important	for	me,	it	should	
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be	readily	understandable	that	maintaining	constant	awareness	of	all	that	other	artists	have	ever	done,	or	may	perhaps	be	doing	at	present,	is	not	very	useful	for	me.		Truth	be	told,	I	have	no	ambition	to	‘join	the	continuum’.	My	dream	as	an	artist	is	instead	to	perhaps	somehow	come	to	stand	apart	from	the	rest!		For	these	reasons,	this	‘historical	continuum	of	art’	is	neither	a	central-	nor	even	an	important	factor	for	me.	If	I	should	at	times	have	the	intention	to	speak	of-	or	to	generalities	in	my	work,	those	pertaining	to	the	history	of	art	or	other	ones,	it	is	always	‘from	the	bottom	up’	that	I	do	so.	That	is	to	say,	I	add	a	small	tangible	fact	in	the	form	of	an	artwork	to	the	sum	total	of	specifics	that	form	the	generality	of	artworks	of	the	present	time,	and	all	that	preceded	them,	the	continuum.	But	I	am	not	concerned	with	where	anyone	imagines	my	work	fits	into	that	totality	of	art.	Determing	that	or	influencing	it	is	quite	simply	not	my	
job!	It	is	for	these	reasons	that	I	am	obliged	to	challenge	practice	and	stipulations	that	insist	that	this	must	be	otherwise,	for	myself	or	for	anyone	else.	An	artist,	I	am	suggesting,	has	very	different	purposes	altogether,	ones	characterized	by	very	different	processes	and	intentions	than	do	people	charged	with	monitoring	and	administering	the	generalities	in	art.	An	art	historian	might	well	be	tasked	for	example,	with	deciding	where	an	artwork	of	mine	should	be	filed	away	among	all	the	others,	for	easy	retrieval,	to	be	cited	or	discussed	when	that	is	opportune.	In	this	way,	there	exist	highly	consequential	differences	between	the	work	of	conservators,	historians,	and	theorists	on	the	one	hand,	and	that	on	the	other	hand	of	artists.	The	artist’s	job	among	other	things	is	to	produce	the	works	that	historians	and	theorists	may	engage	to	conserve,	categorize	or	discuss	if	they	wish	to.		It’s	clear	that	these	quite	different	tasks	that	each	of	us	has	are	related,	they	all	concern	a	professional	engagement	with	art.	But	that	doesn’t	mean	that	artists	should	therefore	carry	
out	the	tasks	of	historians	and	theorists,	any	more	than	the	reverse	is	true!	
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Analogously	as	an	example,	we	would	say	that	football	players	and	sports	journalists	are	clearly,	both	professionally	and	passionately	engaged	in	one	and	the	same	game.	But	it	should	also	be	directly	apparent	that	both	the	nature	of	their	contributions	to	the	game,	and	the	qualitative	criteria	that	apply	to	those	contributions,	are	very,	very	different	ones!	They	do	not	do	the	same	things,	and	therefore	cannot	possibly	be	evaluated	by	the	same	criteria.	I	suggest	that	we	are	currently,	whether	consciously	or	unconsciously,	busy	training	artists	simply	to	be	more	useful	for	others	charged	with	entirely	different	tasks	altogether.	Asking	or	requiring	artists	to	place	their	works	on	the	‘continuum	of	art	history’	exemplifies	this,	and	should	be	understood	in	that	light.	From	an	art	historical	point	of	view,	I	think	that	a	quite	illogical	practice.	From	an	artistic	standpoint,	I	think	it	is	a	literally	counter-productive	one.	As	such,	in	my	view,	it	is	a	practice	for	which	no	rational	basis	exists	and	should	be	discontinued.	
	
STANDING	ON	THE	SHOULDERS	OF	GIANTS	There	is	no	doubt	that	it	is	important	to	instruct	future	artists	in	the	great	contributions	and	importance	of	those	throughout	history	who	preceded	them.	No	accomplishment	from	any	realm	of	our	human	pursuits	is	likely	to	be	completely	new	in	all	respects,	we	profit	greatly	from	the	work	of	those	who	came	before	us.	But	if	at	times	we	are	enabled	to	see	very	far	because	we	arexii‘standing	on	the	shoulders	of	giants’,	what	questions	should	we	then	be	asking	of	ourselves?	Should	we	be	thinking	or	speaking	primarily	of	the	lives	and	times	of	those	giants	who	support	us,	i.e.	the	past?		Or	should	we	instead	derive	profit	from	our	elevated	position	by	speaking	of	what	we	can	see	from	that	marvelous	vantage	point?	When	standing	on	the	shoulders	of	the	giants	of	art,	we	can	acquire	a	view	of	more-	and	very	different	things	than	they	could	
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see	in	their	lifetimes.	Should	we	not	then	be	speaking	of	what	we	can	actually	see	at	such	moments,	rather	than	speaking	of	how	that	relates	to	what	we	imagine	might	have	been	visible	from	an	earlier	vantage	point?	In	other	words,	when	standing	on	the	shoulders	of	giants,	it	would	seem	to	make	far	more	sense	to	look	upwards,	outwards	and	forwards,	rather	than	downwards,	inwards	or	backwards!		To	sum	up	some	of	what	I	have	discussed	up	to	this	point,	what	an	artist	can	‘see’	or	‘say’	in	a	work	of	Art	:		1	is	imbued	with	the	unique	status	that	society,	a	priori,	assigns	to	works	of	art.	Artworks	carry	‘authority’.	The	artist	is	freely	licensed	to	speak	of	things	in	ways	that	either	agree	with,	or	are	completely	contrary	to	convention,	or	to	anyone	else’s	view	regarding	the	things	spoken	of.	The	content	of	artworks	is	not	directed	at	consensus.	As	a	result	of	that	freedom,	when	art	works	at	times	succeed	to	speak	directly	and	deeply	to	us	as	individuals,	that	communication	is	both	remarkable	and	powerful,	very	different	than	the	other	forms	of	communication	that	reach	us.		2	has	been	formulated	in	a	language,	the	visual	language	of	art,	for	which	no	dictionary	exists.	What	the	‘terms’	used	in	a	work	of	art	mean	to	each	individual	viewer	is	not-	and	cannot	be	standardized.	The	meanings	and	associations	triggered	by	each	term	(the	pictorial	elements)	in	a	work	of	art	are,	for	any	given	viewer,	very	likely	entirely	different	ones.		3	is	a	statement	on	the	part	of	one	person,	made	to	no	one	in	particular.	The	artist’s	voice	through	his	artwork	becomes	entirely	separated	from	him,	and	cannot	have	been	directed	specifically	to	anyone	who	hears	(sees)	it.	The	degree	of	relevance	his	statement	will	have	for	a	viewer	is	therefore	something	he	cannot	exercise	much	control	over.	He	has	voluntarily	and	consciously	relinquished	much	of	that	control.		
	 71	
These	factors	taken	together	in	my	view	make	of	art,	a	form	of	communication	quite	unlike	others.	There	is	perhaps	even	an	aspect	of	‘ritual’	we	might	rightfully	attach	to	communication	of	this	kind.	The	unique	conventions	that	apply	both	to	the	making	and	to	the	viewing	of	art,	have	very	real	consequences	for	the	kind	of	meaning	we	can	imbue	it	with,	and	for	the	meaning	we	derive	from	it	as	well.										
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fig	7		“Balance”-1998	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
	
	
SENSITIVITY	When	I	spoke	earlier	of	making	and	experiencing	art	as	an	action,	I	was	by	no	means	referring	only	to	the	deployment	by	the	artist-,	or	to	the	appreciation	by	the	viewer	of	the	considerable	technical	abilities	needed	to	manipulate	material.	I	am	not	speaking	of	craftsmanship	when	I	speak	of	crucial	skills	an	artist	must	have	that	are	needed	for	the	doing.	I’m	referring	instead	to	other	important	skills	and	sensitivities	required	to	make	art	of	quality,	ones	that	we	should	more	actively	concentrate	on	in	art	education,	and	must	further	be	
	 73	
developed	for	-and	through	the	practice	of	art.	Here	are	a	few	of	those	I	think	the	most	important	ones:		1	Material 
For	both	artists	and	viewers	of	art,	sensitivity	to	the	nature,	power	and	depth	of	expressive	meaning	contained	in	the	very	materials	used	in	art	is	important.	Wood,	metal,	paint,	canvas,	porcelain	and	glass,	for	example,	all	carry	intrinsic	meanings	for	us.	A	bust	in	plaster	cannot	be	supposed	to	evoke	the	same	things	as	one	in	every	way	identical	to	it,	save	that	it	was	cast	in	bronze.	Materials	have	meanings	for	us	that	remain	present	in	artworks	fashioned	from	them,	oftentimes	quite	irrespective	of	the	artist’s	intentions.	Those	meanings	issue	in	very	large	measure	from	the	physical	experiences	each	of	us	has	had	with	those	materials.	Quite	apart	from	their	social	connotations	and	common	uses,	each	of	us	has	very	personal	experience	or	associations	with	materials,	their	feel,	temperature,	weight,	and	our	individual	and	very	diverse	memories	and	encounters	with	them.	If	for	example,	when	I	was	a	young	boy,	I	once	got	a	very	deep	and	painful	splinter	in	my	hand	from	handling	a	piece	of	wood,	that	experience	will	likely	influence	to	an	important	extent	how	I	will	react	when	I	encounter	anything	made	of	wood	for	the	rest	of	my	life.	It	is	difficult	to	describe	all	the	ways	in	which	materials	carry	meaning	for	us.	Some	of	these	are	indescribable,	or	may	become	changed	or	lost	when	we	try	to	use	words	to	describe	them.		The	problem	here	is	in	fact	that	verbalization	requires	conscious	awareness,	whereas	very	many	of	the	deeper	meanings	of	experiences,	objects	and	materials,	concern	things	we	are	normally	not	conscious	of	at	all.	This	may	be	in	fact,	an	important	reason	why	many	artists	become	uncomfortable	when	asked	to	explain	their	works.	Too	much	is	lost	in	doing	so,	rich	meaning	that	is	only	manifest	when	experiencing	the	artwork	itself,	without	words.		
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		2			Gesture	
	fig	8	“Fighter”	by	Egon	Schiele,	1913,	©	2000–2014	The	Athenaeum.	Consulted	in	http://www.the-athenaeum.org/art/detail.php?ID=7475,	10/10/2016	Artists	must	also	develop	an	accute	awareness	of	the	meaning-laden	aspects	of	their	own	physical	‘gestures’	as	these	are	transferred	from	hand	into	material.		For	me,	a	poignant	illustration	of	the	importance	of	this	aspect	of	‘material	meaning’	in	art	is	found	in	the	paintings	and	drawings	of	Egon	Schiele.	Looking	closely	at	his	drawings,	I	am	personally	immediately	both	struck	and	moved	by	
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the	quality	of	his	lines.	Somehow	the	force,	direction	and	intensity	of	Schiele’s	lines	manage	to	move	me	emotionally,	meaningfully	and	deeply.	Those	lines	seem	at	one	and	the	same	time	very	purposeful,	but	also	unpredictable,	fragile	and	vulnerable.	Schiele	created	with	the	movements	of	his	hand,	highly	charged	and	meaningful	changes	of	direction	and	intensity	in	the	lines	of	his	paintings	and	drawings.	This	in	my	view	is	a	quintessential	aspect	of	Schiele’s	work,	a	unique	quality	he	conferred	solely	with	the	gestures	needed	to	make	his	works.	I	suggest	that	those	gestures,	even	though	we	cannot	see	his	hands	and	arms	moving	while	creating	them,	are	movements	we	nonetheless	somehow	sense	when	we	look	at	his	works.	We	all	have	the	ability,	and	can	further	develop	that	if	we	wish,	to	instantly	recognize	and	internalize	emotion-laden	intentions	that	those	now	frozen	gestures	convey,	even	if	we	are	most	often,	not	consciously	aware	of	that	recognition			3	Movement	The	issue	of	‘gesture’	is,	I	suggest,	also	directly	related	to	an	important	sense	that	is	not	among	the	5	senses	we	usually	think	of	as	our	human	perceptory	channels.	Nonetheless	it	is	an	important	one	all	of	us	have,	called	xiii‘proprioception’.	Although	I	am	not	a	painter,	I	am	able	to	sense	the	movements	needed	for	the	brushstrokes	I	see	in	a	painting.	Additionally,	when	I	approach	a	sculpture,	its	size	and	the	position	it	takes	up	in	space	with	respect	to	my	own,	will	determine	in	large	measure	how	I	can	and	will	‘approach’	it,	and	that	will	in	important	measure,	determine	how	it	affects	me.	How	and	why	does	that	happen?	In	an	xivarticle	by	professor	of	Philosophy,	Barbara	Montero,	entitled	“Proprioception	as	an	Aesthetic	Sense”,	I	find	a	convincing	argument	for	my	
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position	that	body	and	emotion	are	very,	very	much	more	important	in	art	than	we	are	giving	them	credit	for.						4	Trial	&	error	
	Another	skill	artists	need	to	develop	is	the	ability	to	decide	when	to	continue	with	a	work	they	are	making	in	its	current	direction,	or	at	other	times	to	make	considerable	changes	in	that	direction.	Very	frequently	in	artmaking,	uncertainties	arise	about	various	qualities	the	artist	wishes	his	artwork	to	have,	and	consequently,	which	choices	might	best	advance	those	qualities.	Let’s	call	this	the	‘feeling’	a	particular	work	should	have-	or	can	evoke.	Making	art	in	my	experience	is	not	a	linear	process.	In	fact	it	is	very	far	from	linear.	The	process	of	making	art	is	characterized	by	an	obligatory	openness	to	what	is	at	many	times	unexpectedly	revealed	in	its	course,	what	‘emerges’	while	making,	with	the	accompanying	need	to	respond	to	those	revelations.	Every	artist	needs	to	develop	a	sense	of	how	and	when	to	‘stay	his	course’,	or	contrariwise,	to	recognize	when	it	is	necessary	to	make	bold	changes	of	direction	in	response	to	what	is	revealed	as	the	process	unfolds.	Artists	must	also	try	to	remember	when	and	why	they	felt	it	necessary	to	change	direction	in	the	course	of	their	works.	Doing	so	can	help	them	at	an	earlier	stage	in	subsequent	works	to	avoid	some	of	the	same	‘traps’	they	earlier	fell	prey	to.	In	other	words,	artists	must	be	prepared	to	both	take	risks	and	make	mistakes,	very	many	of	them,	at	times	even	very	BIG	ones!	They	must	learn	to	accept	their	mistakes	as	sometimes	unavoidable,	and	develop	an	ability	to	learn	from	them.	Artists	are	obliged	constantly	to	make	a	great	number	of	choices	along	uncharted	pathways,	to	
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develop	both	the	necessary	courage	and	sensitivity	to	decide	which	paths	to	take,	or	at	times,	when	it’s	better	to	turn	back	and	choose	another	path.	There	is	no	learning	imaginable	that	must	be	undertaken	on	a	more	experiential	and	personal	basis	than	learning	of	this	kind.		5	Feedback	Artists	need	additionally	to	develop	an	ability	to	find	and	maintain	a	workable	balance	between	what	others	say	about	their	work,	and	what	they	themselves	feel	and	think	about	it,	both	while	making	the	work	and	afterwards.	This	demands	a	rather	extraordinary	capacity,	one	consistent	with	the	artist’s	individual	personality,	in	order	to	achieve	it.	He	must	constantly	accept	and	process	a	great	number	of	things	others	say,	attempting	to	extract	only	what	can	be	useful	and,	difficult	as	that	often	is,	somehow	disregard	what	is	not	useful.	A	number	of	the	reactions	artists	get	to	their	works	will	in	fact	be	quite	damaging	if	they	are	not	able	to	accomplish	this.	I	have	earlier	indicated	my	position	that	an	artist’s	works	are	not	depictions	of	objective	reality	as	we	all	can-,	should-	or	do	see	that	in	equal	measure.	Instead,	depictions	in	art	reveal	the	artist’s	own	very	highly	personal	realities,	dealing	often	with	deeply	held	feelings,	experiences,	impressions,	or	intuitions	about	those	realities.	Nothing	we	normally	show	or	discuss	with	each	other	is	as	sensitive	and	difficult	to	discuss	as	our	deepest	most	personal	individual	realities,	these	are	often	very	sensitive	indeed!	For	the	artist,	it	is	not	facts	about	things	or	experiences	that	everyone	can	recognize	that	are	being	depicted	in	his	works.	Instead,	that	which	he	struggles	to	imbue	his	works	with	are	his	own	very	personal-,	and	quite	often,	distinctly	vulnerable	feelings	about	things.	Art	is	personal!			
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6	Affordance	Perhaps	one	of	the	most	difficult	of	the	skills	artists	need	to	develop	is	the	ability	to	‘see	things	differently’.		Artists	must	learn	to	pay	attention,	to	see,	feel	and	express	things	rather	differently	than	others	do	so.	To	develop	this	ability	requires	a	great	deal	of	practice,	it	is	not	something	we	can	learn	by	reading-	or	thinking.	Instead,	it	needs	to	be	acted	upon.	Unlike	scientists,	artists	are	not	engaged	to	find-	and	reveal	‘universal	truths’,	instead	they	are	more	intent	on	discovering	what	might	be	called	‘universal	possibilities’.	Those	are	always	ones	that	in	first	instance	the	artist	recognizes	as	useful	for	himself.	Artists	are	not	in	first	instance	busy	with	at	what	we	regard	as	commonly	held	facts,	truths	or	paradigm.	Instead	they	look	beyond-,	under-	and	in	between	those.		A	simple	way	to	say	this	is:	artists	both	see	and	show	us	things	not	as	we	all	commonly	see	those.	Art	works	offer	us	an	opportunity	to	consider	things	most	of	us	are	indeed	familiar	with,	but	then	almost	always	depicted	in	very	different	ways	than	we	normally	encounter.	If	we	take	advantage	of	that	opportunity	to	look	at	things	differently,	we	may	decide	that	it	is	very	interesting	to	do	so!	We	may	discover	in	that	way	that	our	habitual	visual	or	cognitive	organizational	systems	seem	often	very	limited.	We	experience	quite	new,	different-,	stimulating,	and	revealing	ways	to	look	at	things	we	thought	we	knew.	In	this	context,	the	term	xv‘affordances’		is	I	think	a	very	useful	one.	We	habitually	look	at	things	and	situations	in	a	very	limited	way.	Much	of	the	time,	we	are	conscious	of	little	more	than	the	potential	dangers	things	or	situations	may	present	for	us,	ones	that	we	should	avoid,	or	contrariwise,		advantages	those	things	or	situations	might	offer	to	us	if	we	decide	to	interact	with	them.	A	commonly	cited	example	of	the	affordance	principle	tells	us	that	a	chair	we	may	come	across	is,	in	first	instance,	only	understood	by	us	as	an	object	offering	(affording)	the	possibility	to	sit	on	it.	That	chair	however,	it	is	
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interesting	to	consider,	does	not	at	all	offer	the	same	possibility	to	an	elephant.	When	encountering	a	chair,	an	elephant	will	see	and	understand	that	object	(its	meaning)	very	differently	than	you	or	I.	An	elephant	might,	for	example,	see	the	chair	merely	as	something	he	could	easily	decide	to	step	on	and	crush.	Doing	so	might	be	quite	useful,	perhaps	in	order	to	relieve	some	tension	the	animal	might	be	feeling.		In	any	case,	what	a	chair	affords	an	elephant	is	very	different	than	what	it	affords	a	human.	The	meanings	(the	affordances)	that	a	chair,	a	situation,	a	theoretical	argument,	a	work	of	art,	or	anything	else	we	encounter	have	for	us,	depend	in	very	large	measure	on	what	we	imagine	their	potential	usefulness	for	us	to	be.	Meaning,	understood	in	this	way,	is	not	part	of	a	chair,	an	art	object,	or	an	argument.		Instead	it	is	only	the	meaning	that	we,	either	socially	or	individually,	assign	to	those	things.	Meaning	depends	then	on	our	personal	interests,	on	our	societal	conventions,	on	our	needs,	on	our	physical	capabilities	and	limitations,	and	on	our	individual	wishes	and	intentions	at	any	one	given	time.	It	should	be	clear	that	all	of	those	vary	quite	substantially	from	person	to	person,	and	additionally	vary	for	any	one	person	from	time	to	time.	Artists	I	think,	must	be	highly	aware	of	the	fact	that	meaning	is	relative	to	intention,	i.e.	it	can	be	freely	assigned	rather	than	being	something	that	is	fixed	or	inherent	in	an	object	or	work	of	art.	Artists	need	to	learn	to	see,	think	and	feel	flexibly,	to	develop	the	ability	to	look	at	things	from	a	great	number	of		angles,	rather	than	rely	on	existing	viewpoints,	definitions	or	formulae.	It	should	in	other	words,	be	understood	as	very	much	in	art’s	interest,	to	teach	students	of	art	that	systems	(‘things’)	change.	Organizational	systems	offer	us	confirmed	and	agreed	‘affordances’.	But	it	is	undeniable	that	many	other	affordancescan-	and	will	be	discovered	when	we	search	between-	or	beyond	those	already	confirmed	by	the	system.	Artists,	I	claim,	are	not	here	to	reinforce-	or	confirm	existing	systems	or	historical	paradigm	by	referring	to-,	or	paraphrasing	those.	Once	again,	that’s	just	not	their	job!	Instead,	I	think	the	
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artist’s	job	can	be	usefully	be	looked	at	as	precisely	the	reverse.	The	artist’s	job	is	to	find	-or	invent-,	and	pick	holes	in	existing	systems.	We	should,	I	believe,	really	be	stimulating	young	artists	to	become	very	good	at	that!	In	a	word,	what	I	am	speaking	of	here	is	xviCreativity.		There	should	be	no	discussion	about	the	vital	importance	of	creativity	in	art,	let	alone	in	science	and	most	other	pursuits.	Creativity	is	however	not	being	stimulated	when	we	suggest,	believe	or	act	as	if	our	systems	(art	historical-,	stylistic-,	philosophical-,	etc.)	are	fixed,	immutable,	holy	or	inviolable.	Care	needs	to	be	taken,	I	am	suggesting,	that	our	lessons	about	art	history	and	philosophy	do	not	merely	enshrine	or	perpetuate	system,	suggesting	to	young	students	that	‘this	is	what	IS’.	An	art	historical	continuum	in	my	view,	suggests	exactly	that.	Instead	we	should	take	care	also	to	make	clear	to	art	students	that	History’s	lessons	concern	nothing	more	than	what	HAS	BEEN	UP	UNTIL	THIS	MOMENT.	It	is	not	necessary,	I’m	claiming,	to	have	or	maintain	a	constant	awareness	of	all	previous	facts	in	order	to	create	new	ones.	In	fact,	the	two	may	at	times	be	incompatible.	The	abilities	and	sensitivities	I	name	here	constitute	of	course,	only	a	partial	listing	of	all	those	needed	by	artists,	many	others	are	needed	as	well.	However,	all	of	those	I’ve	named	here	require	training	in-	and	attention	for	individual	actions,	impressions	and	feelings,	in-	and	about	the	material	world,	and	also	with	respect	to	the	immaterial	worlds	(of	thoughts	and	emotions)	that	each	of	us	inhabits.	These	difficult	to	train	abilities	are	not	ones	that	can	be	learned	primarily	through	reading	and	writing.	As	useful	as	are	the	lessons	we	absorb	from	art	history,	philosophy,	art	theory,	psychology,	indeed	from	academic	study	of	any	kind,	they	are	often	not	very	helpful	when	it	comes	to	individual	sensitivity.	That	is	something	we	must	train	and	develop	individually.		
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WHERE	DOES	LOVE	LIVE?	Those	individual	abilities	I	named	don't	issue	from	the	realm	of	our	conscious	rational	thought,	i.e.	they	are	not	directly	related	to	thinking	processes	at	all.	Instead,	they	issue	from	the	domain	of	the	body,	i.e.	its	very	real	intuitive-	and	emotional	capacity	to	retain	memories,	and	to	react	automatically	to	stimuli,	both	internal	and	external	ones.	The	word	‘sensitivity’	derives	from	sense,	and	originates	in	pre-cognitive,	emotional	processes	rather	than	in	the	‘higher’	brain	processing	centers	where	thinking	occurs.	Those	more	‘primitive’	pre-cognitive	capacities	are	the	most	immediate	and	essential	perceptive	and	decision-making	tools	we	employ	when	we	make	or	appreciate	art.	A	very	considerable	proportion	of	decisions	we	take	in	art	is	not	constituted	by	what	we	think,	but	is	instead	directly	informed	by	what	we	feel.	The	cognitive	neuroscientist	Antonio	Damasio	in	a	xviilecture	from	2009	makes	it	clear	that	it	is	not	rational	thinking	that	is	responsible	for	a	great	number	of	the	choices	we	make	in	life.	Instead,	it	is	the	feelings	we	have	about	our	respective	choices	that	are	determinant	for	our	thinking,	and	consequently	for	the	choices	we	make.	It	is	clearly	not	the	other	way	around	as	we	are	most	often	inclined	to	imagine.	In	an	xviii	interview	with	Damasio,	he	cites	as	an	example,	his	interaction	with	a	patient	whose	brain	was	severely	damaged	in	an	accident.	Damage	was	incurred	to	a	part	of	the	brain	where	emotional	processing	faculties	are	concentrated,	while	leaving	the	patient’s	intellectual	capacities	entirely	intact.	From	Damasio’s	description	of	his	interactions	with	his	patient,	it	becomes	clear	that	decisions	about	even	the	simplest	of	things	were	no	longer	possible	for	the	patient	without	his	emotional	processing	systems	because	those	provide	the	definitive	impulse	for	deciding	one-way	or	the	other.	In	a	xixtext	from	“A	
second	chance	for	Emotion”,	Damasio	talks	about	the	history	of	neuroscience,	making	the	case	that	the	role	of	Emotion	in	each	of	our	lives	remains	very	seriously	underestimated	in	Science.	From	what	science	is	now	telling	us,	I	
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think	it	abundantly	clear	that	the	role	of	what	is	sensed,	felt	and	emoted	in	life	in	general,	and	art	in	particular,	is	a	very	much	more	central	and	important	one	than	we	have	yet	accepted	or	understood	it	to	be.	When	emotions	become	conscious	experience	we	speak	of	feelings,	we	feel	things.	Without	our	poorly	understood	but	acute	and	wondrous	sensory	abilities,	we	cannot	make	art	that	has	the	power	to	evoke	complex	emotions,	and	hence	give	rise	to	the	subsequent	thoughts	of	real	value	we	have	about	them.		I	believe	it	essential	that	we	study	and	learn	much	more	about	this	in	order	that	we	are	then	able	to	use	those	lessons	in	art	education.	It	seems	to	me	at	present	that,	rather	than	undertaking	that	investigation	in	art	education,	what	we	are	doing	is	in	large	measure	simply	ignoring	the	role	of	emotion.	In	large	part	I	think,	this	is	because	we	don’t	yet	understand	it	at	all	well,	making	it	as	a	result,	quite	difficult	to	discuss.	Instead	we	tend	to	focus	our	attention	on	teaching	students	to	ask	and	answer	completely	different	questions.	Characteristic	of	this	preference	for	what	I’d	call	‘reliable	answers	to	unrelated	questions’	is	our	current	tendency	to	teach	the	practice	of	art	as	largely	dependent	on	critical	thinking.	We	require	of	art	students	for	example,	that	they	read	and	understand	highly	esoteric	philosophical	tracts,	which	we	persuade	them	are	somehow	related	to	art.	For	me,	it’s	something	of	a	mystery	by	what	line	of	reasoning	art	and	philosophy	can	be	thought	of	as	closely	related	pursuits.	In	my	own	experience,	with	one	important	exception	I	can	think	of	they	are	not	remotely	related!	The	one	thing	those	two	pursuits	do	have	in	common	I	think,	is	that	both	demand	the	rigorous	examination	and	acceptance	of	Uncertainty.	Both	Philosophy	and	Art	relentlessly	question	the	degree	to	which	we	can	be	certain	of	things.	Are	things	really	as	we	commonly	see	them,	as	we	think	we	know	them?	What	basis	in	fact,	do	we	have	for	any	of	our	beliefs,	those	concerning	ourselves,	or	those	relative	to	the	things,	people	and	thoughts,	even	the	universe	that	surrounds	us?	By	asking	such	questions,	
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philosophy	stimulates	us	to	imagine	and	analyze	alternatives	for	the	ways	we	commonly	think,	see	and	sense	things.	That	practice	is	very	conducive	to	Creativity.	It	is,	after	all,	only	by	positing	that	things	are-,	or	may	be	distinctly	different	from	our	normal	understanding	of	them,	that	new	ideas	come	into	existence.	In	this	respect,	I	think	it	valid	to	say	that	Art	and	Philosophy	have	in	common	that	they	can	only	be	engaged	in	effectively,	if	and	when	we	are	a	
priori	willing	to	suspend	our	beliefs.	Inxxdefinitions	of	the	word	Philosophy	however,	can	also	be	found	the	reasons	why	I	consider	philosophy,	in	spite	of	the	important	similarity	I	just	noted,	a	pursuit	quite	different	from	art.	The	definitions	seem	uniformly	to	make	of	philosophy	a	practice	primarily	determined	by	its	dependence	on	reason	and	logic.	Art	in	sharp	contrast,	I	seriously	hope,	would	not	be	defined	by	any	sensible	person	as	relying	on	the	exercise	of	reason	and	logic!	Yet	another	consequential	difference	between	art	and	philosophy	for	me,	is	the	fact	that	philosophy	attempts	to	arrive	at	points	of	view	that	suggest-,	represent-	or	aim	at	consensus.	Art	in	my	view	attempts	no	such	thing.	Art	should	instead	be	looked	at	as	both	emphasizing	and	promoting	the	value	of	a	great	number	of	very	divergent	viewpoints.	Art	neither	advocates	nor	confirms	the	convergence	of	-	or	the	existence	of	any	important	consensus	about	those	many	points	of	view.	To	sum	up	here,	very	unlike	philosophy	then,	art	neither	aims	at	consensus,	nor	is	practiced	largely	through	thinking.	When	we	try	to	compare	two	human	pursuits	with	each	other,	c.q.	Art	and	Philosophy,	and	discover	that	both	the	goals	they	aim	for	and	the	primary	processes	by	which	they	are	conducted	are	very	different,	I	think	the	conclusion	warranted	that	we	are	looking	at	quite	different	pursuits.		
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IS	ART	‘ACADEMIC’?	The	fact	that	we	have	bodies	and	the	genetic	imperative	to	defend	them,	requires	that	in	addition	to	intellect,	we	are	endowed	with	emotion,	and	emotion	is	literally	antithetical	to	objectivity.	In	philosophical	terms	in	fact,	objective	reality	if	such	a	thing	exists,	would	seem	to	be	only	that	which	can	exist	independently	of	our	emotionally	biased	human	perception	of	it.	I	know	of	no	current	defensible	scientific	or	philosophical	claim	to	the	existence		of	any	such	reality.		Objectivity	then,	or	even	the	suggestion	of	it,	becomes	quite	troublesome.	In	fact	it	seems	a	singularly	unrealistic	goal	or	ambition	when	speaking	of	any	aspect	of	art.	Art	proceeds	very	clearly	from	what	is	subjective,	both	in	the	case	of	the	artist	and	the	viewer	of	his	art.	Objective	discourse	is	limited	to	those	issues	that	we	decide	(all	to	simplistically	in	my	view)	are	true	for	all	of	us,	or	for	which	that	status	is	being	strived	for	by	our	discourse,	i.e.	seeking	agreement.	That	kind	of	discourse	in	my	view	is	inconsistent	with	both	the	origins	and	the	main	purposes	of	art,		those	being	subjective	discourse.	For	those	reasons,	I	suggest	that	as	beneficial	as	academic	training	is	for	critical	thinking,	it	cannot	be	imagined	to	constitute	a	major	component	of	art	making.		I	will	add,	that	I	do	know	what	academic	training	is!	Before	my	training	and	career	as	an	artist	I	was	lucky	enough	to	be	able	to	profit	from	an	academic	education.		There	is	no	doubt	that	that	academic	training	was-	and	remains	important	for	me.	Because	of	it,	I	came	to	learn	many	things	about	the	world	and	was	enabled	to	approach	understanding	from	diverse	realms	of	human	knowledge.	I’d	like	to	think	additionally,	that	I’m	able	to	do	so	critically.	In	other	words,	I	sincerely	believe	that	academic	training	is	a	very	good	thing.	However,	based	on	my	experience	as	an	artist,	I	must	also	insist	that	it	is	neither	equal	to-,	nor	can	it	replace	the	training	of	an	entirely	different	nature	that	is	essential	to	making	art	of	quality.	The	abilities	needed	
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for	that	are	very	different	ones	indeed.	They	don’t	involve	fact-based	critical	thinking,	but	instead	sensitive	observations,	actions	and	reactions.	The	operative	words	in	the	last	sentence	are:	action	and	reaction.	One	of	the	important	differences	between	thinking	and	acting	is	the	degree	of	mutability	of	the	first	as	compared	to	the	second.	By	that	I	mean	that	there	is	risk	involved	in	actions,	risk	that	is	not	in	the	same	degree	implicit	in	thinking.	The	presence	of	that	risk	and	the	need	to	actively	engage	with	it	is	important!	For	example,	we	can	think	anything	we	want,	change	direction,	stop,	turn	back,	or	continue	straight	ahead,	following	the	thoughts	we	have.	We	can	even	completely	change	what	we	are	thinking,	i.e.	abandon	earlier	thoughts	if	we	decide	that	is	the	best	course	of	action.	We	cannot	however,	say	that	any	of	those	options	apply	equally	to	our	actions.	Actions	are	not	as	easily	denied,	changed	or	undone	as	thoughts	or	words	are.	Actions	bring	with	them	a	significantly	higher	degree	of	the	need	to	consider	carefully	and	choose,	to	take	risk.	In	other	words,	a	greater	degree	of	commitment	to	the	choices	we	make	is	generally	implied	in	our	actions.	Moreover,	for	most	professions	we	think	of,	there	exist	‘prescribed’	practices,	those	being	consistent	with	the	specific	goals	of	each	of	those	professions.	Contrariwise	in	art	practice,	the	need	to	select	from	among	an	almost	unlimited	number	of	options	is	one	of	its	most	significant	characteristics.	We	confront	and	navigate	what	seems	often	an	infinite	number	of	options	that	we	are	free	to-,	but	also	obliged	to	choose	from	in	art.	“The	freedom	that	an	artist	has…”	is	an	overfamiliar	phrase	for	all	of	us.		Very	often,	artists	find	themselves	the	envy	of	others	because	it	is	imagined	that	making	art	means	you	can	“	do	whatever	you	want”.		While	that	notion	about	art	is	not	very	accurate,	it	is	also	not	without	some	degree	of	truth	to	it.	The	number	of	choices	an	artist	can	make,	but	is	also	obliged	to	make,	are	far	more	numerous	than	those	that,	for	example,	a	shoemaker	or	a	surgeon	must	make,	
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or	is	free	to	make.	That	difference	is	I	think	important,	and	it	results	very	largely	from	what	is	‘prescribed’	for	those	very	different	practices.	We	can	of	course	easily	imagine	that	a	surgeon’s	decisions	are	far	more	consequential	ones	than	those	typically	faced	by	artists.	Be	that	as	it	may,	it	does	not	change	the	number	of	choices	open	to	one	or	to	the	other.	A	surgeon,	for	example,	is	not	free	to	decide	to	incise	with	his	surgical	knife	what	by	some	people	might	be	considered	a	particularly	creative,	evocative,	or	beautiful	pattern	of	cuts	in	the	body	of	his	living	patient.	Similarly,	a	shoemaker	is	generally	not	free	to	make	a	pair	of	shoes	that,	for	example,	he	renders	highly	unusual	and	attractive	by	virtue	of	a	stunning	pattern	of	through-and	through	perforations	in	the	soles	of	those	shoes.	No	matter	how	appealing	such	a	course	of	action	might	perhaps	appear	for	an	unusually	creative	surgeon	or	shoemaker,	acting	on	it	will	defeat	quite	central	goals	of	their	professions.	For	most	professions	whose	outcomes	are	dependent	on	actions,	there	exists	a	set	of	prescribed	rules	and	guidelines	that	necessarily	limit	the	choices	their	practitioners	have.	These	restrict	them	in	large	measure	to	only	those	choices	that	clearly	serve	the	purposes	the	practitioners	must	fulfill.		In	other	words,	‘form	follows	function’	with	respect	to	most	practices.	The	choices	open	to	a	practitioner	depend	on	the	purposes	his	practice	fulfills.	It	will	be	clear	what	that	means	in	the	case	of	a	surgeon	or	a	shoemaker,	we	can	easily	agree	what	the	important	purposes	served	by	practitioners	of	those	professions	are.	For	artists	however,	this	raises	the	very	much	more	difficult	question:	“what	are	an	
artist’s	purposes?”		
ART	AND	THE	ARTIST’S	PURPOSE	Once	again,	the	answers	here	are	by	no	means	clear	or	easy	ones.	While	we	could	quickly	arrive	at	a	high	degree	of	consensus	regarding	a	surgeon’s-	or	a	
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shoemaker’s	purposes,	the	same	cannot	be	said	of	an	artist’s	purposes.	The	multitude	of	very	different	answers	we	hear,	read	or	imagine	when	questioning	art	or	artists’	purposes	indicate	that	we	are	far	from	any	consensus	regarding	answers	to	the	question.	That	poses	significant	problems	when	designing	anything	that	is	to	become	policy	for	art,	whether	in	education	or	in	the	larger	arena	of	public	policy.	For	that	reason,	it	is	highly	important	that	we	try	to	find	and	agree	on	very	much	clearer	answers	than	we	have	at	present	regarding	the	purposes	of	art.	After	all,	everything	we	can-	and	must	decide	now	and	in	the	future	with	respect	to	policy	for	art,	clearly	depends	on	having	those	answers.	So	that	difficult	question	persists:	“educate	practicing	artists	to	do	what,	i.e.	
what	is	art’s	purpose?	“Here	is	the	answer	I’d	like	to	offer:	The	artist’s	purpose	is	to	transform	material	that	cannot	speak	of-	or	for	itself,	into	a	vehicle	for	transmitting	content.	That	content	is	not	singular	in	nature,	and	is	primarily	emotive-	rather	than	rational,	i.e.	its	purpose	is	to	evoke	emotion.	Complex	processes	of	the	free	association	of	all	the	things	we	know,	remember,	think	of	and	feel	at	that	moment	are	initiated	in	an	un-prescribed	way.	The	result	is	that	new	things,	sometimes	amazing	and	quite	important	things	we	would	not	otherwise	be	aware	of,	are	sometimes	revealed	to	us.	That	applies	in	equal	measure	for	both	the	artist	and	for	his	audience.		That	is	art’s	main	purpose.			This	purpose	is	not	one	we	can	accomplish	in	the	same	measure	by	speaking,	reading	or	writing.	Words	alone	are	normally	not	often	able	to	accomplish	that.	The	emotive	capacity	‘things’	(art	works	included)	have	for	us,	is	quite	different	from	the	emotive	capacity	of	words.	The	words	we	use	have	quite	specific	definitions,	every	one	of	them.	That	is	after	all,	their	express	purpose.	The	word	‘shoe’	for	example,	must	evoke	on	hearing	or	reading	that	word,	very	highly	similar	connotations	and	associations	for	all	who	speak	the	English	language.	
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This	is	the	purpose	of	our	spoken	languages.	By	contrast,	we	have	not	agreed	(indeed,	we	cannot	agree)	that	any	such	thing	is	true	with	respect	to	how	each	of	us	will	feel	when	we	contemplate	a	real	shoe,	hold	a	shoe	in	our	hands	without	having	the	intention	to	put	it	on	our	foot,	or	see	a	shoe-like	form	in	a	painting.		What	we	think	of	and	feel	when	we	contemplate	a	real	shoe	or	confront	the	image	of	one,	is	much	further	removed	from	the	realm	of	its	functionality	than	the	word	alone.	When	we	read	or	hear	the	word	‘shoe’,	we	think	in	first	instance	only	of	its	‘affordances’.	When	confronting	the	object	or	its	image,	we	both	think	and	feel	many	more	entirely	different	things.		An	artist	learns	quickly	that	the	emotive	qualities	his	work	has	for	himself,	cannot	in	very	large	measure	be	supposed	to	be	the	same	ones	it	will	have	for	others.	Experience	demonstrates	this	conclusively.	In	undertaking	to	make	art	works,	the	artist	is	free	to	do	almost	anything	he	wants.	There	is	no	pre-existing	consensus	concerning	an	artwork’s	‘function’	or	its	‘prescribed	meaning’,	either	in	kind	or	degree.	The	‘function’	an	artwork	has	is	only	what	emerges	from	
interaction	with	it,	rather	than	something	predefined.	In	first	instance,	that	interaction	I	speak	of	is	between	the	artwork	and	its	maker.		I’d	like	to	emphasize	the	great	importance,	when	discussing	anything	we	imagine	art	to	
be	for	in	my	view,	of	that	first	interaction	between	the	artist	and	his	artwork.	I	will	simply	say	this:	The	degree	to	which	a	critically	important	purpose	I	think	art	serves,	the	purpose	accomplished	during	the	interaction	between	the	work	and	its	maker,	is	consequently	ignored	in	discussions	about	the	function	of	art,	is	puzzling	for	me!	I	have	earlier	suggested	that	we	should	not	imagine	that	artists	are	primarily	engaged	to	convey	information	about	things	to	others.	Rather,	I	think	it	needs	to	be	understood	that	they	are	very	largely	engaged	to	explore	and	discover	the	meanings	of	things	for	themselves!	I	think	this	is	true	of	art	the	first	humans	made,	and	I	believe	that	since	then,	that	hasn’t	changed	nearly	so	much	as	we	seem	to	be	imagining.	It	is	decidedly	strange	for	me	that	
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we	currently	seem	to	limit	our	attention	in	teaching	so	largely	to	what	an	artwork	might	mean	for	everyone	other	than	for	the	artist	who	makes	it!	A	simple	change	of	focus	in	that	regard	would,	I	think,	make	a	great	many	things	regarding	art	more	understandable	for	all	of	us.		The	widely	propagated	point	of	view	that	artists	are	or	should	be	primarily	motivated	by	the	wish	to	show-	or	tell	us	things	is	in	my	opinion,	a	fallacy.	I	am	convinced	that	if	we	tested	that	question	in	a	survey,	we	will	find	that	most	artists	make	art	primarily	because	it	offers	them	a	unique	and	highly	rewarding	way	to	learn	and	experience	things	that	prove	consistently	of	great	value	for	
themselves.	I	don’t	believe	that	means	that	artists	should	therefore	be	thought	egocentric.	I	think	that	exactly	the	same	is	true	for	athletes,	scientists,	philosophers,	and	most	others	I	can	imagine.	We	are	it	seems	to	me,	systematically	taught	or	encouraged	to	represent	and	define	our	activities,	whatever	those	may	be,	very	largely	in	terms	of	the	value	or	meaning	those	have	for	others,	i.e.	for	society	as	a	whole.	But	in	simple	truth,	I	think	the	overriding	motivations	for	making	art,	for	doing	science,	becoming	a	doctor,	an	athlete,	or	pretty	much	anything	else,	are	always	much	more	importantly	highly	personal	ones.	Artists	discover	deeper-lying	subjective,	very	personal	meanings	of	things	and	experiences	through	the	act	of	making	art.	There	is	no	better	substitute	for	that	experience	that	I	know	of.		That	is	knowledge	of	a	kind	that	cannot	be	conveyed	at	all	well	in	words.	This	is	very	real	‘physical	knowledge’	which	is	acquired.	It	is	true	that	this	physical	knowledge	then	becomes	the	basis	of	many	subsequent	associations	and	thought	processes,	ones	we	can	then	easily	verbalize	if	we	choose	to.	But	the	kind	of	knowledge	I	speak	of	here	that	derived	from	making	art,	is	not	reversible.	We	cannot	reverse	the	process	to	distil	or	deduce	physical-emotional	knowing	from	the	verbal	abstractions	we	
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later	find	to	describe	it.		Anyone	who	is	not	able	to	feel	and	acknowledge	the	very	real	physical	aspects	of	the	experience	of	art	(emotion),	will	be	unable	to	fully	understand	what	it	is,	how	or	why	we	do	it,	or	why	we	should	continue	to	teach	or	value	it.	
	fig.	9		“Falling	from	Grace”	-	2003	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	A	great	deal	more	attention	and	emphasis	is	indicated	I	think,	for	all	that	occurs	and	is	learned	during	the	important	first	stage	in	art	I	just	spoke	of,	i.e.	what	is	learned	by	the	artist	through	the	making.	It	is	only	after	that	first	interaction	between	the	artist	and	his	work	that	the	next	phase	begins,	interaction	between	viewers	and	the	artwork.	Assuming,	as	we	often	simplistically	seem	to,	that	
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what	is	learned,	conveyed,	felt	and	thought	in	the	initial	phase	is	in	large	measure	similar	to	what	happens	when	others	view	the	work	is	I	think,	a	mistake.	Elsewhere	I	discuss	in	this	text	pluriformity	of	meaning,	the	centrality	of	bodily	movement	in	cognition,	and	other	issues	that	indicate	strongly	that	the	signifcance	an	artwork	has	for	the	artist	will	certainly	be	very	different	than	those	that	it	will	have	for	almost	anyone	else.		Following	the	artist’s	initial	interaction	with	his	own	artwork,	others	will	see	that	work.	The	artist	learns	much	from	the	experiences	others	relate	having	with	his	artwork.	The	comparison	of	his	experiences	with	what	others	experience	in	his	artwork	is	one	of	the	most	valuable	rewards	making	art	offers.	Making	artworks	affords	the	artist	a	way	to	capture	and	preserve	fleeting	glimpses	of	subconsciously	occurring	processes	and	impressions,	ones	taking	place	inside	all	of	us,	that	perhaps	only	this	transfer	into	material	can	make	perceptible.	In	other	words,	both	making	and	viewing	art	allow	normally	hidden	aspects	of	that	which	we	intuit,	sense	and	feel	to	acceed	to	a	level	that	affords	their	conscious	consideration.		Art,	I	claim,	is	an	eminently	useful	device,	capable	of	raising	normally	hidden	aspects	of	our	subconscious	lives	to	the	level	of	our	conscious	consideration.	It	is	in	that	respect	that	I	think	art	perhaps	has	its	greatest	value	for	humanity.		Through	art	we	are	able	to	capture	and	share	glimpses	of	what	goes	on	at	otherwise	inaccesible	levels	of	our	subconscious	existence.	This	function	art	performs,	is	one	for	which	I	suggest	there	is	currently	no	better	means	of	accomplishing	it.		If	this	is	true,	then	I	think	that	it	constitutes	a	spectacular	function	art	serves.	What	we	‘recognize’	in	great	art,	what	we	communicate	about	through	it	then,	are	both	the	many	striking	similarities	we	discover,	as	well	as	the	very	great	differences	that	characterize	each	of	our	highly	individual	subconscious	lives.	Art	reveals	to	us	what	is	normally	thoroughly	hidden	from	
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our	view.	Artworks	can	speak	profoundly	of	the	deepest	and	most	individual	kinds	of	experiences	and	feelings	that	the	artist	and	the	viewers	of	his	work	can	possibly	exchange	with	each	other.	Art’s	great	value	resides	then	in	its	capacity	to	offer	us	glimpses	of	things	that	would	otherwise	remain	largely	unknown	to	us,	accomplishing	that	in	a	way	and	to	a	degree	that	I	think	few	other	activities	we	undertake	can	parallel.	To	paraphrase	here	something	I	once	heard	a	very	long	time	ago,	the	source	of	which	I	unfortunatly	no	longer	recall:	‘when	an	
artist	succeeds	to	make	tangible	in	an	artwork	his	deepest	and	most	individual	
feelings	and	experiences,	this	can	speak	to	us	of	the	most	universally	shared	and	
fundamental	aspects	of	our	humanity.	Those	that	every	one	of	us	can	deeply	and	
meaningfully	recognize.’	It	is	because	it	is	exceedingly	difficult	to	put	that	kind	of	knowledge/experience	into	words,	that	we	have	art	to	do	it.		
THE	ART	EXPERIENCE,	LIMINALITY,	AND	A	FEW	WORDS	ABOUT	MAGIC	Why	is	it	that	art	can	sometimes	have	such	a	profound	impact	on	us,	when	most	other	things	we	see	daily	do	not	seem	to	have	a	similar	impact?	What	makes	experiencing	art	‘special’?	Part	of	the	answer,	I	think,	could	be	that	conventions	regarding	how	we	exhibit	and	view	art,	e.g.	the	conditions	that	exist	when	we	decide	to	undergo	it,	assist	this.		There	is	a	term	I	think	a	useful	one	to	describe	what	happens	when	I,	for	example,	see	a	work	of	art	and	am	able	to	give	my	serious	attention	to	it.	The	term	is	liminal,	and	it	applies	to	a	concept	from	anthropology.	Liminal	refers	to	an	experience	describable	as	an	unusual	one,	a	sometimes	unclear,	difficult	to	describe	state	between	two	more	clear	and	distinct	states.	Among	other	things,	it	applies	to	the	period	of	time	during	a	xxi	
rite	of	passage	ritual	in	tribal	societies.	A	young	boy	for	example,	on	reaching	the	age	that	his	tribal	society	defines	as	the	point	of	‘passage	into	manhood’,	will	be	required	to	undergo	a	ritual	marking	that	passage.	Let’s	imagine	that	
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we’ve	been	invited	to	attend	such	an	event,	and	are	told	that	next	Monday,	at	1:00	in	the	afternoon,	that	rite	of	passage	for	one	specific	boy	will	commence.		On	waking	up	at	7	o’clock	that	very	Monday	morning,	he	is	still	a	boy,	a	state	he	knows	very	well	because	he’s	been	that	almost	all	his	life.	The	very	next	day	however,	after	the	ritual	is	completed,	he	will	have	become	something	entirely	different,	a	man.	From	that	moment	he	will	see	himself-,	and	will	be	seen	by	others	as	a	man,	for	the	entire	remainder	of	his	life.	That’s	a	momentous	change!	In	the	course	of	his	passage	ritual,	starting	at	1:00	on	that	Monday,	and	continuing	for	some	hours	until	the	ceremony	is	completed,	he	will	however,	confusingly,	be	neither	a	man	nor	a	boy.	He	will	be	something	that	is	unclear,	in	between	those	two	clearly	defined	states	of	identity,	boy	and	man.	During	his	rite	of	passage,	things	for	the	boy	will	likely	be	very	much	less	clear	than	they	were	before	it,	and	will	once	again	become	afterwards.	That	‘unclear’	period	of	time	during	the	rite	of	passage	ritual	is	called	a	liminal	state.	I	am	intrigued	by	the	similarity	I	sense	between	what	that	boy	likely	experiences	during	the	ritual,	and	what	happens	with	me	when	I	view	a	work	of	art	that	succeeds	to	move	me.	I	imagine	that	what	happens	when	I	give	my	entire	attention	to	a	moving	work	of	art,	might	also	be	called	a	liminal	state,	one	between	other	distinct,	familiar,	or	‘normal’	states	of	being.	When	I	go	to	a	museum,	I	will	see	many	paintings.	I	walk	through	the	museum	looking	at	each	of	them	briefly	until	one	of	those	paintings,	for	whatever	reasons,	captures	my	attention	in	a	way	the	others	I’ve	seen	haven’t.		At	such	a	moment,	I	approach	the	start	of	a	liminal	state.	Around	that	painting,	space	has	been	made	‘neutral’,	left	free,	allowing	me	better	to	concentrate	on	that	one	painting	I	will	now	give	very	close	attention	to.	I	am	thereby	assisted	to	limit	my	focus	to	that	one	object	of	my	interest,	take	advantage	of	existing	circumstances	to	immerse	myself	for	a	time	in	only	that	painting.	I	begin	to	take	up	various	positions	in	relation	to	the	painting,	moving	perhaps	first	closer	to	
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it,	then	away	from	it,	then	perhaps	again	closer.	I	look	intensely	at	the	painting,	both	as	a	whole,	and	as	a	function	of	its	parts,	willingly	giving	myself	over	to	the	experience	without	knowing	exactly	what	I	am	looking	for.	What	I’m	engaged	in	doing	at	such	times	is	the	result	of	a	quite	purposeful	decision	I’ve	made.	I’ve	decided	not	just	to	glance	at	the	painting,	and	then	perhaps	quickly	turn	my	attention	elsewhere	once	I’ve	determined	that	what	I’m	looking	at	is	a	
painting.	I	might	very	likely	unthinkingly	do	exactly	this	in	my	‘normal	attention	mode’.	No,	at	this	time	I	have	chosen	to	undertake	something	very	different	from	what	I	normally	do	with	everyday	objects	and	situations.	I	am	now	intent	on	deeply	‘undergoing’	the	experience	of	focusing	on	that	one	painting,	savoring	all	that	it	might	bring	me,	or	in	the	end	perhaps	disappointingly	may	not	bring	me.		I	have	‘drawn	down	my	focus’,	limited	my	attention	to	only	that	painting	in	all	its	aspects.	I	no	longer	pay	attention	to	anything	else.	I	‘take	the	painting	inside	me’	to	find	out	what	happens.	Why	do	I	do	that,	what	underlies	such	a	decision?	I	do	this	simply	because	I	am	curious	to	find	out	what	will	happen,	both	with	me	and	inside	me.	I	am	curious	only	with	respect	to	my	own	individual	and	spontaneous	reactions,	disregarding	others’	definitions,	reactions	or	descriptions.	That	means	that	I	have	effected	a	rather	dramatic	change	in	a	number	of	aspects	of	my	usual	observational	mode,	changed	my	position	with	respect	to	the	world	quite	considerably.	I	am,	for	example,	no	longer	at	all	concerned	with	how	others	may	regard	me.	I	have	completely,	or	almost	completely	turned	off	that	awareness,	a	very	unusual	thing	for	me	to	do	when	I	am	among	others.	At	such	a	time,	I	don’t	care	if	or	how	others	see	me.	I’m	now	doing	something	that	requires	my	complete	attention.	I	am	entirely	unconcerned	with	the	‘affordances’	of	that	object	I’m	looking	at,	i.e.	in	finding	out	what	I	might	do	with	that	object.	I	am	purposefully	paying	attention	only	to	what	happens	while	looking	and	feeling,	with	no	way	to	know	in	advance	what	that	will	be.	All	that	happens	when	I’m	looking	at	art	
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in	this	way,	results	from	a	very	conscious	decision	to	put	myself	into	a	different	state	than	my	normal	state	of	existence	or	awareness.	Normally,	I	am	aware	of	all-	or	most	things	that	surround	me.	Normally	my	actions	are	directed	at	achieving	clear	and	predefined	goals.	I	am	normally	highly	conscious	of	how	others	may	see	me.	In	fact,	of	I	think	about	it,	normally	I	have	a	very	different	set	of	purposes	and	awarenesses	altogether	than	when	I	view	art.	I	walk	from	here	to	there	because	I	want	to	arrive	there,	or	I	pick	up	an	object	because	I	can	use	it	to	accomplish	some	task.	Or	I	listen	to	a	friend	tell	me	something,	formulating	my	reactions	entirely	in	accordance	with	both	the	nature	of	our	relationship,	and	what	he	tells	me.	But	when	I’ve	made	the	decision	to	experience	a	work	of	art	as	fully	as	I	am	able,	I’m	doing	something	very	different.	I	have	decided	to	become	unusually	attentive	to	what	happens	to	me	in	a	situation	about	which	I	cannot	predict	what	that	will	be,	and	on	which	very	few	external	limitations	are	of	influence.	But,	we	could	ask,	is	that	so	very	different	from	deciding	to	drive	to	the	mountains	in	order	to	take	a	long	walk	alone	in	nature?	Is	that	not	the	same-	or	a	very	similar	kind	of	thing?	Although	in	first	instance	it’s	true	that	those	two	choices	appear	in	important	ways	similar,	there	are	also	some	quite	important	differences	between	them.	Two	obvious	similarities	are	the	commonality	of	the	wish	to	experience	‘beauty’,	and	the	likely	‘contemplative	states’	we	might	arrive	at	through	either	experience.	But	it	is	also	true	that	we	know	considerably	more	about-,	can	predict	to	a	much	greater	degree	what	will	happen	when	we	take	a	walk	through	nature,	than	with	respect	to	what	will	happen	when	we	deeply	experience	a	work	of	art	we	are	seeing	for	the	first	time.	Do	we	for	example,	typically	imagine	that	in	the	course	of	a	walk	in	nature,	we	may	be	confronted	with	something	surprising,	ugly,	repellant,	wildly	out	of	place,	or	which	perhaps	may	trigger	the	recall	of	a	deeply	felt	painful	experience?	Is	it	likely	that	the	nature	walk	will	result	in	the	same	kind	of	free-associative,	very	fast	moving,	unpredictable	and	difficult	to	
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pinpoint	reactions	that	are	likely	to	be	evoked	by	an	unfamiliar	painting?	I	suggest	that	the	answers	to	those	questions	indicate	significant	differences	in	both	the	degree	of-	and	kind	of	‘intention’	we	have	when	deciding	to	do	one	or	the	other.	Deciding	for	the	nature	walk,	or	alternatively	for	to	go	to	a	museum,	is	then	a	conscious	decision	to	undergo	distinctly	different	experiences.	There	is	yet	another	important	difference	between	deciding	to	undergo	what	results	from	one	or	the	other	of	those	two	activities.	When	we	concentrate	on	a	work	of	art,	our	focus	is	directed	at	what	the	actions	of	one	single	human	being,	acting	over	a	relatively	limited	period	of	time	has	caused	to	come	into	existence.	If	we	choose	instead	for	a	walk	in	nature,	we	opt	to	undergo	what	God,	and/or	the	Big	Bang,	and	all	subsequent	natural	evolutionary	(and	human)	processes,	acting	over	billions	of	years,	have	caused	to	come	into	existence.	This	indicates	that	the	choice	for	a	walk	in	nature,	or	alternatively	to	undergo	experiencing	a	painting,	will	confront	us	with	both	very	different	‘products’	and	very	different	kinds	of	‘Creators’!		Although	we	are	perhaps	not	always	conscious	of	it,	we	do	know	this.	I	think	that	is	certain	to	have	important	influence	on	the	kinds	of	reactions	we	will	have	to	one	or	the	other	experience.		In	the	case	of	the	painting,	we	carry	the	knowledge,	whether	fully	conscious	of	it	or	not,	that	one	person	has	caused	what	we’re	looking	at	to	come	into	existence.	We	then	naturally	assume	that	in	so	doing,	that	person,	the	artist,	had	some	purposes	in	mind.	We	can	correctly	assume	that	one	of	the	artist’s	primary	purposes	was	that	others	might	be	interested	to	undergo	whatever	results	from	giving	close	attention	to	his	work.	Because	of	this,	we	know	a	
priori,	that	some	form	of	communication	is	intended	or	is	possible	between	that	artist	via	his	work,	and	ourselves.	I	suggest	that	this	state	of	affairs	changes	very	considerably	if	we	decided	instead	for	the	nature	walk.	While	we	may	also	find	that	a	moving	experience,	most	of	us	will	be	unlikely	to	imagine	what		we	experience	on	our	walk	as	an	intentional	communication	of	‘content’	or	
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‘information’	between	someone	else	and	ourselves.	Quite	simply,	when	we	undergo	an	art	experience,	we	know	or	assume	that	it	is	intended	as	a	form	of	communication	between	humans.	Our	nature	walk	in	contrast,	is	usually	not	understood	by	us	as	implying	anything	remotely	similar.	I	think	it	is	fair	to	say	that	these	differences,	even	if	we	are	not	conscious	of	them,	result	in	considerable	differences	in	both	the	intentions	and	expectations	we	have	when	opting	for	one	or	the	other	of	those	two	experiences.	As	a	result	of	our	choice	between	the	two,	informed	by	both	different	intentions	and	expectations,	I	think	it	likely	that	the	experiences	we	undergo	in	the	two	cases	are	in	important	ways,	very	different	ones.	While	it’s	true	that	both	can	be	characterized	by	the	desire	to	experience	beauty	of	some	kind,	beauty	and	its	cousin,	aesthetics,	are	quite	slippery	words!	In	my	view,	those	words	are	not	remotely	as	specific	or	informative	as	we	seem	to	imagine	when	invariably	using	them	in	every	definition	of	ART.	Do	we	really	have	realistic	ground	for	assuming	that	all-,	or	even	most	humans	imagine	very	similar	things	when	they	think	of	beauty?	Both	a	walk	in	nature	and	a	visit	to	an	art	exhibition	are	activities	we	undertake	in	order	to	have	an	uncommon	experience,	one	that	transports	us	from	one	state	to	another.	Both	can	therefore	I	think	be	described	as	liminal	states.	When	we	consider	what	we	thought,	felt	and	did	before-,	during-,	and	after	those	respective	experiences,	both	can	perhaps	be	called	liminal	states.	What	we	experience	in	the	course	of	either	of	those	‘rites’	we	decide	to	undergo,	can	be	described	as	moving	from	a	‘normal’	state,	passing	through	what	is	an	unclear-	unpredictable	state,	in	order	afterwards,	to	arrive	at	a	somehow	altered	normal	state.	There	are	of	course,	many	other	ways	to	say	the	same	things	about	art	experience	I’ve	just	described	using	the	term,	liminality.	Alternatively,	I	could	
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say	for	example:	Experiencing	art	in	western	society	is	one	of	our	currently	
accepted	ways	to	invoke	and	reverently	undergo	a	‘magic	spell’.	We	do	this	
knowing	that	it	may	well	change	us	in	some	way.	We	feel	ready	for	a	change,	
whatever	that	is,	we’re	simply	curious	about	what	will	happen.	Very	likely,	we	
hope	or	believe	that	something	of	importance	and/or	good	might	result.	But	regardless	of	which	terms	we	choose	to	describe	it,	the	mystery	inherent	in		this	ritual	of	art	we	decide	to	undergo,	as	we	ll	asthe	possible	changes	in	us	it	might	result	in,	is	a	very	attractive	and	useful	option	we	have.	And	it	is	manifested	each	time	we	look	at-	and	are	able	to	deeply	enjoy	art.	If	we	are	artists,	we	decide	to	make	a	work	of	art.	Or	if	we	are	viewers,	we	view	works	of	art	that	we	hope	will	move	us.	While	that	movement	is	devoid	of	any	measurable	motion,	it	is	nevertheless	capable	of	transporting	us	from	where	we	were	before,	to	a	quite	different	place.	Art	offers	this	possibility.		
THE	LIMITATIONS	OF	RATIO	That	making	and	viewing	art	are	very	largely	intellectual	processes	is	a	premise	I	am	here	challenging.	When	I	say	‘intellectual	processes’,	I	mean	as	a	function	of	higher	cognitive	processing	in	the	brain,	in	other	words,	‘thinking’.	Currently	it	seems	to	me,	we	are	seriously	promoting	that	‘understanding	art’	is	something	we	should	teach	and	study	academically,	while	forgetting	that	‘practice’	is	both	the	very	first-	and	operative	word	that	young	aspiring	artists	signed	up	for.	We	seem	increasingly	to	believe	that	in	very	large	part,	making-,	understanding	and	appreciating	art	can	be	accomplished	simply	by	the	analysis	of	‘relevant	facts’	about	it.	In	other	words,	we	are	saying	that	the	analysis	of	factual	knowledge	is	what	is	critical	for	both	the	making	and	for	the	appreciation	of	art.	This	implies	that	art	making	and	appreciation	are	ordered,	conscious	analytical	processes.	I	believe	very	differently,	that	the	logical	and	
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analytical	considerations	that	accompany	the	making	of-,	or	that	emerge	from	a	work	of	art,	although	at	times	interesting,	are	far	less	important	aspects	of	art	than	our	emotional	processing	of	it.	My	view	is	that	in	first	instance	and	most	importantly,	it	is	art’s	ability	to	move	us	to	feel-,	as	opposed	to	think,	that	is	the	primary	purpose	it	serves.	A	great	deal	of	structural	time	in	education	seems	increasingly	dedicated	to	training	and	testing	the	ability	to	write	and	think	about	art,	and	correspondingly	less	attention	is	given	to	training	the	understanding	of-	and	ability	to	emote	through	art.	The	same	trend	seems	to	apply	for	the	structural	time	available	for	teaching	art	relative	to	the	amount	of	time	teachers	must	now	spend	on	documenting	and	measuring,	i.e.	‘evaluating’	their	teaching.	Those	last	activities	taking	up	increasing	portions	of	what	used	to	be	teaching	time,	demand	that	that	measurement	and	evaluation	is	carried	out	and	recorded	on	numerical	scales,	i.e.	‘objectively’	and	quantitatively.	I	believe	that	there	is	no	experimental	evidence	that	can	be	produced	to	indicate	that	training	the	ability	to	think	or	speak	about	art	is	significantly	beneficial	to	art	making.	Taking	that	position	a	step	further,	I	suggest	that	there	exists	no	demonstrable	relationship	between	the	ability	to	speak	and	reason	well	analytically,	and	the	ability	to	make	art	of	quality.	It	is	undeniable	that	verbal	and	analytical	abilities	are	important	when	it	comes	to	‘selling’	art.	But	we	should	not	be	confusing	what	sells	art	with	what	is	required	to	make	it	and	constitutes	its	real	value	for	us.		With	respect	to	the	trend	towards	‘absolute’	numerical	evaluation	scales	for	art	practice	education,	I	think	this	a	ridiculous	practice	simply	because	that	evaluation	is	an	unavoidably	subjective	one,	and	putting	a	number	on	a	subjective	judgment	in	no	way	makes	of	it	an	absolute	or	objective	one.		And	we	are	using	those	numbers	as	if	they	are	objective.	The	usefulness	of	an	increasing	concentration	in	art	education	on	factual	knowledge	and	analytical	thinking	has,	to	my	knowledge,	never	been	tested	or	demonstrated	anywhere.	Instead	I	think	that	it	is	simply	being	assumed	that	
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doing	so	is	useful	and	effective,	and	that	assumption	is	now	being	acted	on.	With	respect	to	the	rapidly	increasing	resort	to	quantitative	evaluation	methodology	in	education	as	an	indicator	of	quality,	in	my	experience,	what	is	currently	being	measured	and	evaluated	bears	almost	no	relationship	to	the	real	quality	of	the	results.		The	notion	that	quality	in	education	can	be	monitored	and	guaranteed,	or	even	indicated	by	impressive	sounding	but	very	vague	parameters	that	we	call	‘impact’,	‘partnerships’,	‘visibility’,	‘articles	in	peer-reviewed	journals’,	etc.		is	for	me	very	highly	suspect.	These	are	terms,	after	all	that	both	define	and	reflect	corporate	interests	and	parameters,	not	educational	ones!	In	my	view,	there	is	not	the	remotest	empirical	or	logical	reason	for	concluding	that	those	interests	are	similar	or	run	parallel!	If	we	consider	how	our	human	ability	to	think	may	relate	to	our	ability	to	feel	and	act,	it	is	interesting	to	realise	that	while	our	minds	are	capable	of	conceiving	of	perfection,	our	bodies	can	never	reproduce	it.	For	example,	our	brain	allows	us	easily	to	imagine	a	perfect	circle.	But	our	hands	are	quite	incapable	of	drawing	what	the	mind	has	conceived.	Conversely,	what	our	hands	actually	will	produce	if	we	try	to	draw	a	perfect	circle,	is	a	shape	that	in	turn,	our	mind	could	never	accurately	model.	That	simple	example	of	a	difference	between	what	our	logical/analytical	abilities	make	conceivable	for	us,	and	what	our	bodies	allow	us	to	realise,	is	I	think	highly	consequential.	What	we	can	think	of	are	mental	constructs.	Neither	our	bodies,	nor	indeed	all	of	the	perceivable	Universe	however,	are	capable	of	accurately	reproducing	those.		Conversely,	we	are	eminently	capable	of	creating	or	accomplishing	with	our	body	concrete	facts,	but	in	turn,	our	mind	is	incapable	of	accurately	modeling	those.	Art	I	believe,	is	at	home	there,	precisely	in	the	center	of	that	wondrous	paradox!		
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	fig.	10		“Reductio	ad	Aurum”-	1997	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
SYNCHRONICITY	and	DON	JUAN	Another	way	to	describe	what	art	accomplishes	that	distinguishes	it	from	thinking	is	offered	by	the	principle	of	xxiisynchronicity.	That	term	was	coined	by	Carl	Jung	to	connote	his	ideas	about	the	acausal	linking	of	events,	a	concept	that	had	previously	been	studied	and	written	about	by	the	Austrian	biologist	Paul	Kammerer.	The	synchronicity	principle	holds	that	things	can	occur	together	or	coincide	not	only	when	they	are	linked	by	causality,	but	also	because	they	are	linked	by	meaning.		It	would	seem	clear,	because	meaning	is	not	universal,	
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whereas	causality	is,	that	being	linked	by	causality	is	an	objective	quality	things	can	have,	whereas	being	linked	by	meaning	or	significance	is	a	subjective	link.	In	my	view,	both	making	art	and	appreciating	it	are	dependent	on	the	willingness	to	search	for-,	and	more	importantly,	on	the	openness	to	being	surprised	(and	sometimes	moved)	by	the	discovery	that	things	are	linked	in	that	way,	i.e.	meaningfully	and	significantly	rather	than	causally.	That	is	a	very	different	kind	of	linkage	from	the	time-,	space-	and	causally	determined	connections	that	are	the	steppingstones	of	formal	logical	or	rational	analysis,	i.e.	our	normally	directed	thinking.	In	my	experience	instead,	it’s	very	often	necessary	to	practice	a	kind	of		‘unfocused-‘,	distinctly	un-analytical	attention	in	art.	Focused	attention	limits	our	field	of	view	to	only	those	things	being	actively	and	consciously	considered	at	any	one	time.	Doing	that	has	proven	to	be	a	highly	useful	practice.	But	at	other	times,	I	think	it	is	not	a	useful	thing	to	do	at	all.	Scientific	focused	attention	tends	to	constrain	attention	to	only	to	those	things	that	we	are	able	to	demonstrate	occur	consistently.	It	is	in	other	words,	the	measure	of	statistical	consistency	that	is	the	backbone	of	scientific	inquiry.	Sometimes	however,	we	need	to	do	something	very	different,	making	sure	that	we	are	attentive	to	things	that	inevitably	fall	outside	our	field	of	view	when	we	look	at	them	only	on	a	quantitative	basis,	too	closely,	or	hierarchically.	In	other	words,		at	times	we	need	to	dramatically	alter	our	focus	in	order	to	consider,	or	even	just	to	notice	the	existence	of	things	that	we	cannot	readily	understand	analytically.	Very	many	such	things	are	in	fact	not	yet	understandable	for	us	at	all.		But	we	can	nonetheless	profit	greatly,	from	at	the	very	least	appreciating	that	they	exist,	and	accepting	that	oftentimes	such	things	have	a	great	deal	of	influence	on	our	lives,	even	though	we	not	are	able	to	understand	them	in	an	intellectual	way.	The	author	Carlos	Castaneda	wrote	at	length	of	that	ability	each	of	has,	can	use	and	improve	on	if	we	choose	to	do	so,	to	alter	our	field	of	focus.	He	did	so	through	the	words	of	his	fascinating	character	Don	Juan,	a	
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Yaqui	Indian	shaman.	Don	Juan,	speaking	of	his	‘magic’	to	his	pupil	Carlos	Castaneda,	refers	repeatedly	to	the	crucial	importance	of	developing	an	ability	to	see	clearly.	With	that	term,	Don	Juan	meant	really	coming	to	see	and	understand-,	or	even	simply	to	deeply	appreciate	the	existence	of	a	thing	in	depth,	i.e.	developing	the	ability	to	look	past	the	limitations	of	our	habitual	and	automatic	conscious	and	reasoned	responses	to	things.	In	order	to	achieve	this,	Don	Juan	told	his	pupil,	he	needed	to	learn	to	unfocus	his	gaze.	With	that	term	Don	Juan	meant,	counter-intuitively,	that	his	pupil	should	learn	not	to	look	directly	at	the	thing	he	wished	to	‘see	clearly’,	but	instead	for	example,	to	squint	his	eyes	at	it,	thereby	also	taking	in	what	is	next	to-,	as	well	as	what’s	‘inside-,	under-	and	behind	it’.	Might	Emmauel	Kant	perhaps	have	called	that	‘noumenon’?	Who	knows?	At	any	rate,	we	are	able	to	look	at-	and	see	things	very	differently,	sometimes	even	more	fully,	by	seeing	them	‘unclearly’.	My	experience	as	an	artist	has	taught	me	that	this	way	of	looking	is	in	fact	far	more	than	merely	a	romantic	novelist’s	fictional	creation!	Don	Juan’s	description	of	the	process	of	becoming	aware	of	some	normally	hidden	aspects	of	things	has	always	resonated	very	strongly	with	me.	In	my	own	experience,	the	‘frame	of	my	gaze’	is	very	highly	determinent	for	what	I	am	able	to	perceive	in	art,	just	as	in	life,	and	all	that	I	will	come	to	understand	about	both.		In	Science	we	can	also	find	this	idea	that	the	‘unfocused	gaze’	may	well	be	a	critical	component	of	human	creativity.	It	has	been	studied,	discussed	and	validated,	and	we	find	this	in	scientific	literature	referred	to	variously	as	xxiii	‘incubation’,	‘mind	wandering’	and	‘unfocused	attention’.	Additionally,	there	is	considerable	xxivevidence	from	Science	that	Perception	is	not	merely	the	open	window	of	our	senses	through	which	all	things	outside	us	randomly,	freely,	and	unchanged	by	their	passage,	enter	our	attention	and	are	then	processed.	We	do	not	in	fact	see	even	the	entirety	of	each	individual	thing	we	look	at.	Instead	in	very	large	measure,	we	see	and	process	only	that	part	of	what	we	look	at	that	
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has	a	direct	relation	to	what	we’re	looking	for.	It	seems	that	we	choose	without	any	awareness	of	that	fact,	not	only	what	we	look	at,	but	also	what	we	will	register	about	it,	and	hence	what	we	will	come	to	feel	and	think	about	what	we	look	at.	Artists	and	viewers	of	art,	I	think	it	fair	to	say,	are	most	often	looking	for	what	they	have	not	seen	before,	i.e.	looking	to	see	things	differently.	Because	we	don’t	in	first	instance	know	exactly	where	to	look	for	these	new	things	we’ve	not	seen	before,	we	must	search	them	out.	We	therefore	must	try	out	various	directions	and	sizes	for	‘the	frame	of	our	gaze’,	in	order	to	locate	what	we	are	hoping	to	find.	The	‘frame	of	gaze’	that	we	select	when	we	restrict	ourselves	to	largely	logical/analytical	or	rational	points	of	view,	makes	of	that	methodology	alone	in	art,	as	I	repeatedly	suggest	throughout	this	text,	a	severe	limitation	rather	than	a	useful	practice.	The	same	of	course	is	also	true	if	an	artist’s	gaze	is	always	‘unfocused’.	Both	logical/analysis	and	what	may	be	called	its	opposite,	‘the	unfocused	gaze’,	are	highly	useful	tools.	I	am	100%	convinced	on	the	basis	of	my	own	experience	however,	that	it	isn’t	possible	to	engage	both	simultaneously.	We	can	choose	one	or	the	other,	or	we	can	try	to	go	back	and	forth	between	the	two.	That	is	why	I	insist	that	it’s	important	not	to	ignore	or	devalue	either	mode	of	operating,	something	I	think	is	occurring	in	regard	to	valuing	and	training	our	ability	to	sense	and	use	those	things	that	which	we	perceive	and	‘know’,	not	on	the	basis	of	intellect,	but	rather	on	the	basis	of	emotion.		I	submit	that	what	I	am	here	calling	’the	unfocused	gaze’	is	critically	important	for	Creativity	because	it	is	a	highly	effective	way	for	us	to	gain	access	to	our	sub-conscious	faculties.	If	we	hope	to	bring	all	we	can	to	bear	on	the	practice	of	art,	make	the	best	possible	use	of	all	of	our	tools,	we	need	to	understand	not	only	the	direct	linear	links	between	things	through	causality,	but	also	those	links	that	are	better	described	as	the	resonance	between	our	experiences,	not	
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causal	in	nature,	but	instead	clearly	related	by	meaning	or	significance,	i.e.	
synchronicity.		Clear	answers	for	some	of	the	most	fundamental	questions	about	art	do	not	presently,	with	any	significant	degree	of	consensus,	exist.	That	is	‘the	elephant	in	the	room’,	one	I	suggest	we	currently,	instead	of	honestly	admitting	it,	quite	irresponsibly	try	to	ignore.	I	am	convinced	additionally	that	the	lack	of	agreed-upon	answers	to	those	questions	constitutes	a	serious	problem	in	speaking	about	art,	both	in-	and	outside	of	education.	It	will	only	be	when	we	formulate	better	answers	for	these	fundamental	questions	that	we	can	begin	to	discover	ever	better	ways	to	teach	students	to	make	art	of	quality.	If	that’s	true,	how	then	might	we	start	finding	those	answers?		
INTELLECTUAL	RIGOR	The	first	thing	I	think	is	of	paramount	importance	if	we	hope	to	find	better	answers	for	difficult	questions,	is	a	high	degree	of	intellectual	honesty.	To	understand	art	more	fully,	to	arrive	at	good	answers	for	fundamental	questions	about	it,	will	in	first	instance	depend	on	educators,	artists	and	students	of	art	alike,	being	both	encouraged-,	and	encouraging	each	other	to	understand	and	to	represent	honestly	and	accurately	for	others	what	making	art	really	is	for	them.	We	must	learn	both	more	usefully	and	honestly	to	describe	the	true	nature	of	the	processes	by	which	we	come	to	make	and	appreciate	works	of	art.	If	an	artist	is	unable	to	honestly	answer	for	himself	the	question,	“what	is	it	I’m	
really	doing	here,	and	why?”,		that	will	clearly	impede	discovering	how	to	get	better	at	it.	In	several	respects	it	seems	to	me	that	we	are	currently	training	art	students	to	do	something	very	different	than	finding	honest	answers	for	that	question.	Instead,	we	increasingly	often	teach	them	to	accept-	and	to	repeat	for	others	phrases	I	suggest	are	no	more	than	simplistic	‘fables’	about	art	making.	
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In	other	words,	art	students	are	currently	being	taught	to	understand	and	speak	about	their	work	in	ways	that	neither	represent	their	true	motivations	for	making	art,	nor	the	real	nature	of	the	processes	by	which	that	work	comes	into	existence.	If	there	is	truth	to	that,	then	it	is	clearly	inconsistent	with	the	term	‘intellectual	rigor’.	That	term	implies	scrupulous	honesty	in	our	considerations	of-	and	statements	about	what	really	happens	when	we	study,	conduct-	and	present	the	results	of	our	research,	in	art	or	in	any	other	pursuit.		The	premise,	for	example,	that	in	the	study	of	art	practice,	increasing	the	emphasis	on	academic	research	and	promoting	the	use	of	terminology	borrowed	from	other	pursuits	is	grounded	wholly	or	even	largely	in	educational	concerns	relating	to	the	pursuit	of	art,	is	in	my	view	a	fable.	There	exist	if	we	think	about	it	in	fact,	entirely	different	goals	that	are	far	more	directly	and	effectively	served	by	that	policy	than	promoting	quality	in	art.	I	suggest	that	academic	rigor	can	be	significantly	served	by	taking	a	close	look	at	our	curriculum	in	art	education,	and	undertaking	to	analyze	the	relative	contributions	to	making	art	of	quality	of	each	of	the	items	that	compose	it.	Another	highly	useful	thing	to	undertake	in	my	view,	would	be	a	serious	and	formal	discussion	among	authorities	in	art	and	education	in	it,	questiong	the	degree	to	which	the	many	current	definitions	of	art	and	the	terminology	we	use	to	speak	of	and	evaluate	it	are	understood	by	all	of	us	in	the	same	way,	i.e.	are	really	as	useful	as	we	seem	to	imagine	they	are.		
	
CONCEPT…..WHAT’S	UP	WITH	THAT?!	For	me,	yet	another	of	the	‘fables	about	art’	is	the	increasingly	accepted	notion	that	a	work	of	art	starts	with-	or	conveys	a	concept,	i.e.	carries	content	of	a	specifiable	nature.	On	the	basis	of	my	experience	in	both	making	and	teaching	art,	I	suggest	that	that	premise	lacks valid	substance 		and,	for	that	reason,	
	 107	
results	very	frequently	in	considerable	confusion.	Many	instructors	today		advise	their	students	that	concept	must	be	clearly	formulated	in	words	before	starting	on	an	artwork,	and	that	the	work	when	finished,	must	convey	the	original	concept	in	visual	form.	The	degree	in	which	this	dictate	is	satisfied	is	then	very	often	regarded	as	a	crucial	criterion	in	the	formal	evaluation	of	‘the	quality’	of	the	finished	artwork.	That	approach	to	art,	as	being	of	quality	in	large	measure	to	the	extent	that	it	is	able	to	successfully	‘encrypt	verbal	concepts	in	visual	images’	is,	I	suggest,	nonsensical.	In	my	opinion,	it	belongs	in	the	same	category	as	the	FCT’s	formulation	of	‘art	as	contribution	to	scientific	
culture’.		It	is	of	course	true	that	artists	start	their	works	with	ideas.	Sometimes	these	are	very	clear	ones,	but	just	as	often,	they	are	less	clear,	and	at	times	even	entirely	unclear	ones.	Those	ideas	the	artist	sets	out	with	relate	to	what	he	hopes	he	can	accomplish	in-	and	with	the	work	he	will	make.	But	that	is	a	very	different	starting	point	indeed	than	one	implied	by	rigid	policy	requiring	that	the	‘content’	of	an	artwork	must	be	clearly	stated	in	words	beforehand.	For	me	it	is	nothing	short	of	mind-boggling	that	we	could	imagine	that	the	‘quality’	of	artworks	is	determined	by	the	degree	of	correspondence	of	initially	formulated	verbal	concepts	with	what	can	later	readily	be	‘decoded’	from	finished	works	of	art!	I	argue	that	such	a	notion	doesn’t	constitute	a	remotely	informed	way	to	understand,	evaluate-,	make	or	appreciate	art.	Art	cannot	be	simplistically	reduced	to	a	kind	of	visual	code	or	shorthand	for	conveying	verbal	concept.	That’s	the	business	of	graphic	design,	not	of	art.	The	art-as-concept	approach	to	understanding	it,	I	think,	offers	in	the	end	nothing	more	than	a	simplistic	formula	for	imagining	art	as	a	kind	of	painting	by	the	numbers	.		It	presumes	that	artists	start	with	well-formulated	verbal	ideas,	and	then	proceed	to	translate	those	into	visual	‘code’	using	colors	and	materials.	It	is	then	further	assumed	that	the	results	will	‘say	something’	to	a	viewer,	even	although	he	
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doesn’t	have	the	‘codebook’	explaining	how	the	message	was	encrypted.	Why,	I	wonder,	do	we	seem	to	be	advocating	such	a	simplistic	approach	to	making	and	appreciating	art?	I	think	that	the	answer	to	that	question	must	be	that	clearly	the	doctrine	that	art	is	based	on	concept	admirably	does	serve	some	distinct	purposes.	But	those,	I	submit,	are	very	different	ones	than	the	advancement	of	the	quality	of	art	or	art	education.	The	structural	approach	in	education	that	the	‘concept	based	art’	model	expounds	offers	some	clear	advantages.	First	of	all,	it	constitutes	a	relatively	simple	to	define	theoretical	approach	to	art.	Additionally,	teaching	‘concept	art’	as	structural	theory	is	less	costly	and	time	consuming	than	more	complex	(and	in	my	opinion,	more	accurate)	formulations	of	what	art	is	and	should	accomplish.	Concept	and	Theory	can	be	dealt	with	in	classrooms	with	many	students,	requiring	fewer	teaching	hours	and	less	supervision.	Concept-based-art	is	easy	to	define,	less	expensive	to	teach,	and	also	far	more	easily	dealt	with	by	administrators.	It	enables	additionally	that	instructors	not	trained	in-	or	even	familiar	with	art	practice	from	other	fields	(sometimes	‘far	afields’!)	can	be	regularly	enlisted	in	art	practice	education.	And	lastly,	it	facilitates	the	considerable	timesaving	option	of	evaluating	art	using	‘objective’-	rather	than	subjective	criteria.	If	all	art	is	based	in	concept,	we	can	spend	far	less	time	evaluating	art,	considering	instead	the	artist’s	words	about	it,	a	far	less	demanding	task.	In	short,	a	concept-based	approach	to	art	offers	the	attraction	of	a	simpler,	cheaper,	less	time	consuming,	and	less	‘risky’	path	to	take.		Attractive	as	that	approach	clearly	is	proving	to	be	for	quite	a	number	of	people	involved	in	education,	I	submit	that	the	idea	that	art	is	based	primarily	in	concept,	and	should	therefore	be	taught	and	evaluated	as	such,	is	demonstrably	inaccurate	and	dramatically	ineffective.	It	ignores	the	most	important	real	things	that	happen,	both	when	we	make	art,	and	when	as	viewers	we	are	able	
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to	derive	great	value	from	it.	One	of	those	things	it	ignores	is	the	freedom	and	necessity	at	times	to	radically	change	course	when	making	art.		If	the	premise	were	true	that	we	make	art	to	‘express	predetermined	concepts’,	then	there	would	seem	to	be	no	reason	to	change	course	when	making	artworks.		More	importantly,	there	would	perhaps	be	no	reason	to	make	art	at	all,	if	we	are	merely	translating	existing	verbal	concepts	into	some	kind	of	visual	code!	But	at	any	rate,	changing	course	is	often	both	highly	necessary	and	clearly	beneficial	when	making	art.		Expressing	singular	concept	I	am	saying,	cannot	be	imagined	as	the	central	goal	that	artists	are	at	pains	to	achieve	in	their	works.	Only	someone	who	doesn’t	understand	art	could	imagine	that	that	could	be	true.	No,	it	is	the	invariably	many-facetted	emotive	and	expressive	quality	of	the	finished	work	that	is	far	more	important.	The	very	word	‘concept’	as	it	is	used	in	art,	in	fact	seems	to	indicate	nothing	more	than	‘idea’.	I	suggest	indeed	that	‘idea’	is	a	much	more	useful	and	less	presumptive	term	for	indicating	what	is	being	spoken	of	at	such	times.	We	all	have	ideas,	lots	of	them.	We	take	these	with	us	when	we	start	any	process.	But	that	process	once	underway,	may	very	often	indicate-,	or	even	demand	of	us	that	those	initial	ideas	change	in	accordance	with	what	succeeding	steps	will	make	clear.	We	must	acknowledge	both	the	freedom	and	the	necessity	to	alter	ideas	when	making	art,	allow	works	to	evolve	naturally,	rather	than	sticking	to	initial	ideas	regardless	of	what	the	steps	in	that	process	reveal	to	us.	Making	art	is	not	predictable	enough	to	embark	on	it	with	fixed	ideas	and	then,	irrespective	of	what	becomes	clear	during	the	process,	hang	on	to	those	initial	ideas	for	dear	life!	Fixed	‘concepts’	simply	cannot,	I	am	saying,	be	seriously	considered	a	central	aspect	of	either	the	creation-,	or	the	deeper	enjoyment	of	artworks.	An	artist	cannot	expect	of	himself	before	completing	his	work,	that	he	already	knows	what	it	will	mean	when	it’s	finished,	neither	mean	to	himself,	nor	to	anyone	else.	Artworks	can	perhaps	quite	usefully	be	likened	to	experiments.	
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The	very	reason	for	undertaking	an	experiment	is	in	order	to	discover	things	we	didn’t	know	beforehand,	things	we	can	only	find	out	on	completing	the	experiment.	No	one	conducting	an	experiment	can	be	expected	to	describe	its	outcome,	or	the	meaning	of	that	outcome	in	advance.	If	that	were	possible,	there	would	be	no	need	ever	to	conduct	any	experiment.	Advance	and	accurate	knowledge	of	the	resultant	meaning	of	an	experiment	should	under	no	circumstance	be	considered	a	prerequisite	for	a	succesful	one,	and	certainly	not	in	art.	Instead,	I	consider	that	a	highly	useful	formula	for	guaranteeing	the	production	of	singularly	boring	works,	rarely	revealing	anything	more	than	what	both	the	artist	and	his	audience	already	knew	before	the	artwork	existed.	The	reason	we	make	art	I’m	suggesting,	is	not	at	all	in	order	to	convey	meaning,	but	in	order	to	find	meaning,	meaning	that	emerges	from	an	artwork.	Meaning	emerges	in	precisely	that	way	from	almost	everything	we	undertake	in	life.	Meaning	takes	on	form	only	when	we	do	what	is	necessary	to	reveal	it.	The	important	meanings	for	example,	that	atomic	fission	now	has	for	us,	admittedly	not	all	of	them	good	ones,	were	by	no	means	known	or	contained	in	its	discovery.	Those	emerged,	all	of	them,	after	the	discovery.	Is	not	the	point	of	embarking	on	any	voyage	of	discovery	in	fact,	equally	true	of	human	discoveries	in	all	pursuits	throughout	our	history,	the	search	for	emergent	meaning?	Why	do	we	not	admit	that	this	is	also	true	for	works	of	art?	I	argue	that	in	art	education	currently,	we	are	gravitating	towards	very	vague	terminology,	stupidly	confusing	quality	with	quantity,	and	simultaneously	promoting	a	number	of	fables	that	we	teach	as	fundaments	of	art.	Another	of	these	fables	in	my	view	is	the	notion,	one	seeimingly	firmly	entrenched	in	almost	all	discussions	of	art	that:	“We	make	art	to	communicate	things”.		Those	words	are	already	very	familiar	and	comfortable	ones	for	most	of	us,	they	seem		straight-forward	and	acceptable.	But	if	we	think	about	it,	do	those	words	not	clearly	imply	that	the	artist	is	expressing	things	he	already	knows?	And	is	that	
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not	demonstrably	false?	A	far	more	adequate	and	honest	approach	to	what	art	enables	I	suggest,	is	not	to	imagine	it	as	communicating	meaning,	but	instead	as	a	highly	effective	way	to	discover	meaning,	both	for	the	artist	and	for	his	viewers.	Art,	I’m	suggesting,	is	in	fact	not	usefully	thought	of	as	communication,	but	much	more	accurately	understood	as	experiment	or	discovery.	That	description	of	‘art	as	discovery’	applies	equally	to	what	motivates	artists	to	make	their	works,	and	to	what	I	believe	constitutes	the	primary	basis	for	the	public’s	appreciation	of	them.	Making	art	I	suggest,	should	neither	be	understood	or	spoken	of	as	a	way	to	express	concept,	or	to	convey	knowledge.	Instead,	I	think	it	very	much	more	accurate	and	useful	to	understand	art	as	a	means	to	discover	concept,	to	acquire	knowledge.	If	for	example,	we	start	to	construct	a	house,	we	start	with	very	little	idea	of	the	‘meaning’	it	will	come	to	have	for	those	who	eventually	will	live	in	it.	We	also	don’t	know	what	meaning	it	will	have	for	those	who	will	come	to	live	nextdoor,	the	neighbors.	On	completion,	that	house	will	not	yet	have	important	meaning	for	anyone,	except	perhaps	for	those	who	built-	or	commissioned	it.	Later	however,	we	can	be	sure	that	the	house	will	take	on	very	important	meanings.	Those	depend	entirely	on	what	happens	later,	rather	than	on	what	was	planned,	written	or	hoped	for	before	the	house	is	occupied	and	begins	to	‘take	on	life’.	In	other	words,	the	meanings	that	our	discoveries,	inventions,	houses,	and	even	our	artworks	eventually	take	on	(i.e.	have)	can	only	become	manifest	to	us	as	a	consequence	of	making-	and	then	offering	them!	When	considered	in	this	way,	Meaning	is	never	intrinsic,	instead	it’s	an	emergent	entity.	‘Emergent’,	as	defined	by	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	is:	Philosophy (of a 
property-) arising as an effect of complex causes and not analysable simply 
as the sum of their effects. 
	 112	
I	submit	that	because	meaning	in	art	is	emergent,	an	artist	is	in	no	position	to	state	what	his	work	will-	or	should	mean	for	viewers	of	it.	Instead	he	has-,	and	can	only	express	if	required	to	do	so,	his	hopes	for	what	will	happen.	In	other	words,	he	can	speculate.	But	should	responsible	qualitative	evaluation	of	an	artwork	be	accomplished	by	analyzing	what	is	nothing	more	than	the	advance	speculation	of	the	artist?	When	‘concept’	is	considered	the	basis	for	making	and	appreciating	art,	I	argue	that	a	number	of	critical	realities	that	ultimately	decide	the	meaning	and	value	of	a	work	of	art	are	being	completely	ignored.	What	the	work	will	mean,	what	value	it	has,	will	in	fact	depend	on	whom	we	ask,	and	on	what	the	circumstances	of	their	interaction	with	the	artwork	are,	both	of	those	being	entirely	unpredictable	factors.	We	entirely	ignore	this	when	we	concern	ourselves	largely	with	the	artist’s	intentions	and	hopes	for	an	artwork	as	determinant	for	meanings	and	values	that	only	emerge	later.		Those	hopes	that	an	artist	has	for	his	artwork,	his	speculations	about	it,	are	without	doubt	very	important	for	him.	It	is	also	true	that	hearing	them	may	at	times	be	both	revealing	and	interesting	for	others.	But	we	should	not,	I	suggest,	be	teaching	students	that	their	advance	hopes	and	speculations	are	of	any	appreciable	consequence	for	anyone	else	who	later	views	their	works.	That	is,	I	think,	clearly	untrue.	I	suggest	that	the	words	of	an	artist	about	his	work,	whether	those	of	a	student	or	an	accomplished	professional	artist,	cannot	and	should	not	be	regarded	as	a	factor	of	importance	in	responsible	qualitative	evaluation.	Is	it	not	apparent	to	us	already,	that	no	matter	what	we	have	at	one	time	imagined-	or	hoped	for	in	life,	is	simply	far	too	often	quite	different	than	what	we	actually	succeed	to	make	manifest?		I	offer	here	an	example	from	my	own	work	to	support	my	argument	that		‘concept’	in	a	work	of	art,	should	not	be	imagined	to	embody	what	that	work	will	come	to	mean,	either	for	the	artist	himself,	or	for	the	viewers	of	that	work.	
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		fig	11		“Who’s	Afraid	of	Wood,	Paint	and	Glass?”	-2006	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	The	photo	above	shows	a	work	of	mine	from	2006.	Its	constituent	materials	are	wood,	acrylic	paint	on	canvas,	and	glass.	With	the	choice	for	its	title,	I	was	both	naming	those	materials,	and	making	reference	to	the	hyper-famous	series	of	paintings	by	Barnett	Newman	produced	between	1966	and	1970,	entitled	
“Who's	Afraid	of	Red,	Yellow	and	Blue?”.		The	colors	I	used	are	intentionally	close	to	the	ones	used	by	Newman	for	his	paintings.	When	I	now	pose	myself	the	question:	“What	was	my	‘concept’	at	the	time	of	making?”,	the	simple	and	honest	answer	is:	“I	can’t	answer	that	because	I	didn’t	have	one”.		When	I	made	that	work,	I	felt	no	need	for-	or	attraction	to	thinking	about	my	works	in	terms	of	concept.	So	the	answer	to	that	question,	it’s	clear,	doesn’t	help	me	or	anyone	else	understand	this	work.	Let’s	try	another	question	then:	“What	were	my	
purposes	in	making	the	work?”	First	of	all,	there	was	in	fact	no	single	or	central	
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purpose	in	doing	so.	Instead	I	had	quite	a	number	of	different	purposes	in	mind.	One	of	those	was	simply	to	make	a	work	referring	to	that	particular	group	of	Newman’s	paintings.	Why?		The	answer	is	simply	that	those	paintings	are	certainly	among	the	most	celebrated	examples	of	modern	painting	that	exist,	yet	sadly	for	me	perhaps,	they	are	ones	I	never	liked	much	or	was	able	to	appreciate	deeply.	The	title	of	my	work	then	names,	i.e.	evokes	‘an	icon’	of	modern	art,	one	I	often	wonder	about.		Another	intention	I	had	at	the	time	was	to	refer	to	an	existing	prejudice	regarding	the	use	of	glass	as	a	material	for	‘fine	art’.	It	has	often	the	case,	simply	because	I	use	glass	in	my	works,	that	for	that	reason	alone	they	are	sometimes	viewed	or	discussed	by	critics,	curators,	or	galerists	as	exercises	in	craft	rather	than	in	art.		Worse	still	for	me,	on	occasion	they	have	been	referred	to	as	prime	examples	of	a	craftsman’s	vane	hope	to	be	
able	to	make	art.		I	wanted	to	suggest	then	with	my	title	that	those	are	not	logical	or	objective	qualifications,	but	are	instead	emotional	ones	(fear).	By	that	I	mean	that	such	categorical	qualifications	in	my	opinion,	resulted	very	largely	from	simply	‘being	Afraid’,	i.e	they	are	the	result	of	anxiety	about	glass,	a	material	the	authorities	in	art	making	those	comments	are	normally	uncomfortably	unfamiliar	with.		Ok,	now	let’s	try	another	question:	“Were	the	intentions	I’ve	just	named	central	
to	my	‘concept’	for	this	work?		“No”.		I	cannot	honestly	say	that	those	concerns	I	just	noted	constituted	more	than	a	kind	of	private	joke	for	my	own	amusement.	In	fact,	that	title	itself	‘emerged’	quite	some	time	after	I	started	the	work,	so	it	cannot	possibly	be	regarded	as	embodying	any	initial	‘concept..	The	main	objective	I	now	remember	having	had	with	that	work,	was	very	simply	to	find	out	how	I,	and	later	others	who	saw	it,	would	react	to	a	blown	glass	shape	‘folded	over’	a	canvas.	My	primary	goal	was	to	bend	a	glass	form	over	canvas	in	this	way	in	order	to	find	out	what	happened,	what	that	meant,	or	
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might	tell	me.	I	just	wanted	to	do	that	because	of	the	many	rich	associations	those	two	materials	used	in	that	unusual	way	conjured	up	in	my	imagination.	Simply	stated,	bending	a	piece	of	hard	blown	glass	over	a	soft	canvas	was	at	that	time,	a	highly	interesting	experiment	for	me	to	undertake.	I	needed	to	act	on	this	in	order	to	find	out	what	that	‘reversal’	in	how	we	normally	feel	and	think	about	those	two	materials,	would	cause	me	to	feel	and	think.	I	was,	I	remember	now,	also	intent	that	the	yellow	glass	element	should	seem	to	be	‘holding	the	canvas’.	I	did	not,	either	at	the	time	of	making	or	now,	feel	any	need	or	obligation	to	find	words	explaining	why	this	was	important	for	me,	or	why	it	should	or	might	be	important	for	anyone	else.	This	was	simply	what	is	called		‘gut	feeling’,	the	strong	and	persistent	sense	that	one	should	act	on	an	idea	because	it	is	only	doing	so	that	will	tell	him	what	he	wants	to	know.	Past	experience	makes	clear	to	us	that	it	is	important	to	undertake	to	do	something,	and	that’s	enough,	we	do	it.	Calling	such	an	impulse,	as	strong	as	that	can	sometimes	be,	‘a	concept’,	seems	for	me	a	poor	use	of	language.	The	word	‘concept’	means	something	entirely	different.	Another	intention	I	remember	having	had	at	the	time	of	making	that	work	was	to	create	something		‘in	between	a	painting	and	a	sculpture’.		For	a	long	time	I	have	long	been	interested	in	exploring	the	relationship	between	two-	and	three-	dimensional	representations	in	art.	Yet	another	aspect	of	that	work	was	the	wish	to	represent	both	the	viewer	and	the	viewed	in	it.	The	blue	wooden	dog	(or	coyote)	was	for	me	‘a	viewer’.	He	gazes	at	the	canvas	and	the	strange	glass	shape	holding	it,	trying,	(not	very	successfully,	I	imagine),	to	decide	what	to	make	of	it.	A	well-known	trait	of	coyotes,	‘howling	at	the	moon’,	is	something	we	commonly	consider	a	quite	senseless	thing	to	do.	Characteristic	of	this	work	was	additionally	my	interest	in	the	‘rhythm	of	movements’,	i.e.	the	position	and	direction	of	the	constituent	elements	as	they	relate	to	each	other,	as	well	as	to	the	empty	spaces	surrounding	them.	One	last	intention	I	can	now	remember	
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having	had	in	this	work,	was	my	interest	in	the	deeper-lying	meanings	and	associations	evoked	by	different	materials,	in	the	case	of	this	particular	work,	wood,	paint	and	glass.	The	materials	used	in	art	carry	meanings	that	precede-	and	sometimes	even	override	whatever	manipulations	of	them	we	undertake.	In	most	cases,	that	meaning	remains	deeply	embedded	in	the	finished	work.		And	there	it	is!	These	are	all	of	the	considerations,	motivations	and	intentions	I	can	remember	having	had	with	that	work.	Ok,	so…….	what	does	all	of	that	tell	
us?	Well,	having	here	summed	up	all	I’m	now	been	able	to	recall	about	this	work,	it	should	be	clear	that	my	primary	motivation	for	making	it,	was	my	expectation	that	doing	so	would	be	able	to	tell/show	me	interesting	things	I	did	not	know	before	making	it,	i.e.	things	I	could	find	out	only	by	making	it.	I	was	in	fact,	not	at	all	engaged	in	trying	to	tell	or	show	other	people	anything	‘important’	that	I	felt	they	needed	to	become	aware	of.		So…….concept,	message,	meaning?...	Is	it	perhaps	possible	that	all	I’ve	now	been	able	to	recall	and	say	here	about	my	considerations,	motivations	and	expectations	with	regard	to	this	work,	when	put	together,	constitute	‘concept’?	If	for	the	sake	of	argument	I	assume	that	they	do,	could	then	someone	who	hasn’t	read	this	passage,	derive	my	concept	from	looking	at	that	work?	I	think	not.	But	even	if,	quite	astonishingly	for	me	someone	was	able	to	do	that,	have	I	thereby	defined	the	meaning	the	work	has,	for	myself,	for	anyone	else?	It	should	I	hope	be	clear,	that	my	answer	to	all	of	the	above	questions	is	“no,	decidedly	not”.	Distilling	a	coherent	concept	from	the	statements	I’m	able	to	make	about	all	of	the	concerns	and	purposes	I	had	with	that	work	is	an	undertaking	I	neither	engaged	in	at	the	time,	nor	one	I	find	remotely	useful	now.	Attempting	to	do	so	results	unavoidably	in	phrases	or	words	that	for	me	are	quite	uninteresting	to	hear	or	read,	both	for	myself	and	for	others.		Hearing	or	reading	what	I’ve	
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written	above	as	my	concerns	or	intentions	with	my	works	is	in	fact,	something	I	don’t	normally	allow	to	accommpany	the	viewing	of	my	works.	In	my	experience,	such	words	serve	no	purpose	other	than	to	‘dumb	down’	the	works,	unavoidably	limiting	the	viewer’s	experience	to	only	the	words	he	hears	or	reads.	As	an	artist,	I	believe	it	clearly	in	my	interest	to	avoid	at	all	costs	that	I	or	anyone	else	expresses	in	words	the	concepts	or	purposes	behind	my	works.	I	am	of	course	interested	to	find	out	about	other’s	reactions	to	my	works.	But	I	am	neither	interested	in-,	nor	do	I	think	that	art	is	served	by	the	almost	invariably	simplistic,	and	often	quite	boring	verbal	formulations	I	hear	or	read,	that	are	called		‘concepts’	in	art.		My	conviction	is	that	we	don’t	make	art	in	order	to	express	ideas	at	all,	but	instead	to	discover	them,	in	first	instance	ideas	interesting	for	the	artist	himself.	In	other	words,	artists	don’t	make	art	to	
formulate	or	express	concept.	Instead	making	art	allows	them	to	discover-,	to	
generate	concept.	Making	art	allows	us	addtionally	to	find	out	how	others	will	react	to	‘discoveries’	revealed	in	our	artworks.	Artists	I	suggest	are	primarily	driven	by	a	fervent	desire	to	make	artworks	that	can	reveal	new	things	to	them.	When	that	happens,	they	can	also	find	out	what	those	new	things	mean	for	others.	I	submit	that	neither	of	those	things	can	or	will	occur	when	we	limit	that	fertile	field	of	discovery	by	dictating	that	‘the	expression	of	concept’	is	the	primary	goal	and	the	most	important	product	of	the	exercise.	The	notion	that	fixed	central	concepts	are	captured	and	contained	in	a	work	of	art,	and	that	others	will	then	understand	those	in	the	way	the	artist	intended	is,	I	think,	the	biggest	and	most	troublesome	of	what	I	am	referring	to	as	‘fables’	promulgated	in	art	practice	and	education.	For	me,	making	concept	central	in	art	reduces	art	to	an	exercise	in	‘reductio	ad	absurdum’.	Why	do	we	imagine	that	we	are	expressing	intellectual	concepts	in	visual	art,	when	we	have	a	vastly	
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more	efficient	tool	for	that	purpose?	Isn’t	that	what	mankind	invented	words	for?	Do	we	perhaps	also	maintain	that	this	‘expression	of	concept’	is	the	central	purpose	of	the	arts	of	Music,	of	Theater,	of	Poetry,	or	of	Dance?	It	seems	to	me	that	this	is	clearly,	quite	decidedly	not	the	case!	If	we	think	more	deeply	about	this	matter,	the	conviction	that	Visual	Art	is	somehow	an	exception	among	the	arts	and	is,	uniquely	then,	aimed	at	the	expression	of	literal	content,	becomes	very	hard,	if	not	impossible	to	defend.	In	fact	in	my	view,	it	begins	to	seem	quite	silly!	
	
MATERIAL	MATTERS	Under	the	heading	Sensitivity	to	Materials	(p	59),	I	spoke	earlier	of	the	role	that	materials	play	in	the	meanings	artworks	come	to	have.	Wood,	glass,	canvas	and	paint	for	example,	each	trigger	immediate	and	deep	associations	in	us,	ones	initiated	by	our	body’s	automatic	responses	to	the	imagined	feel	of	them.	That	imagined	touch,	even	before	we	act	on	it,	carries	strong	meaning.	The	‘material	meaning’	of	the	elements	that	constitute	artworks	is	however,	an	issue	largely	and,	for	me,	very	puzzlingly	overlooked	in	most	theoretical	considerations	of	concept	and	meaning.	Wherever	that	omission	occurs,	I	think	it	a	serious	one.	Later,	under	the	heading	Progress	through	Chemistry	(p	129)	I	will	refer	to	this	issue	once	again.	In	my	view,	it	is	essential	that	all	of	us	involved	in	teaching	and/or	evaluating	art	are	aware,	quite	apart	from	the	form	an	artwork	takes,	of	what	the	choice	for	the	materials	that	constitute	it	already	means.		That	awareness	requires	that	we	are	familiar	with	the	feel	and	working	characteristics	of	many	of	the	various	materials	used	in	art.	Processes	and	materials	used	to	create	a	work	invariably	constitute	a	critical	part	of	its	meaning	for	the	artist.	This	is	I	claim,	albeit	to	a	lesser	extent,	also	true	for	the	viewer	of	artwork,	whether	or	not	he	is	fully	cognizant	of	it.	How	the	thing	got	
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there,	how	it	came	into	being	must	be	taken	into	account	as	a	highly	important	constituent	of	what	we	are	discussing	when	we	talk	about	‘meaning’	in	art.	Isn’t	that	in	fact,	always	an	important	constituent	of	the	meaning	of	everything	we	encounter	or	experience	in	life,	‘the	how	it	came	to	be’	part?		Although	those	two	terms	are	currently	very	often	confused	with	each	other,	‘meaning’	and	‘concept’	do	not	denote	remotely	the	same	thing.	We	invented	spoken	and	written	languages	in	order	to	express	concepts.	Those	complex	syntheses	of	ideas	we	refer	to	as	concepts,	are	the	fruits	of	our	human	ability	to	engage	in	directed	intellectual	thought.	In	addition	to	words,	we	also	invented	mathematics	to	help	us	express	and	communicate	even	more	precise	concepts	than	words	can	capture	and	convery.	We	create	and	pursue	mathematical	formulations	of	concept	in	aid	of	our	search	for	truths	that	we	are	able	to	demonstrate	are	persistent	ones.	When	we	succeed	to	demonstrate	such	persistent	truths,	we	then	confirm	it	as	universally	valid	and	call	those	‘scientific	truths’.	That	status,	scientific	truth,	depends	on	repeated	demonstration	of	the	principals	implied	with	the	same	results	each	time.	Expressing	concept	then,	with	varying	degrees	of	precise,	constant	and	universally	similar	meanings,	is	the	very	clear	purpose	of	both	our	written,	verbal	and	mathematical	languages.	But	long	before	those	languages	for	expression	and	communication	were	invented,	humans	had	already	felt	and	responded	to	the	need	for	another	‘language’.	They	invented	art,	a	language	in	almost	every	respect,	entirely	different	from	mathematics	and	words.	The	need	for	that	language	existed	because	with	the	aid	of	it	we	could	accomplish	very	different-,	but	equally	important	purposes.	I	submit	that	those	purposes	that	we	accomplish	with	art	have	everything	to	do	with	Meaning,	and	nothing	to	do	with	Concept.	
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Art,	in	contrast	to	the	other	languages	I	named	is	the	one	we	can	most	appropriately	use	to	communicate	one	particularly	highly	important	aspect	of	our	human	experience,	i.e.	our	ability	to	feel	things,	in	both	the	literal	and	figurative	senses	of	that	word.	I	am	suggesting	that	concept	doesn’t	constitute	an	important-	or	natural	part	of	the	realm	of	art	practice	at	all,	whereas	contrariwise,	feeling	is	critically	central	to	that	realm.	I	don’t	believe	that	it’s	at	all	true	that	in	Art	we	are	busy	trying	to	capture	or	express	intellectual	constructs,	simply	because	we	can	almost	always	far	more	easily	and	exactly	accomplish	that	using	words.	Why	then	would	we	bother	trying	to	transform	words	into	pictures?	I	am	arguing	that	we	don’t	do	that	in	art.		Instead,	we	make	art	because	our	human	existence	is	very	importantly	constituted	by	experiences	and	feelings,	most	of	which	we	are	quite	unable	to	succcessfully	capture	in	words.	That	central	part	of	our	human	existence	I	speak	of	is	the	realm	of	emotion	and	it	is,	I	argue	here,	The	one	art	is	concerned	with	and	used	for.		Very	many	of	those	arguments	I	am	at	pains	here	to	discuss,	have	in	my	view	their	origin	in	very	large	part	in	the	conflation/inflation	of	that	one	word,	
concept.	I	think	it	helpful	therefore,	to	look	at	the	meaning	of	that	word.	The	word	concept	is	a	noun,	the	product	of	the	act	of	conceiving.	Below	are	some	xxvdefinitions	we	can	find	of	the	verb	‘to	conceive’.	
1.	To	become	pregnant	with	(offspring).	
2.	To	form	or	develop	in	the	mind;	devise:	
3.	To	apprehend	mentally;	understand:	
4.	To	be	of	the	opinion	that;	think:	
5.	To	begin	or	originate	in	a	specific	way		
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With	the	exception	of	the	first	definition	above,	none	of	these	definitions	indicate	anything	we	can	imagine	as	exact,	fixed,	or	universally	applicable.	What	we	are	typically	offered	as	‘the	concept’	behind	artworks	seems	almost	invariably	to	me,	a	reduction	of	the	sources,	intentions,	thoughts,	and	feelings	of	the	artist,	to	some	very	few	concise,	quite	limited	and	abstract	words.	Both	as	an	artist	and	a	teacher,	whenever	I’ve	heard	or	read	such	formulations,	I	am	almost	never	able	to	recognize	them	as	having	any	correlation	with	what	my	own	practice	actually	involves.	Almost	invariably	such	‘concepts’	expressed	as	central	to	a	work	of	art,	result	for	me	in	disappointment,	a	feeling	of	deflation,	of	being	let	down.	Hearing	a	work	of	art	reduced	this	way	always	strikes	me	as	sadly	insufficient,	empty	when	contrasted	with	the	complex,	varied	and	rich	experience	I	have	when	that	artwork	succeeds	to	touch	or	move	me.	For	me	then,	there	is	a	distinct	absence	of	‘beauty’	in	words	used	in	this	way,	i.e.	the	words	chosen	strike	me	strongly	as	distinctly	unaesthetic.		In	fact,	not	one	of	the	‘concepts’	behind	individual	works	of	art	I’ve	ever	heard	expounded	has	persuaded	me	to	consider	the	artwork	differently,	enjoy	it	more	fully,	or	has	proven	remotely	adequate	to	encompass	all	that	I	can	see,	feel	and	think	of	when	looking	at	artworks	that	buoy	me.		For	these	reasons,	for	me	the	phrase,	“expressing	concept	in	art”	is	akin	to	xxvi“Dancing	about	Architecture.”	What	I	mean	is	that	while	both	might	be	interesting	things	to	try	out	once	or	twice,	neither	seems	to	me	a	useful	path	at	all	to	the	practice	we	are	hoping	to	better	understand	by	choosing	for	one	of	those	actions.	 		Making	art	is	a	distinctly	human	act,	through	it	we	give	birth	to	ideas	we	have	carried	to	fruition.	But	we	cannot	presume	on	conception	to	be	able	to	define	the	product	of	that	act	because	we	cannot	yet	know	what	life	it	will	follow.	Whether	the	birth	we	speak	of	is	that	of	a	human	child,	or	a	work	of	art,	we	cannot	know	in	advance	what	the	fresh	new	entity	can-,	should-,	or	will	mean	for	ourself	or	for	anyone	else.	Seen	in	in	this	way,	the	process	of	making	art	
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relates	most	directly,	and	I	think	appropriately	so,	to	the	first	definition	above	of	to	conceive,	1.	To	become	pregnant	with	(offspring).	In	both	the	creation	of	art,	and	in	the	processes	related	to	human	childbirth,	the	overriding	concerns	and	motivations	for	beginning	and	going	through	with	the	process	are	most	often	not	at	all	intellectual	considerations.	Instead,	in	both	cases,	our	primary	and	most	important	motivations	are	far	more	often	bodily-,	emotional-,	and	perhaps	even	spiritual	ones.	My	point	here	is	that	Art	is	simply	not	governed	by	the	directed	logical	causality	principles	common	to	Mathematics	or	Physics.	Instead,	I	am	suggesting	that	it	is	far	more	closely	related	to	both	those	processes	and	concerns	that	are	at	home	in	Biology	and	Metaphysics.	The	concept	behind	any	given	work	of	art	I	argue,	is	little	more	(but	also	no	less!),	than	the	fervent	hope	that	what	will	be	born(e)	into	the	world	will	be	of	lasting	value,	for	the	artist	who	gives	birth	to	it,	for	the	newborn	entity	itself,	and	hopefully	also	for	others	who	later	interact	with	it.	Artists	cannot	and	do	not	determine	the	meaning	their	artworks	have	.	Instead,	giving	birth	to	an	artwork	directly	changes	the	artist	himself,	subtly	redefines	him.		
	
SOME	CERTAINTIES	ABOUT	UNCERTAINTY	Art	allows	us	to	exercise	our	capacity	to	intuit	wordlessly,	to	make	unclear	feelings	manifest.	Through	art	we	can	touch	in	meaningful	ways	the	vast	depot	of	our	subconscious	experience,	explore	the	elusive,	rich,	and	deeply	seated	impressions	located	there.	As	difficult	as	that	seemingly	makes	it	for	some	people,	art	almost	always	does	this	UNclearly.	What	this	means	is	tha,t	more	often	than	not,	works	don’t	have	singular,	clear	concepts	underlying	them,	either	as	the	reason	for	making	them,	or	the	meaning	we	might	derive	from	them.	Art	is	simply	not	a	symbolic	language	in	that	way,	whereby	images	have	defined	verbal	equivalents.	The	pictorial	elements	of	a	work	of	art	cannot	be	
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regarded	as	representative	of	concepts	or	ideas	that	we	can	readily	describe	in	words.	The	visual	language	of	art	is	in	fact,	uniquely	tailored	to	evoke	that	realm	of	our	experience	and	knowledge	that	isn’t	direct,	clear,	simple	or	
singular.	The	inhabitants	of	this	realm	of	uncertainty	don’t	remotely	ressemble	the	characters	we	habitually	encounter	in	realms	of	exactitude.	Instead	art’s	realm	is	populated	by	ambiguous	figures	whose	movements	leave	only	light	and	fleeting	impressions,	not	the	clear	or	lasting	footprints	of	concrete	facts.	Art	is	the	realm	of	uncertainty,	and	can	be	thought	of	as	society’s	institutionalized	way	to	communicate	about	that	multitude	of	unclear	or	ambiguous	things	sensed	and	felt	by	all	of	us.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	important	to	realise	that	this	doesn’t	mean	that	those	things	are	similarly	felt	by	all	of	us.	All	that	is	not	precise	in	nature,	singular,	easily	conveyed	in	words,	and	not	necessarily	experienced	in	the	same	way	by	all	of	us,	is	natural	to	this	domain.	It	may	in	fact		be	that	all	that	is	singular	and	precise	in	nature	is	not	native	to	the	domain	of	art.	It	is	after	all,	quite	easy	for	us	to	express	deliberated	thoughts,	clearly	formed	ideas	in	words.	But	it	is	considerably	more	difficult	to	express	the	many	things	that	we	can	feel,	sense	or	intuit	in	words.	An	obvious	reason	for	this	is	that	what	we	sense	or	feel	is	simply	very	often	unclear.	The	nature	of	things	we	feel	or	sense	is	veery	often	ambiguous,	fleeting,	and	many-sided.	But,	in	no	case	should	we	make	the	mistake	of	assuming	that	those	last	adjectives	imply	that	what	we	sense,	feel	or	intuit	is	unimportant!	Uncertainty	in	fact,	is	a	surprisingly	frequent,	very	real	,	and	undeniably	important	condition,	one	that	accompanies	every	one	of	us,	all	of	our	lives.	Uncertainty	for	example,	is	present	in	almost	every	decision	we	make,	from	the	smallest	inconsequential	ones,	to	the	biggest	life-changing	decisions	we	must	sometimes	face.	This	is	true	I	think,	of	all	that	has	ever	happened	in	the	entire	course	of	our	human	history.	The	pluriform-,	unresolved-	unclear	domain	of	uncertainty	is	the	natural	domain	of	art.	And	that	domain	is	not	in	any	need	of	
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‘resolution’.	We	should	most	certainly	not	imagine	that	we	do	well	to	try	to	‘clear	things	up’	by	structurally	instituting	vague	or	simplistic	terminology,	or	by	inadequately	defining	complex	process	in	art.	Art,	I	am	saying,	simply	cannot	be	moved	into	the	comfortable	realm	of	certainty.	In	fact,	I	suggest	that	attempts	to	find	or	create	certainties	in	art	are	literally	antithetical	to	art’s	purposes.	For	that	reason,	advocating	that	the	practice	of	art	should	or	can	be	understood	largely	as	a	rational/reasoned/logical	activity	does	nothing	either	to	advance	art	or	anyone’s	understanding	of	it.		We	should	not	see	our	many	uncertainties	about	art	as	an	unfortunate	aspect	of	it	that	we	should-	or	can	resolve.	Instead,	we	should	accept	that	our	uncertainties	about	art	are	a	critically	important	constituent	of	it,	even	perhaps	its	very	lifeblood.	What	our	uncertainty	about	art	demands	of	us,	is	simply	that	we	undertake	honestly,	bravely,	and	curiously	to	investigate	the	many	rich	options	on	offer.	There	are	multiple	choices	in	art,	maintaining	their	functional	presence	is	essential.	For	these	reasons	we	should	accept	and	take	that	curious	character	Uncertainty,	very	seriously.	He	will	be	an	omnipresent	fellow	passenger	on	all	our	richest	voyages	in	art.	Is	it	not	true	that	it	is	only	when	we	confront	and	accept	the	uncertainties	of	life	that	we	define	who	we	are	as	individuals?	What	we	choose	to	do	when	we’re	faced	with	uncertainty,	perhaps	more	than	anything	else,	is	what	defines	us.	The	French	18th	century	writer	and	philosopher	Voltaire	said:	-xxvii	"Doubt	is	an	uncomfortable	position,	but	certainty	
is	an	absurd	one".	Who	we	are,	is	determined	by	what	we	do	when	we	face	choices,	never	by	what	we	merely	intend	or	hope	to	do	if	we	face	choices.		
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	fig	12			”Intentie/Pretentie’	-1990	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
	
THE	MOTHER	OF	INTENTION	An	artist	making	an	artwork	as	I	described	that	earlier	embarks	on	a	process	that	leads	to	a	birth,	the	coming	into	existence	of	an	entirely	new	entity.	It	will	be	one	for	which	no	equal	exists.	The	same	is	true	for	the	parents	of	a	child.	Whether	we	have	conceived	and	given	birth	to	a	child	or	an	artwork,	in	neither	case	can	we	legitimately	assume	its	future	existence	to	be	in	service	of	anyone-	or	anything	other	than	itself.	Whatever	meanings	the	newly	born	entity	later	takes	on	will	depend	entirely	on	the	unpredictable	course	of	its	life.	Neither	on	conception,	nor	later	at	birth,	is	it	reasonable	to	expect	that	the	‘mother	of	that	invention’	can	reliably	tell	us	what	we	can	expect,	either	from	a	child	or	an	artwork.	When	we	then	ask	an	artist	about	his	intentions	with	his	artwork,	I	submit	that	we	should	regard	his	answer	as	follows:	those	answers	are		equivalent,	in	both	kind	and	importance,	to	the	answers	we	get	from	a	pregnant	woman	if	we	ask	her	intentions	for	the	child	she	will	give	birth	to.	In	neither	
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case	is	there	any	logical	reason	to	expect	that	the	answers	can	serve	us	as	reliable	predictors.	And	in	neither	case	should	we	imagine	that	the	artwork	or	the	child	have	the	same	degree	of	importance	for	anyone	not	its	‘mother’.		Neither	pregnant	women	nor	artists	have	any	appreciable	degree	of	control	over	what	their	offspring	accomplish.	I	think	then	that	devoting	considerable	time	in	formal	art	education	to	asking,	training	or	evaluating	‘the	artist’s	intentions	with	his	or	her	work’,	is	not	at	all	a	very	useful	practice.		Artworks	are	autonomous	which	means	that	they	answer	to	no	one.	They	must	over	time	carve	out	their	own	existence.	An	artwork	cannot	be	presumed	to	carry	clear	and	concise	meaning,	either	for	the	artist	who	makes	it,	or	for	others	who	view	it.	Additionally,	whatever	meaning	is	conveyed	will	most	certainly	not	be	the	same	one	for	every	person	who	sees	it.	And	to	compound	the	difficulties,	meaning	does	not	remain	constant	over	time,	not	for	any	one	person	who	views	it,	or	even	for	the	artist	who	made	it.	I	think	that	art’s	entire	history	demonstrates	that	all	of	those	things	are	true.	We	have	more	than	ample	examples	of	works	that	we	regard	very	differently	today	than	they	were	regarded	in	the	past,	also	differently	with	respect	to	what	the	artist	intended	with	them.	Is	it	then	either	logical	or	defensible,	that	we	ask	art	students	to	have	and	formulate	carefully	all	the	expectations	regarding	the	function	their	works	will	have,	in	the	same	manner	that	we	require	that	of	engineering	students	designing	an	internal	combustion	engine?	Another	thought	perhaps	worth	considering	is	the	following:	It	may	be	in	very	large	part	because	we	don’t	understand	many	things	about	art	that	it	can	take	on	great	importance.	There	is	undeniably	great	power	in	mystery.	All	of	the	world’s	religions	and	the	critically	important	meaning	so	many	people	derive	from	them,	demonstrate	that	clearly.	
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In	very	many	respects,	I	think	it	obvious	that	the	uncertainty	art	presents	us	with	is	one	of	its	most	criticial	components.	Uncertainty	then	should	not	be	seen	as	a	problem	we	can	perhaps	solve	by	grasping	at	pseudo-certainties	like	‘intention’,	‘concept’	or	‘research’,	by	seeking	relief	from	doubt	in	hard	but	unrelated	academic	fact,	or	through	all-encompassing	theories	about	art.	Uncertainty	in-	and	about	art	is,	I	am	saying,	really	not	a	problem!	Instead	it	is	one	of	its	most	vital	constituents,	essential	for	art’s	function.	Uncertainty	opens	opportunities.	It	invites	us	to	travel	roads	we	would	not	otherwise	know	of,	or	even	think	to	explore.	What	we	learn	by	embarking	on	such	journeys	has,	over	millennia,	proven	of	very	great	value	to	humankind.			
METAPHYSICS	Acts	of	Magic	and	acts	of	Art	are	interestingly	similar.	Neither	of	those	are	actions	we	undertake	in	order	to	clarify	or	resolve	anything.	Both	I	suggest,	are	in	fact	largely	intended	to	achieve	precisely	the	opposite,	i.e.	to	create	and	maintain	a	functional	state	of	uncertainty.	If	we	accept	the	idea	that	an	important	purpose	of	art	is	the	creation	of	functional	uncertainties,	then	the		hesitance	many	artists	have	to	explain	what	they	do	becomes	more	readily	understandable.	The	requirement	to	explain	one’s	artwork	then	becomes	akin	to	being	the	main	act	in	a	‘magic	show’,	and	being	required	to	say	how	and	why	he	does	every	‘trick’!	The	magician	or	artist	in	that	case,	confronted	with	the	demand	to	‘demystify’	the	very	mystery	he	has	just	taken	great	pains	to	create,	will	very	likely	not	appreciate	that!	That	simply	doesn’t	work	well	for	the	artist,	nor	for	that	matter,	for	his	audience.	
Here’s	what	an	artist	or	a	magician	really	wants:	To	create	for	himself	and	his	audience	the	state	of	thinking,	feeling	and	being,	that	results	when	genuine	uncertainty	about	things,	let’s	call	that		‘a	state	of	Wonder’,	is	brought	about.	
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That	state	of	wonder	that	is	the	fundamental	purpose	of	the	‘trick’	must	be	painstakingly	created	and	maintained.	Demands	for	explanation	of	how	and	why	the	trick	was	accomplished,	invariably	and	directly	defeat	the	purpose	of	it.	The	magician	or	artist	should	neither	be	asked	nor	required	to	explain	his	trick	as	a	prerequisite	for	‘understanding	it’.	If	he	acceeds	to	that	demand,	the	state	of	uncertainty	(a	quantum	state)	he	has	laboriously	created	will	instantaneously	and	irreversibly	collapse.	
Here’s	what	the	artist’s	or	magician’s	audience	really	wants:	To	be	led	to	experience	a	state	of	wonder,	being	neither	certain	of	what	they	are	seeing,	nor	exactly	how	they	will	then	come	to	think	and	feel	about	it.	The	most	important	precondition	for	that	experience	is	the	freedom	to	process	what	they	see	individually,	and	thereby	discover	what	they	will	come	to	think	and	feel	as	a	result.	Explaining	to	them	before	they’ve	engaged	in	that	process	what	they	
should	come	to	think	and	feel,	what	they	should	take	away	from	that	experience,	will	defeat	the	real	purpose	of	their	attendance.	What	it	comes	down	to	is	this:	When	an	artist	explains	for	his	viewers	what	‘his	works	mean’,	or	when	someone	else	undertakes	to	do	it,	that	critical	purpose	I	am	suggesting	art	fulfills,	to	create	and	maintain	a	‘state	of	wonder’,	will	largely	and	immediately	be	defeated.	Instead	what	will	be	arrived	at	is	‘comfortable	consensus’	about	meaning.	That	consensus	necessarily	takes	the	form	of	a	singular	and	very	limited	way	of	understanding.	And	that	then	negates	all	other	ways	of	understanding.	The	point	of	a	feat	of	art	or	of	prestidigitation	is	neither	the	technique	by	which	it	is	accomplished,	nor	any	one	person’s	interpretation	of	the	‘meaning‘	of	that	manipulation.	The	point	is	the	excitement	and	energy	generated	by	the	inspirational	‘field	of	uncertainty’	for	the	attending	audience.	Exposing	the	workings,	the	components,	or	the	end	point	of	the	manipulation,	whether	in	art	
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or	magic,	accomplishes	nothing	more	than	the	destruction	of	the	very	illusion	that	is	its	purpose.	One	of	the	more	pervasive-,	and	I	think	also	fallacious	tenets	about	art,	is	that	it	can	be	understood	as	a	number	of	discrete	‘facts’	that	can	lead	us	to	‘logical	conclusions’.	A	fact	is	a	concise	bit	of	information	that	we	insert	into-	or	extract	from	a	‘system’,	enabling	us	to	predict	and	observe	its	effects	on	that	system.	But	artworks	neither	are-,	nor	do	they	reference	facts	in	that	way.	Instead	they	are	personal	and	highly	individual	observations,	more	akin	to	opinions.	Importantly	also,	they	are	not	reproducible.	Observational	experience	of	the	kind	art	offers	us	relies	on	a	highly	complex	set	of	circumstances,	parameters	on	which	it	is	wholly	dependent.	That	type	of	experience	life	offers	us	quite	differently	from	our	encounters	with	facts	is	neither	objective,	nor	can	it	be	seen	as	based	on	any	intention	to	achieve	universally	validity.	For	those	reasons,	I	suggest	that	any	approach	to	art	that	assumes	objective	meaning	or	intention,	embarks	on	a	fool’s	errand.	Works	of	art	are	the	recordings	of	individual	messages,	ones	that	are	time-,	mood-	and	situation-	dependent.	We	cannot,	as	I	indicated	earlier,	be	sure	for	whom	the	message	is	intended.	As	such,	that	message	is	one	that	can	never	be	fully	‘understood’	as	having	any	singular	meaning,	intention,	or	consequence,	at	least	not	one	its	creator	can	be	held	entirely	responsible	for.	The	response	to	a	work	of	art	by	its	viewer	is	equally	time-,	mood-	and	situation	dependent.	None	of	these	are	factors	the	artist	has	any	appreciable	control	over,	and	therefore	he	cannot	be	expected	to	accurately	predict	them.	In	this	light,	it	seems	quite	illogical	to	assume	that	there	are	singular	or	primary	‘messages	or	concepts’	contained	in-	or	being	formulated	in	works	of	art.		If	such	messages	exist,	I	think	that	those	can	perhaps	only	be	understood	as	ones	sent	by	the	artist	to	himself.	As	strange	as	that	may	sound,	it	may	well	be	a	
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functional	aspect	of	the	practice	of	art!	Could	it	be	that	artists	are	not	sending	messages	to	the	rest	of	us,	but	instead	to	themselves?	Maybe	their	works	are	a	kind	of	‘messages	in	a	bottle’	that	the	artist	first	carefully	composes	and	then	‘sets	adrift’.	Then,	some	time	later	the	artist,	on	reencountering	his	work,	no	longer	‘the	writer’,	but	instead	now	‘a	reader’,	can	ponder	the	meaning	that	message	now	holds	for	him.	That	meaning	will	in	many	respects,	not	be	the	same	one	he	thought	to	have	initially	recorded.	That	is	to	say	that	also	for	the	artist,	his	works	will	inevitably	take	on	new	meanings	that	he	cannot	be	aware	of	at	the	time	of	making.	As	strange	as	looking	at	art	in	this	way	might	sound	on	first	hearing	it	,	I	suggest	that	this	may	be	a	far	truer	and	considerably	more	useful	model	than	the	one-sided,	simplistic	notion	that	artists	merely	compose	and	send	messages	to	the	rest	of	us!	
	fig	13	untitled-	1981	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Robert	Schlingemann©	
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Perhaps	an	example	from	my	own	work	may	once	again	be	useful	.	The	work	pictured	above	from	1981	was	for	me	an	experiment	in	precisely	that	‘message-in-a-bottle’	type	I	just	described.	The	‘message’,	in	this	case	consisted	of	a	somewhat	mysterious	text	that	I	composed	and	typed	on	canvas.	I	then	partially	burnt,	painted,	folded,	and	rigidly	plasticized	the	canvas	and	mounted	it	in	the	blue	glass	shape	that	penetrates	the	glass	form.	For	me	at	the	time	of	making,	an	important	aspect	of	the	work	was	imagining	what	I	might	remember	and	understand	on	re-reading	that	message	if	I	much	later	re-encountered	it.	As	a	result	of	folding	and	burning	parts	of	it,	I	had	ensured	that	neither	I	nor	anyone	else	would	ever	be	able	to	read	the	entire	text,	but	only	fragments	of	it.	In	fact,	many	years	later,	9	years	to	be	precise,	I	did	re-encounter	that	work.		It	was	one	of	a	large	number	of	my	works	borrowed	from	various	private	and	public	collections	for	a	museum	retrospective	show	in	Paris	in	1990.	Standing	again	for	the	first	time	in	many	years	in	front	of	that	work,	and	trying	to	remember	what	message	I	had	written	and	why,	I	found	that	I	had	very	little	memory	of	the	text	I	had	long	before	written.	I	was	quite	unable	to	reconstruct	my	message	from	the	individual	phrases	I	was	now	able	to	decipher.		A	work	of	art	can	be	described	as	a	‘quantum	observation’.	It	is	a	record	of	a	set	of	experiential	conditions	so	complex	in	their	potential	interactions	with	each	other,	as	to	be	indescribable	in	any	one	formulation.	In	fact,	any	attempt	to	reductively	process	those	circumstances,	to	‘distil’	from	them	concise	parameters	or	meanings,	is	literally	contra-productive	to	fully	understanding	them.	Doing	so,	isolating	aspects	of	the	experience	from	each	other,	just	as	in	quantum	mechanics,	results	in	what	is	called	xxviii’wave	function	collapse’,	i.e.	it	
destroys	the	existing	state.	We	end	up	then	describing	only	one	aspect	of	an	existing	state,	thereby	irrevesibly	changing	all	the	other	just-as-real	characteristics	it	had.	I	think	that	art	can	be	quite	usefully	looked	at	as	relating	
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to	quantum	mechanics	in	this	respect.	A	quantum	observation	is	characterized	by	the	fact	that	we	cannot	describe	with	any	exactitude	any	one	aspect	of	it	without	substantially	changing	the	other	ones.	In	art	just	as	in	quantum	mechanics,	the	information	we	gather	from	our	observations	depends	entirely	on	what	is	being	looked	for-	and	at.	In	simple	terms	that	means	that	a	functioning	work	of	art	will	be	irrevocably	altered	by	attempts	to	describe	its	nature	or	meaning	all	too	precisely.	There	are	,	of	course,	many	different	ways	to	look	at	and	describe	the	workings	and	meanings	of	artworks.	Choosing	or	advocating	only	one	of	them	as	the	way	makes	no	sense,	neither	artistic-	nor	scientific	sense.	It	is,	I’m	trying	to	make	clear,	the	simultaneous	existence	of	the	multitude	of	ways	in	which	artworks	can	be	looked	at	and	interpreted,	that	both	constitutes-	and	informs	art	experience.	The	physicist	David	Bohm,	in	a	theoretical	article	about	the	ramifications	of	quantum	theory	said	this:	
xxix	“One	is	led	to	a	new	notion	of	unbroken	wholeness	which	
denies	the	classical	idea	of	analyzability	of	the	world	into	
separately	and	independently	existing	parts	.	.	.	We	have	
reversed	the	usual	classical	notion	that	the	independent	
‘elementary	parts’	of	the	world	are	the	fundamental	
reality,	and	that	the	various	systems	are	merely	particular	
contingent	forms	and	arrangements	of	these	parts.	
Rather,	we	say	that	inseparable	quantum	interconnectedness	
of	the	whole	universe	is	the	fundamental	reality,	and	
that	relatively	independently	behaving	parts	are	merely	
particular	and	contingent	forms	within	this	whole.”	
	In	my	view	we	often	suffer	from	the	desire	to	distil	information	from	art	of	a	kind	that	it	cannot	offer	us.	I	opine	here	that	that	tendency	results	in	large	part	from	the	uncomfortable	confrontation	with	uncertainty	about	how	we	should	react	to	artworks.	Artworks	speak	to	imagination,	imagination	demands	that	we	explore	of	a	number	of	seemingly	equally	valid	alternatives	of	seeing	a	thing.	We	cannot	however,	stimulate	imagination	about	anything	by	adding	information	that	irreversibly	changes	that	thing.	Similarly,	if	we	ignore	
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important	aspects	of	the	information	a	thing	offers	us,	we	accomplish	the	opposite	of	understanding	it.	Mystery	and	ambiguity	are	fields	for	imagination	that	rely	precisely	on	the	absence	of	any	singular	valid	resolution	of	them.	When	we	extract	information	from	a	multiple-choice	field,	it	leads	to	the	reduction	of	all	possible	interpretations	to	only	that	one.	But	is	then	the	remaining	interpretation	the	‘right	one’,	the	most	important	one?	We	can	and	often	do	resolve	the	discomfort	of	ambiguity	by	taking	that	course.	But	when	we	do	that,	I	am	suggesting,	we’re	diminishing	the	ability	of	artworks	to	act	as	‘fields	for	imagination’.	We	live	now	in	a	time	when	it	seems	increasingly,	that	we	are	convinced	that	‘fact	trumps	doubt’,	in	pretty	much	all	situations	we	encounter.	We	need	only	to	look	at	the	explosively	expanding	market	for	computers,	telephones,	cameras	and	other	devices	that	offer	instant	access	to-	and	control	over	the	precise	information	we	seek.	Those	amazing	devices	allow	us	very	quickly	and	easily	to	find,	alter,	reshuffle,	and	pass	back	and	forth	between	each	other	enormous	amounts	of	‘information’.	We	have	now	instantly	within	our	reach	an	incredible	number	of	single	isolated	facts.	The	functional	attraction	of	such	technological	magic	boxes	for	us	is	the	illusion	that	we	are	more	completetely	in	control	of	our	lives	as	the	result	of	instant	access	to-,	and	an	almost	incessant	recombination	of	‘the	relevant	facts	about	any	situation	we	encounter.	Characteristic	of	these	control	processes	is	that	they	are	most	frequently	geared	towards	‘singular’	resolution.	It	will	I	think	be	clear	that	my	position	in	art	is	that	singular	resolution	is	not	an	ally	of	art.	Teaching	artists	that	they	should	explain	their	artworks	(i.e.	offer	singular	interpretations	of	their	intentions	or	meanings),	is	I	think,	a	manifestation	of	the	notion	that	knowledge	is	advanced	through	clarity	and	‘problem	solving’.	The	only	problem	we	‘solve’	by	promoting	singular	meanings	in	art	is	the	existence	of	our	uncertainty	about	
	 134	
our	reactions	to	it.		It	is	my	position	that	we	are	then	merely	pretending	that	simple	truths	exist	about	something	for	which	that	is	patently	quite	untrue.			
	
INFORMATION	AND	CATEGORIES	We	are	enabled	by	the	amazing	technological	capabilities	computers	and	other	‘magic	boxes’	offer	us,	to	immediately	relegate	any	piece	or	pieces	of	information	we	gather	to	some	category.	We	simply	consign	what	we	decide	are	related	facts	to	an	existing	‘folder’,	or	perhaps	quickly	click	a	new	one	into	existence,	giving	it	a	name	we	invent.	In	fact,	it	is	very	often	those	names	we	relatively	unthinkingly	invent	that	later	become	the	source	of	considerable	problems	we	later	encounter.		Computers	enable	us	to	gather	and	order	facts	very	quickly	and	easily.	We	deposit	those	ordered	facts	in	various	files	or	folders	we	create,	in	the	belief	that	that	information	is	then	both	‘saved	and	ordered’.		We	can	then	manipulate,	categorize,	open	and	close	those	files	any	time	we	want,	and	also	very	easily	find	them	again.	There	is	no	doubt	that	with	the	aid	of	computers,	the	ease	with	which	we	are	able	to	create	and	maintain	organizational	categories,	to	manage	and	conserve	massive	amounts	of	factual	information,	has	seen	a	quantum	leap.	But	I	want	to	suggest	that	it’s	important	to	realise	that	when	we	increasingly	rely	on	categories	(our	files	and	folders)	to	access	information,	whether	in	computers	or	in	our	brains,	that	simultaneously	creates	appreciable	resistance	to	change.	The	consideration	of	any	alternative	order	to	the	one	we	thereby	establish	and	‘give	weight	to’	becomes	impeded,	and	that’s	not	a	good	thing	in	my	view.	The	ability	to	imagine	and	give	form	to	alternatives	to	existing	orders,	(e.g.	current	paradigm	in	art),	is	something	I	
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believe	it	crucially	important	that	artists	are	able	to	do	well.	If	we’re	not	careful	when	we	create	or	confirm	new	categories,	we	accomplish	the	reverse	of	that!	We	are	then	only	increasing	the	ease	and	speed	of	our	access	to	what	may	be	less	useful	information.	We	are	no	longer	generating	or	accruing	knowledge.	Instead,	we	are	then	merely	administering	it.	Additionally,	what	we	then	administer	is	only	that	type	of	knowledge	that	can	take	the	form	of	independent	and	relatively	inflexible	facts.	In	other	words,	with	the	help	of	our	magic	boxes,	we	are	creating	information	bundles	that	are	primarily	useful	for	historical-	and	statistical	reconstructions.	And	reconstruction	is	a	very	different	thing	than	creative	advance!	History	and	Statistics	are	very	useful	indeed	for	the	preservation,	study	and	analysis	of	the	coincidence	of	facts.	But	neither	history	nor	statistics,	I	suggest,	can	claim	authority	when	it	comes	to	the	meaning	of	
those	facts.	We	are	very	easily	led	to	incorrect	conclusions	by	statistics	if	we	do	not	sufficiently	understand	the	interrelationship	of	the	facts	they	represent.	Later,	under	the	heading	OUTLIERS,	I	will	offer	a	poignant	example	of	what	can	happen	when	we	look	too	closely	only	at	statistics,	i.e.	the	coincidence	of	facts,	without	sufficiently	understanding	the	deeper	implications	or	meaning	of	those	facts.	It	is,	I	am	suggesting	here,	critically	important	that	we	make	careful	choices	regarding	when	and	how	we	apply	facts.	We	believe	we	are	succeeding	to	make	things	‘clear’	by	categorizing	them,	and	that	is	quite	often	the	case.	At	the	same	time,	the	more	categories	we	create,	the	more	‘unclear’	the	connections	between	those	categories	automatically	become.	That	is	to	say	that	the	more	empty	spaces	we	create	between	categories	we	accumulate,	the	less	clear	the	relationship	between	those	categories	is.	What	connect	those	categories	then,	what	is	the	nature	and	role	of	the	‘mortar’	that	hold	those	‘bricks’	in	place?	It	seems	we	imagine	that	by	this	process	of	gathering	and	categorizing	facts,	we	preserve,	oversee	and	will	understand	better.	That’s	true,	but	only	when	those	categories	we	create	for	the	
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information	we	gather	are	truly	functional,	i.e.	only	when	care	is	exercised	to	ensure	that	those	categories	are	either	mutually	exclusive,	or	clearly	and	systematically	connected.	More	often	than	not	however,	that	is	not	at	all	what	we	do,	or	are	perhaps	even	capable	of	doing.	The	‘knowledge	bases’	we	create	in	this	way	are	artificial	ones,	i.e.	they	have	neither	evolved	nor	emerged	naturally	or	experientially	from	the	facts	we	gather,	and	have	also	not	been	tested	by	time.	Instead	we	have	imposed	our	own	order	on	things	and	consequently,	functionality	is	limited	to	no	more	than	our	perceived	needs	at	the	time.	In	this	manner,	the	natural	and	quite	often	consequential	interfaces	within	any	knowledge	base,	those	either	ordered	by	similarities	or	by	differences,	become	obscured.	We	are	then	no	longer	able	to	consider-and	gain	important	insights	from	the	information	we’ve	gathered	in	any	other	way	than	what	follows	from	its	current	structural	organization.	With	organization	of	this	kind,	we	are	in	fact	prioritizing	the	manageability	of	things,	and	in	so	doing,	unavoidably	often	impeding	a	deeper	understanding	of	those	things.	In	other	words,	we	are	currently	very	often	effectively	advancing	manageability	by	obscuring	meaning.	Later,	I	believe	inevitably,	we	arrive	at	a	point	where	things	again	become	unmanageable,	because	we	have	obscured	meaning.	We	are	no	longer	open	to	emergent	meaning	because	we	impede	emergence	with	our	static	‘order’.	This	point	is	related,	very	directly	I	think,	to	the	increasingly	often	heard	plaint	of	scientists,	and	more	recently	even	of	social	scientists,	that	all	research	is	very	rapidly	becoming	only	‘applied’	research,	and	that	‘pure	science’	is	sufferering	as	a	result.	Because	all	research	is	increasingly	dependent	on	the	immediacy	of	its	potential	for	useful,	i.e.	profitable	applications	(our	‘perceived	needs	at	the	time’),	this	is	radically	changing	the	nature	of	science.	The	possibility	to	conduct	research	and	perhaps	make	important	discovery	for	which	no	immediate	commercial	use	can	be	
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demonstrated,	becomes	severely	curtailed.	And	it	may	be	that	those	are	the	very	discoveries	that	could	prove	critically	important	ones	for	mankind.	A	more	familiar	example	of	the	problems	created	by	artificial	order,	is	I	think	the	following	one:	Most	of	us	at	one	time	or	another	have	experienced	the	frustration	that	accompanies	being	informed	by	someone	in	an	office,	or	over	the	telephone	or	internet,	that	‘The	System’	as	it	was	set	up	to	administer	a	service	we	use	and	need,	for	example	telephone	or	internet,	and	is	now	not	working	as	it	should,	is	not	able	to	consider	or	solve	the	specific	problem	we	are	seeking	assistance	for.	We	are	informed	that	the	system	has	relegated	our	problem	to	a	category,	one	often	entirely	at	odds	with	the	facts	of	the	matter	we	are	complaining	about.		Our	specific	problem	seems	to	fall	entirely	outside	of	the	parameters	considered	in	the	design	of	that	system	and,	for	that	reason	we	cannot	expect	to	be	helped	by	the	system.	We	find	out	at	such	times	that	The	System,	one	nominally	designed	to	effectively	help	the	customer,	is	completely	incapable	of	performing	that	service.	It	can	do	nothing	more	than	to	register	our	problem	and	assign	it	to	some	unhelpful	category.	In	other	words,	that	system	can	help	us	only	when	the	specific	problem	we	are	trying	to	resolve	matches	one	of	the	situational	categories	tha	are	the	most	frequently	encountered	ones,	and	have	been	programmed	into	the	system.	We	find	out,	maddeningly,	that	a	very	real	problem	we	are	experiencing	just	doesn’t	fit	into	any	existing	category,	and	that	therefore	the	problem	cannot	be	recognized,	and	no	solution	can	be	expected	Trying	to	solve	problems,	engage	in	meaningful	communication,	or	arrive	at	real	understanding	exclusively	through	rigidly	categorized	and	artificially	administered	systems	can	be	very	difficult,	oftentimes	even	impossible.	Systems	such	as	I	describe	them	here	that	are	designed	to	more	efficiently	administer	facts	can	act	very	quickly,	but	they	necessarily	always	do	so	
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uniformly,	acting	on	some	of	the	facts,	but	never	on	all	of	them.	For	any	problem	that	requires	more	sophisticated	or	nuanced	solutions,	those	systems	increasingly	often	fail	us.	Thinking	in	categories,	and	acting	primarily	on	the	basis	of	what	categories	indicate	or	dictate,	increases	the	speed	of	the	
resolution	of	a	problem,	but	by	no	means	necessarily	advances	its	correct	
solution.	Instead,	by	ignoring	or	obscuring	pertinent	facts,	or	the	interrelatedness	of	those	facts,	categories	increase	the	ease	and	speed	with	which	we	can	administer	things,	but	not	necessarily	resolve	them	correctly	or	sustainably.	This	is,	perhaps	we	could	say,	the	difference	between	taking	quick,	uniform	and	hopefully	useful	action	based	on	‘the	relevant	facts’,	or	alternatively,	understanding	things	fully	before	acting	on	them.	Accumulating	and	administering	information,	i.e.	knowing	facts,	is	a	very	different	thing	altogether	from	understanding	the	meaning	of	that	information	and	those	facts.	
	
fig.	14			”History”-	1995	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
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IT’S	ABOUT	TIME!	Contrary	to	an	important	current	tendency	in	art	practice	education,	I	believe	that	learning	to	read,	write	and	recite	facts	about	those	who’ve	made	art	in	the	past	does	not	to	the	degree	we	seem	to	imagine,	help	us	make	art	of	quality	now.	My	standpoint	throughout	this	text	is	that	reading,	writing	and	thinking	about	art,	engage	entirely	different	processes	than	making-	or	deeply	appreciating	art.	Memorizing	lists	of	great	artists	belonging	to	certain	stylistic	groups	for	example,	is	a	practice	that	may	even	be	counterproductive	for	artists	who	are	trying	to	develop	their	own	‘unique	discourse’,	and	also	I	believe,	for	the	viewer’s	ability	to	derive	real	personal	meaning	from	works	of	art.		There	is	no	doubt	that	teaching	art	students	to	look	deeply,	both	at-	and	into	the	works	of	our	greatest	artists,	offers	them	important	experiences	of	quality	in	art.	Careful,	sensitive	study	and	consideration	of	different	aspects	of	those	artworks	can	and	does	accomplish	that.	But	the	usefulness	of	that	practice	is,	I	submit,	very	significantly	diminished	when	the	study	is	led	by	attention	only	for	those	similarities	that	are	the	basis	for	the	category	within	which	art	historians	tell	us	those	works	fall.	In	that	aspect	of	it,	I	think,	‘History’	may	not	always	serve	us	well.		My	reasons	for	saying	this	relate	directly	to	what	I	have	just	said	about	systems,	files	and	categorical	thinking.	Our	primary	focus	in	art	practice	should	be,	it	seems	to	me,	promoting	individuality	of	approach	for	students	of	that	practice,	i.e.	helping	them	to	discover	and	develop	their	own	personal	approaches	to	making	art	of	quality.		I	suggest	that	the	institutionalized	practice	of	looking	at	great	art	from	the	past	
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through	the	categorizing	lens	of	art	history	can	in	some	respects	be	regarded	as	encouraging	the	opposite.		There	is	no	doubt	that	looking	into	the	past	through	the	lens	of	History	offers	us	a	unique,	instructive	and	fascinating	view.	But	we	should	not	forget	that	that	our	view	of	anything	is	always	restricted	by	the	focal	point	of	the	lens	we	are	peering	through.	That	lens	specific	to	History	offers	us	a	view	of	things	that	are	often	quite	distant	in	time,	effectively	permitting	us	to	see	them	sharply!	But	there	are	other	things	within	that	field	of	view	that	we	then	no	longer	see	sharply,	sometimes	those	become	even	entirely	obscured!	History’s	lens	enables	a	sharp	focus,	but	only	on	those	objects	that	support	the	category	to	which	history	relegates	them	in	order	to	enable	that	extraordinarily	sharp	view.	Anything	that	has	no	categorical	function	within	history’s	field	of	view	is	rendered	either	vague,	or	is	sometimes	no	longer	visible.	I	think	it	entirely	fair	to	say	that	History	both	establishes	and	promotes	Category.	It	confirms	thinking	about	things,	events,	and	people	from	the	past	by	grouping	them.	But	I	suggest	that	it	is	worth	considering	that	categorization	may	well	be	antithetical	to	individual	creativity,	thinking,	and	actions.	How,	for	example,	does	the	important	and	daunting	task	instructors	in	art	are	charged	with,	to	encourage	their	students	to	think	and	act	‘outside	the	box’,	relate	to	History’s	prime	directive	to	‘create	and	structurally	institutionalize	those	boxes’?	Learning	to	read,	write	and	think	in	historical	terms	advances	valuable	skills,	there	is	no	doubt	of	it,	but	only	when	that	is	undertaken	critically	and	sensitively.	In	my	experience	however,	some	of	the	categories	that	we	create	and	imagine	are	helpful	for	understanding	great	art	can	often	seem	maddeningly	illogical.	
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	fig.	15		“History	Too”	2006	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		Consider	for	example	two	artists	whose	work	is	designated	in	formal	art	history	as	belonging	to	the	category:	‘the	Post-	Impressionists’.	History	tells	us	that	both	Van	Gogh	and	Seurat	were	post-impressionists.	When	standing	in	front	of	the	works	of	those	two	great	artists,	and	undergoing	with	some	concentration	and	sensitivity	what	each	of	them	accomplished	in-	and	with	their	works,	I	have	difficulty	understanding	why	Van	Gogh’s	paintings	are	usefully	thought	to	belong	to	the	same	category	as	Seurat’s.	Instead,	I	have	a	feeling	that	I	cannot	shake,	that	the	similarities	that	exist	between	their	works	seem	far	less	consequential	than	the	immediate	and	much	more	striking	differences	between	them.	The	History	of	art,	I’m	saying,	may	in	fact	not	be	very	helpful	in	sensitizing	us	to	some	of	the	consequential	differences	between	things.	Instead,	history	more	often	seems	to	systematically	focus	on	what	it	construes	as	similar,	i.e.	what	links	things.	I	submit	that	artists	need	also	to	be	highly	sensitive	to	the	often	highly	consequential	differences	between	things.	
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It	seems	clear	that	one	aspect	of	the	way	history	characterizes	and	categorizes	things	is	determinant	for	the	entire	view	it	offers	us	of	art.	That	aspect	is	‘chronology’.	The	stuctural	link	between	history	and	chronology	is	I	think,	the	single	most	determinant	factor	for	what	art	history	can	tell	us	about	art,	and	also	for	what	it	cannot	tell	us	about	art.	It’s	about	TIME.	Things	that	happen	in	the	same	time	period	are	given	consideration	together.	And	that	consideration	will	in	very	large	measure	influence	the	meaning	of	things	looked	at	in	that	way.	What	happened	later	or	earlier	is	usually	not	simultaneously	considered	in	any	one	historical	view.		History	is	a	fascinating	view	of	events	that	we	achieve	by	looking	backwards,	attempting	to	penetrate	the	haze	of	time.	It	groups	the	facts	it	can	establish	with	the	objective	of	creating	a	continuum	that	is	linked	by	causality	as	that	relates	to	Time.	But	History	may	not	be	very	helpful	when	it	comes	to	locating	or	understanding	some	of	the	unique	and	important	events	in	the	past	or	the	present	that	it	cannot	establish	as	links	in	such	a	time-sequential	causality	chain.	For	that	reason,	I	suggest	that	history’s	view	may	not	always	enable	the	focus	on	some	important	facts	or	events	in	the	past	in	the	degree	that	is	sometimes	necessary	to	reveal	the	essential	meanings	of	those	facts	and	events.	History	is	a	chronologically	based	pursuit.	Its	most	critical	selection	criterion,	and	consequentially	its	informational	value,	must	be	understood	as	overridingly	related	to	the	recording	of	events	in	TIME.	For	that	reason	alone,	History	should	not	necessarily	be	expected	to	be	effective	in	revealing	to	us	the	MEANING	of	those	events.	For	example,	we	should	not	expect	that	history	will	notice	and	register	subtle	but	important	differences	between	events	happening	at	the	same	time,	even	less	so	for	meaningfully	linked	events	separated	by	time.	History	tends	to	look	at	events	with	attention	to	commonality	and	‘causality’,	but	only	when	it	is	able	
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to	locate-,	sharply	focus	on-,	and	reveal	those.	It	is	wise	to	remain	aware	that	History	with	respect	to	some	things	we	consider	it	important	to	know,	may	by	itself	be	unable	to	reveal	those	to	us	accurately	or	comprehensively.	For	these	reasons,	I	am	suggesting	that	automatically	resorting	to	History	as	the	most	effective	tool	we	have	to	advance	our	understanding	of	the	past,	(let	alone	the	present	or	the	future),	should	always	be	critically	questioned.	I	think	in	fact,	that	it	may	prove	quite	interesting	to	undertake	a	critical	look	at	History	in	art	practice	education,	i.e.	at	the	academic	pursuit	itself.	We	may	well,	I	believe,	come	to	realise	that	there	are	important	things	that	we	should	not	be	expecting	history	to	be	able	to	tell	us.		I	want	here	to	make	it	clear	here	that	the	sweeping,	perhaps	even	dramatic	cautions	I	note	regarding	what	I	believe	History	can	or	cannot	tell	us,	should	in	no	respect	be	taken	to	mean	that	I’m	‘against	History’.	History	offers	us	a	view	
of	process,	and	it	is	an	extraordinarily	rich	and	useful	one	indeed.	I	want	only	to	argue	that	we	should	not	imagine	to	the	extent	we	currently	seem	to	that	history	is	also	our	most	useful	advisor	when	we	need	to	‘manage,	understand,	or	evaluate	process.		History	can	only	accomplish	those	tasks	in	the	degree	in	which	the	methodologies,	rules	and	biases	that	define	that	pursuit,	enable-,	but	also	necessarily	confine	it.		All	those	involved	in	art	practice	education	should	be	cognizant	of	the	unavoidable	bias	that	looking	at	things	through	any	one	lens	brings	with	it,	whether	that	is	the	lens	of	History’	or	any	other	one.	Conscientious,	sensitive	attention	must	always	be	paid	to	what	will	not	be	visible	from	any	one	given	viewpoint.	In	art	education,	my	remarks	here	should	be	seen	as	arguing	that	history	should	not	uncritically	be	thought	of-	or	resorted	to	as	a	holistic	or	an	unbiased	viewpoint.		
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OUTLIERS	History,	among	other	things,	tends	to	ignore	outliers.	An	“outlier”	is	xxxdefined	as:	
1.	something	that	lies	outside	the	main	body	or	group	that	it	is	a	part	of,	as	a	cow	far	from	the	
rest	of	the	herd,	or	a	distant	island	belonging	to	a	cluster	of	islands	
	
2.	someone	who	stands	apart	from	others	of	his	or	her	group,	as	by	differing	actions,	beliefs,	
religious	practices,	etc.	
	
3.	In	Statistics-an	observation	that	is	well	outside	of	the	expected	range	of	values	in	a	study	or	
experiment,	and	which	is	often	discarded	from	the	data	set:		a	person	whose	abilities,	
achievements,	etc.,	lie	outside	the	range	of	statistical	probability.		Outliers	in	my	view,	those	seemingly	small	and	unimportant	exceptions	to	‘the	rule’,	constitute	a	factor	of	importance	for	a	holistic	understanding	of	some	of	the	great	moments	in	our	history,	whether	that	is	art	or	any	other	pursuit,	now	or	in	the	past.	Illustrative	of	that	for	me	is	an	example	from	our	very	recent	past,	the	world’s	financial	collapse	in	2008,	clearly	not	an	unimportant	event!	That	historical	process	on	analysis	of	it,	shows	that	ignoring	outliers	that	are	part	of	any	process	can	result	in	very	serious	consequences,	sometimes	ones	with	literally	immense	repercussions.	In	his	book,	xxxi“The	Black	Swan”,	Nicholas	Nassim	Taleb	provides	a	rare	‘insider’	description	and	analysis	of	the	events	that	led	to	the	worldwide	financial	collapse	of	2007-2008	that	we	continue	to	suffer	from	today.	His	book	recounts	in	great	detail	how-,	when-	and	why	that	collapse	resulted	from	ignoring	the	very	large,	sometimes	even	catastrophic	effects	that	statistical	outliers	can	have	on	any	system.	The	financial	collapse	is	shown	to	have	had	its	origin	in	the	derivatives	market,	causing	that	market	first	to	collapse,	and	progressively	bringing	down	almost	the	entire	world’s	interlinked	financial	
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systems	with	it.	This	happened	sometime	after	the	financial	industry	had	brought	in	a	brilliant	group	of	mathematicians	and	physicists,	all	of	them	conversant	with	quantum	mechanics,	and	for	that	reason	nicknamed	‘quants.	Those	specialists	from	entirely	outside	the	world	of	finance,	(the	author	Taleb,	was	one	of	them),	were	tasked	with	making	highly	complex	calculations	that	could	reliably	indicate	the	degree	of	confidence	investors	should	feel	in	their	investments,	and	specifically	in	offerings	of	one	type	of	financial	product	called	derivatives.	Based	on	their	calculations	pertaining	to	the	probablility	that	the	value	of	investments	would	increase	or	decrease,	potent	institutional	investors	proceeded	to	make	huge	bets	in	that	market,	and	proceeded	to	lose	almost	all	of	their	(c.q.	our)	money	on	those	huge	bets	they	made.		But	the	ensuing	collapse	of	the	world’s	markets	was	not	the	result	of	calculation	errors	the	‘quants’	made.	Their	calculations	were	quite	correct	and.	the	world’s	biggest	financial	players	had	indeed	paid	heed	to	them,	investing	very	largely	consistent	with	what	those	calculated	probabilties	indicated.	The	problem	resulted	because	those	quants,	some	of	whom	had	repeatedly	tried	to	warn	of	this,	failed	to	convince	their	bosses	in	the	financial	industry	that	they	should	not	fail	to	take	into	account	an	ostensibly	negligible-	but	critically	important	factor	that	the	‘quants’	were	aware	of.	That	factor	was	one	they	could	describe,	but	could	not	convincinly	reveal	in	their	calculations,	namely	disastrous	statistical	‘outliers’.	It	was	this	kind	of	very	small,	seemingly	impossibly	improbable	event	within	the	multitude	of	possible	events	being	considered,	that	although	highly	unlikely,	would	have	an	unimaginably	great	effect	if	it	came	to	pass,	that	caused	the	world’s	financial	system	to	crash.	What	happened	was	this:	The	financial	industry	proceeded	to	both	offer	and	take	enormous	investment	risks,	while	ignoring	the	highly	unlikely,	but	potentially	catastrophic	effects	that	known	but	highly	unlikely	and	very	poorly	understood	
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eventualities	could	have	on	the	system	if	they	became	manifest.	Because	the	extreme	criticality	of	such	‘outliers’	was	ignored,	our	financial	institutions	then	either	collapsed,	or	survived	only	after	a	massive	proportion	of	our	entire	public	wealth	was	injected	into	them.	Since	2007-2008,	when	we	were	so	painfully	offered	this	crystal-clear	historical	lesson,	the	world	of	international	finance	has	instituted	the	following	preventive	measures	to	ensure	that	the	same	catastrophe	does	not	strike	us	again:	none.		
	fig.	16			“Progress	through	Chemistry”-2001	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		
PROGRESS	THROUGH	CHEMISTRY	Another	question	I	think	of	some	importance	if	we	hope	to	become	better	at	educating	artists	is:	“why	is	it	that	no	concentrated	training	and	experience	with	
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the	materials	of	art	is	required	curriculum	for	art	historians	and	art	theorists?”	In	my	view,	having	no	direct	experience	with	the	materials	artists	use	every	day	is	the	source	of	a	quite	obvious	and	consequential	‘disconnect’	between	what	art	historians	and	theorists	know	and	can	speak	of,	and	what	practicing	artists	do.	In	my	view	this	hiatus	has	serious	consequences.	It	is,	I	believe,	very	largely	for	this	reason	alone	that	artist-students	very	often	can’t	communicate	effectively	with	some	of	their	most	important	instructors	regarding	subjects	that	are	at	the	very	heart	of	their	practice,	i.e.	communication	using	tangible	materials	rather	than	words.	Students	can’t	effectively	discuss	that	issue	with	their	art	history	or	art	theory	instructors	because	most	of	those	instructors	know	very	little	about	it.	In	the	course	of	their	education,	historians	and	theorists	of	art	are	in	fact	not	normally	exposed	to	or	required	to	gain	any	experience	at	all	with	the	materials	of	art	practice.	But	it	is	that	very	experience	that	has	always	been-	and	remains	at	the	heart	of	making	art!	In	my	opinion,	it	is	essential	experience	for	anyone	teaching	anything	about	art.	Let	me	try	with	an	example	to	explain	why	I	think	this	so	important.	Imagine	that	you	set	out	to	make	a	landscape	painting,	deciding	to	execute	that	same	painting	twice.	You	make	the	first	version	with	oil	paint	on	canvas,	using	thick	impasto	technique.	Then	on	completing	that	painting,	you	make	a	second	one,	depicting	exactly	the	same	landscape	and	trying	to	imbue	it	with	the	same	feeling	or	‘meaning’,	i.e.	communicate/express	the	same	things.	But	quite	differently	for	this	second	version,	you	use	watercolors	on	paper.	Imagine	that	you	are	making	both	the	oil-on-canvas-	and	the	watercolor-on-paper	renditions	with	precisely	the	same	composition,	and	using	the	same	colors.	You	make	both	versions	with	the	clear	intention	to	convey	the	same	aspects	of	your	thoughts	and	feelings	about	what	is	depicted	in	the	paintings.	Additionally,	you	are	making	both	in	the	same	historical	time	period,	and	with	the	same	hands.		Will	the	two	paintings	on	completion	then	have	the	same	‘meaning’	for	you?	Will	
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they	succeed	to	convey	the	same	information	to	an	independent	viewer?	The	answer	to	both	of	those	questions,	I	think,	will	be	a	resounding,	‘No’.	Those	two	paintings	will	very	likely	not	convey	even	remotely	similar	‘meanings’.		I	believe	we	could	not	possibly	accomplish	that.	The	very	different	‘meanings’	I	think	those	two	works	of	art	will	have,	for	both	the	artist	and	impartial	viewers	of	them,	is	in	very	large	measure	a	consequence	of	the	way	materials	can	be-	and	were	used	to	create	those	two	respective	paintings.	I	am	suggesting	here	that	‘meaning	in	art’,	is	in	very	large	part	the	direct	result	of	bodily	gestures	specifically	enabled	by-,	but	also	limited	by	the	dictates	of	the	materials	used.	I	am	referring	now	specifically	to	the	very	different	physical-muscular	efforts	required	for	the	movements	of	the	artist’s	hand	and	brush	through-	and	onto	material	in	order	to	accomplish	one	or	the	other	version	of	the	painting.	The	considerable	difference	in	the	‘meanings’	I’ve	suggested	the	two	versions	in	my	example	will	have,	both	for	the	artist	and	the	viewers,	must	then	be	in	very	large	measure	attributable	to	the	concrete	physicality	of	the	body’s	interaction	with	materials.	If	what	I	am	saying	here	is	in	any	appreciable	degree	true,	do	art	historians	or	theorists	who	have	had	no	experience	with	how	very	different	are	the	feelings	and	the	results	that	accompany	painting	in	oil	as	opposed	to	watercolor,	understand	all	they	need	to	about	meaning	or	intention	in	art	practice?	I	submit	that	at	present	they	perhaps	don’t,	and	they	cannot	realistically	be	expected	to.		I	believe	that	this	very	significantly	impedes	communication	between	those	instructors	and	their	students,	and	is	something	we	can	and	should	act	to	improve	on.	If	tasked	with	proposing	a	single-	and	consequential	improvement	that	might	quickly	and	relatively	easily	be	realised	in	art	education,	I	would	propose	this	one:	the	structural-	and	obligatory	inclusion	of	a	course	in	working	with	the	materials	of	art	for	aspiring	historians	and	theorists	in	art.	I	sincerely	believe	that	a	substantial	improvement	in	art	education,	for	historians	and	theorists,	as	
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well	as	for	the	practicing	artists	who	study	with	them,	would	be	realized	by	doing	so.	A	number	of	those	confusions	about	the	practice	of	art	I	discuss	in	this	text,	could	I	think	soon	become	far	better	resolved	if	that	course	of	action	were	followed.	I	am	suggesting	therefore	that	structural	introduction	to	the	material	
aspects	of	meaning	in	art	should	be	a	required	element	of	the	formal	education	of	artists,	historians	and	theorists	of	art,	alike.	Those	of	us	whose	job	it	is	to	know-,	teach-,	and	register	authoritative	judgments	about	art	must	have	sufficient	familiarity	with	what	that	activity	entails.	When	we	think	about	it,	is	there	any	valid	reason	why	‘the	practice	of	art’,	i.e.	making	art,	is	not	an	obligatory	curricular	item	for	art	historians	and	art	theorists,	while	the	study	of	art	history	is	required	curriculum	for	every	practicing	artist?	That	seems	obviously	unbalanced	and	illogical.	It	indicates	I	think,	that	we	are	presently	quite	some	distance	removed	from	arriving	at	logical-,	balanced-	and	responsible	practices	in	art	education.			
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	fig.	17			“Le	Verre,	le	Contraire,	et	L’Autre”-1990	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
	
ART,	THE	INDIVIDUAL,	AND	THE	OTHER	History	of	art,	art	theory,	philosophy,	and	science	are	distinct	and	noble	pursuits	that	have	at	least	two	important	characteristics	in	common.		1		the	lingua	franca	for	each	of	them	is	the	language	of	our	written	and	spoken	words,	(supplemented	importantly	in	science	by	the	even	more	precise	language	of	mathematics.)	2		each	is	focussed	on	the	critical	analysis	and	discussion	of	things	that	are	the	products	of	our	intellect.	In	other	words,	‘meaning’	in	the	discourse	characteristic	of	history,	art	theory,	science	and	philosophy	is	invariably	the	
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product	of	conscious	logical/analytical	processing	that	the	part	of	our	brain	called	the	frontal	cortex	enables	us	to	engage	in.	That	discourse	is	characterized	by	the	fact	that	it’s	almost	invariably	singular,	linear,	causally	connected,	and	conscious.	And	now,	enter	Art…..	I	submit	that	not	a	single	one	of	those	qualifications	I	just	listed	can	legitimately	be	applied	to	Art.	This	indicates	strongly	in	my	view	that	making	art	with	respect	to	its	origins,	goals,	processes,	intentions,	and	its	audience,	a	profoundly	different	pursuit	than	the	others	I	just	listed.	In	my	experience	there	are	many	indicators	signaling	that	we	have	not	yet	understood	well	enough	what	Art	is.	And	because	we	haven’t,	that	we	are	not	able	to	offer	art	practice	education	that	accomplishes	to	as	high	degree	as	possible	what	we’d	like	it	to.	Instead,	we	seem	currently	intent	on	simply	tacking	onto	our	insufficient	understanding	of	art	practice,	curriculum	and	viewpoints	from	other	pursuits,	ones	that	we	thankfully	understand	much	better.		
	
MORE	ABOUT	DERIVATIVES	It	is	high	time	that	we	begin	to	pay	closer	attention	to	some	of	the	very	appreciable	differences	between	art	and	other	pursuits.	First	of	all,	Art	should	not	in	my	view	ever	be	taught,	introduced	or	thought	of	as	derivative	of-	or	emerging	from	other	pursuits.	It	is	important	to	consider	the	undisputable	fact	that	as	a	human	activity,	making	art	predates	art	history,	art	theory,	philosophy	and	science,	by	a	very	considerable	number	of	years!	Should	we	not	ask	ourselves	what	that	might	perhaps	indicate	in	terms	of	the	priority	of	our	human	needs?	Because	of	this	clear	historical	precedence,	it	seems	quite	illogical	that	we	seem	intent	to	teach	students	that	Art	is	intimately	related	to-,	
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or	worse	still,	that	it	emerges	from	history,	philosophy,	science,	or	anything	else.	Art	did	and	does	not	emerge	from	any	other	human	pursuit.	Instead	I	think	it	highly	likely	that	art	emerges	from	simply	being	human!		In	fact	it	is	also	clear	that	both	art	history	and	art	theory	emerge	directly	from	art.	Art	really	cannot	be	made	or	taught	well,	(nor	personally,	do	I	believe	it	can	be	truly	appreciated),	if	we	insist	that	it	should	be	taught	or	understood	in	large	part	through	the	lens	of	other	pursuits.	The	widely	held	current	notion	that	artworks	can	be	regarded	as	charming	but	humble	actors	in	the	grand	theatre	of	art	history	is	quite	untenable.	That	theatre	was	designed	and	painstakingly	constructed	to	house,	nurture,	and	advance	the	practice	of	art.	It	is	very	defintely	not	the	other	way	around!		
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fig.	18		“Art	Before	Horse”	1996	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
	
	
HORS(E)	CATEGORIE	It	is	my	experience	that	artists	neither	are-,nor	should	they	be	concerned	with	categorizing	things.	Categorization	is	a	useful	tool	indeed,	but	I	think	one	primarily	useful	in	other	disciplines.	I	say	this	because	rather	than	to	categorize	experience	in	order	to	better	understand	it,	it	is	more	often	helpful	on	art	to	do	the	opposite,	i.e.	not	conform	to-	or	affirm	category,	but	in	important	measure,	to	defy	it.	We	speak	often	and	admiringly	of	‘unique’	works	of	art,	of	‘new	
insights’.	Those	terms	embody,	what	society	both	hopes	and	expects	artists	to	
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accomplish.	That	is	not	to	produce	works	that	comfortably	and	convincingly	slot	into	existing	categories,	or	onto	An	Historical	Continuum.		Instead	we	hope	that	artists	offer	us	works	that	don’t	do	that!		For	this	reason	alone,	prioritizing	art	history,	a	pursuit	that	depends	on	categorization,	is	not	a	logical	choice	as	primary	methodology	in	art	practice	education.	In	other	words,	I’m	suggesting	that	we’ve	gone	much	too	far	in	the	degree	to	which	art	historians	determine	curriculum	for	artists,	and	also	in	the	degree	to	which	the	evaluation	of	contemporary	art	by	art	historians	is	deemed	consequential.	Art	history	and	art	theory	aim	to	arrive	at	consensus	regarding	persons,	trends,	styles,	social	and	political	conditions,	hierarchic	status,	etc..		Their	task	is	to	locate,	cite	and	order	facts,	and	then	propose	theory	based	on	those	facts.	When	consensus	is	arrived	at	about	these	theories,	they	become	structurally	embedded	as	History.	Artists	however,	are	not	busy	with	theory.	Instead	they	are	charged	with		
creating	new	facts.	Those	facts,	in	the	form	of	he	works	artists	create,	represent	no	more	(but	also	no	less!)	than	what	is	extraordinarily	true	for	only	one	individual,	the	artist	himself.	I	believe	that	all	great	art	throughout	History	can	be	characterized	as	fulfilling	the	dictate	of	that	last	sentence.		An	artist	must	at	times	be	able	to	completely	ignore	what	history	and	theory	tell	him,	both	his	own	hsitory	and	all	others,	to	arrive	at	the	qualities	he	wants	his	work	to	have.	Those	intense	and	individual	‘truths’	that	artists	find	and	reveal	in	their	works	are	the	substance	of	art’s	value	for	humanity.		Those	truths	also,	are	what	will	ultimately	determine	the	degree	of	note	that	History	willl	take	of	any	artwork	or	any	artist.	History,	when	we	think	about	it,	does	not	in	fact	consist	importantly	of	examples	of	what	fits	seamlessly	and	comfortably	into	a	given	time	period	or	category	because	it	contributed	to	the	continuation	of	that	period.	In	fact	when	we	think	about	it,	quite	the	reverse	is	true.	History	is	structurally	constitituted	much	more	importantly	by	very	different	elements!	The	History	that	we	all	remember	and	pass	on	is	primarily	ordered	and	given	
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structure	by	events	that	do	not	fit	with	what	accompanies-	or	immediately	precedes	them,	i.e.	it	consists	of	‘striking	breaks	in	continuity’.	It	is	because	those	events	didn’t	conform	to	paradigm	of	the	time,	that	they	became	turning	points,	i.e.	initiated	marked	structural	change.	It	is	these	events	that	history	has	always	taught	us	are	the	most	important	historical	events	we	must	notice	and	remember!	
	
ART,	WORK,	AND	PLAY	We	are	born	into	this	world	as	intruders,	plopping	into	it	suddenly,	loudly	and	messily.	We	are	fresh	new	entities	that	have	no	clear	function	or	place	here.	We	are	born	with	no	awareness	that	we	are	part	of	that	system	in	which	we	suddenly	find	ourselves.	We	come	clothed	and	armed	with	nothing	other	than	a	very	substantial	drive	to	remain,	a	will	to	live.	We	begin	then	immediately	to	do	all	that	is	within	our	meager	powers	to	survive.	In	the	early	stages	of	development,	we	are	importantly	assisted	by	our	parents	and	family	to	do	so.	But	we	have	as	yet,	no	idea	why	we	should	survive,	or	what	we	should	be	doing	during	the	long	and	uncertain	period	of	our	earthly	existence.	The	first	thing	we	need	very	quickly	to	learn	is	to	gain	control	over	our	body	and	its	various	parts.	We	begin	by	exploring	how	we	can	use	our	mouths,	our	hands,	and	our	feet.	If	we	do	not	learn	this	quickly	and	well,	we	will	most	certainly	die,	because	learning	how	to	use	our	body	parts	is	of	existential	importance.	We	learn	by	doing	it,	just	trying	different	things	out.	Some	of	those	actions	we	undertake	will	in	fact	endanger	us,	in	fact	could	potentially	result	in	the	end	our	lives.	It	is	a	very	serious	business	this,	finding	out	how	to	use-	and	to	steer	our	bodies	away	from	danger.	Somehow	most	of	us	can	and	do	learn	to	navigate	the	world,	avoiding	mortal	dangers.	We	accomplish	this	in	very	large	part	through	what	is	called	PLAY,	i.e.	we	create	our	own	spontaneous	
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experiments	to	see	what	happens	if	we	do	this,	or	do	that.	Later	we’re	able	to	combine	our	experiments	into	increasingly	complex	ones.	But	no	one	watching	us	do	this	really	understands	what	we’re	doing.	Neither	do	we	understand	it	ourselves	in	terms	of	intentions,	concrete	goals,	or	as	the	result	of	monitoring	our	own	progress	in	any	systematic	and	conscious	fashion.	We	are	not	yet	able	to	be	analytical,	systematic	or	to	monitor	things;	we’re	way	too	young	for	that	yet.	It	just	happens,	we	do	it,	we	discover	and	learn	by	playing.	We	are	born	with	the	urge	and	the	ability	to	play,	and	not	much	else,	so	we	just	do	that.	What	happens	for	example,	when	we	try	to	put	our	toes	into	our	mouth?		What	happens	if	we	bang	our	head	into	the	wooden-	or	plastic	bars	of	our	crib?	What	happens	if	we	make	sounds,	either	soft	ones	or	very	loud	ones?	What	happens	when	we	try	to	stand	up,	but	don’t	yet	understand	the	forces	involved,	and	we	fall	down	again?	Later,	we	extend	these	experiments	increasingly	to	include	others	around	us.	What	happens	when	we	interact	with	others?	What	happens	when	we	try	to	imitate	them?	What	happens	if	we	bite	our	mother’s	nipple	while	feeding?	What	happens	if	we	make	crying	sounds	loudly,	or	smile	at	someone	who	is	looking	at	us?	This	is	Play.	Is	it	merely	fun,	or	could	that	be	something	more	serious?	Might	we	perhaps	also	call	it	‘research’?		Is	play	merely	an	attractive	and	entertaining	waste	of	time,	or	might	it	instead	constitute	something	far	more	important,	perhaps	even	the	primary	means	by	which	both	humans	and	all	other	animals	learn	to	survive?	A	marvelous	book	that	both	asks	and	attempts	to	answer	such	questions	is	xxxiiThe	Ambiguity	of	Play	by	Brian	Sutton	Smith.	As	a	result	of	reading	that	book,	I	became	convinced	that	in	play,	we	design	and	carry	out	some	of	the	most	original	experiments	we	ever	undertake.	In	so	doing,		we	learn	critically	important	things	about	surviving	in	this	world.	Play	is	clearly	of	great	importance	for	our	survival	when	we’re	very	young,	and	its	motor	is	curiosity.	We	just	wonder,	“What	happens	IF...?”,	and	then	we	proceed	
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to	take	the	actions	needed	to	find	out.	Play,	I’m	suggesting	here,	is	creativity	of	the	highest	order,	its	goal	is	learning,	and	it	originates	in	every	individual.	David	Bohm	had	this	to	say	about	creativity	and	play:	
xxxiii“One	prerequisite	for	originality	is	clearly	that	a	person	shall	not	be	inclined	to	impose	his	preconceptions	on	the	fact	as	he	sees	it.	Rather,	he	must	be	able	to	learn	something	new,	even	if	this	means	that	the	ideas	and	notions	that	are	comfortable	or	dear	to	him	may	be	overturned.		But	the	ability	to	learn	in	this	way	is	a	principle	common	to	the	whole	of	humanity.	Thus	it	is	well	known	that	a	child	learns	to	walk,	to	talk,	and	to	know	his	way	around	the	world	just	by	trying	something	out	and	seeing	what	happens,	then	modifying	what	he	does	(or	thinks)	in	accordance	with	what	has	actually	happened.	In	this	way,	he	spends	his	first	few	years	in	a	wonderfully	creative	way,	discovering	all	sorts	of	things	that	are	new	to	him,	and	this	leads	people	to	look	back	on	childhood	as	a	kind	of	lost	paradise.	As	the	child	grows	older,	however,	learning	takes	on	a	narrower	meaning.	In	school,	he	learns	by	repetition	to	accumulate	knowledge,	so	as	to	please	the	teacher	and	pass	examinations.	At	work,	he	learns	in	a	similar	way,	so	as	to	make	a	living,	or	for	some	other	utilitarian	purpose,	and	not	mainly	for	the	love	of	the	action	of	learning	itself.	So	his	ability	to	see	something	new	and	original	gradually	dies	away.	And	without	it	there	is	evidently	no	ground	from	which	anything	can	grow.”		We	should	not	in	my	opinion	be	afraid	to	use	the	word	play	merely	because	it	may	seem	to	imply	that	that	activity	it	is	not	a	serious	one.	Play	is	not	as	we	seem	often	to	imagine	it,	the	opposite	of	seriousness	or	work,	and	most	especially	not	when	it	comes	to	art!	Instead,	it	is	an	activity	conducive	to	learning,	in	many	respects	in	my	view,	to	a	higher	degree	than	any	other	activity	we	can	undertake.		Play	as	I	describe	that	here,	is	a	vital	constituent	of	
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art	practice.	I	suggest	that	evidence	for	that	claim	can	be	found	in	a	great	number	of	our	most	highly	valued	artworks.	We	would,	I	think,	do	well	to	learn	and	come	to	understand	far	more	than	we	presently	do	about	the	vital	role	of	play	in	art,	and	indeed	in	all	human	creativity.		
	
ART	IS	TO	LOGIC	AS	DANCING	IS	TO	WALKING	Dancing	and	Walking	are,	both	of	them,	means	of	transport.	The	first	of	those,	is	something	we	are	inclined	to	think	of	as	a	form	of	amusement	or	play.	The	second,	walking,	we	normally	think	of	as	functional,	a	form	of	work.		Both	of	them	however,	are	means	we	can	choose	from	to	effect	movement	from	point	A	to	point	B.		A	and	B	here	indicate	different	locations,	but	not	both	of	them	geographical	ones.	In	the	case	of	walking	between	two	points,	we	transport	ourselves	physically	between	two	geographical	locations	or	states.	In	dancing,	we	also	transport	ourselves	between	two	states,	but	not	geographical	ones.	Those	are	then	emotional	states	we	travel	between.	When	we	dance,	our	movements	both	depict	and	cause	that	transportation,	one	of	feeling.	The	important	difference	between	the	two	modes	of	transportation	is	a	matter	of	what’s	being	changed.	Walking	moves	us	physically,	causing	transportation	that	is	tangible	and	can	be	perceived	and	described	by	anyone	looking	on.	That	movement	can	be	measured	and	recorded	easily	and	accurately.	In	the	case	of	dancing	we	are	instead	transported	emotionally.	What	is	being	transported	is	very	much	more	difficult	to	describe,	because	it’s	intangible	and	measurement	of	it	is	impossible.	We	make	that	choice	to	walk,	or	alternatively	to	dance,	for	equally	valid	reasons.	Although	the	two	forms	of	transportation	are	quite	different	ones,	equally	important		changes	in	our	positions	result.	Logic	tends	to	investigate	reality	and	change	as	a	position	arrived	at	by	linear	process.	That	process	is	characterized	by	causation,	i.e.	one	thing	happens,	chronlogically	
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preceding	and	causing	the	next	thing	to	happen.	Such	processes	can	easily	be	broken	down	and	analyzed,	allowing	us	to	understand	how	their	mechanical	and	chronological	constitutents	produce	the	physical	result	we	call	Reality.	As	is	the	case	with	walking,	we	can	do	this		simply	and	easily,	step	by	step.		Just	as	in	dance,	Art	also	advances	by	process,	but	that	one	is	by	no	means	a	linear	process.	Instead	it	advances	through	intangible,	parallel	emotional	processing	of	experience,	rather	than	as	a	direct	result	of	the	serial	individual	steps	that	constitute	the	progression.	Causality,	I	cam	saying	again,	is	very	much	less	important	in	art	than	in	most	other	pursuits.	That	is	to	say	that	there	is	no	important	role	played	in	art	either	by	chronology	or	linearity	of	process.		Returning	 to	 the	 theme	 of	 walking	 and	 dancing,	 those	 logical	 and	 generally	linear	steps	that,	when	added	together,	constitute	our	‘walking’	from	point	a	to	point	 b,	 are	 more	 often	 than	 not,	 ones	 we	 choose	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 known,	desired,	and	fixed	destinations.	‘Walking’	as	I	describe	that	here,	is	analogous	to	the	practice	of	Science.	The	 ‘dancing’	of	Artists	by	contrast,	 is	 far	 less	 focused	on-	 or	 characterized	 by	 the	 intention	 to	 arrive	 at	 known	 and	 predetermined	points	or	answers.	Because	in	art,	 ‘travel’	rather	than	‘arrival’	is	its	goal,	much	more	 attention	 can	 be	 given	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 ‘dance’,	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	curiosity,	 i.e.	we	are	 freer	 to	 investigate	any	of	 the	many	waypoints	along	 the	journey.	At	each	of	 those	points,	we	may	discover	new	 things.	We	are	 free	 to	stop	or	not	to	stop	at	any	of	those	places,	we	can	decide	to	undertake	diversions	from	the	line	of	travel	we	had,	or	we	can	choose	not	to	do	so.	It	 is	 in	this	way	that	 is	 largely	 determined	 when	 we	 arrive	 at	 point	 B,	 and	 moreover,	 what	meanings	 both	 the	 journey	 and	 our	 arrival	 will	 come	 to	 hold	 for	 us.	 When	looked	at	 in	 this	way,	 it	 is	 those	 choices	we	make	along	 the	way,	 rather	 than	ones	made	beforehand,	that	determine	both	the	location	and	the	significance	of	the	 destination.	 It	 is	 those	 choices	 that	 determine	 in	 fact	 what	 the	 entire	undertaking	means.	
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																Fig	19			“Cold	fusion”		1997	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 161	
PUTTING	THE	PIECES	TOGETHER	
	In	making	an	artwork,	I	manifest	for	myself	aspects	of	myself	and	my	experience	that	I	hope	may	be	unique	about	me.	These	become	visible	and	tangible	for	me,	thereby	effecting	my	own	discovery	of	important	things	about	what	I	feel	and	think.	But	I	also	have	the	wish	to	share	what	I’ve	done	with	others.	In	taking	that	second	step,	I	may	ultimately	find	approval,	discover	new	interpretations,	experience	disapproval,	or,	worse	still,	find	that	my	work	meets	with	general	disinterest.	That	last	possibility,	although	very	far	from	the	desired	result,	also	teachs	me	important	things.	Few	other	undertakings	I	know	of	can	so	strongly	and	directly	make	individuality	vs.	universality	manifest,	i.e.	‘myself’	in	relation	to	everyone	and	everything	else.	This	is	the	fundament	of	art.	I	am	convinced	that	it	is	for	this	reason	that	the	first	person	who	ever	made	what	we	now	call	art	did	so.	It	is	by	externalizing	individual	experience	that	we	learn	things	about	the	many	-and	deeply	important	aspects	of	that	duality	I	named,	perhaps	the	most	imporant	one	for	human	beings	throughout	history,	i.e.	me	as	opposed	to	all	else.	That	duality	is	a	central	element	of	almost	every	activity	we	undertake	and	all	experiences	we	have.	Whether	or	not	we	are	aware	of	it,	we	are	constantly	querying	ask	ourselves	:	i.e“how	do	I	see,	think,	feel	about-	or	react	to	this	thing	or	experience?”	and	then,	“is	that	similar	to-,	or	perhaps	very	different	indeed	from	how	others	(would)	think,	feel	or	react	to	this	same	thing	or	experience?”					
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SIX	LEGGED	COWS	AND	THE	TERRIFYINGLY	IMPOSSIBLE	Some	years	ago,	I	can	remember	being	seated	comfortably	on	a	train	for	a	long	journey	passing	through	the	countryside	of	the	Netherlands.	That	countryside	is	certainly	picturesque,	but	would	not	I	think,	be	called	dramatic.	The	Netherlands	is	a	comparatively	flat	country,	not	at	all	punctuated	by	mountains,	deep	valleys,	jungles,	deserts	or	other	dramatic	landscapes.	Passing	through	it,	one	sees	fields,	farms,	a	very	great	number	of	small	waterways,	the	odd	strangely	sculpted	tree,	and	lots	of	grazing	animals.	At	one	point	in	my	journey,	I	began	to	feel	tired	and	started	to	drift	off	into	sleep	at	my	place	by	the	window,	when	suddenly	something	I	had	caught	a	glimpse	of,	shocked	me	to	sit	up	straight,	and	to	become	instantly	alert.	Through	the	window	at	medium	distance,	I	had	seen	what	seemed	to	be	a	cow	with	six	legs!	Imagine	what	happens	if	you	see	something	like	that!	Everything	is	suddenly	turned	upside	down,	all	that	you	had	thought	of	as	‘Reality’	comes	to	a	sudden	and	full	stop!	The	brain	then	starts	frantically	to	race	through	all	memory,	desperately	searching	for	any	experience	or	theory	that	might	help	guide	our	reaction	to	what	we	have	just	encountered.	Finding	then,	quite	terrifyingly,	nothing	to	explain	that,	nothing	to	grab	onto,	we	start	to	experience	great	anxiety	because	all	of	our	systems	of	belief	are	now	seriously	threatened,	in	danger	of	being	provien	demonstrably	invalid,	useless.	If	we	cannot	explain	to	ourselves	what	we	have	just	experienced,	it	means	that	all	that	we	know	and	have	experienced	to	date,	and	all	that	others	have	ever	told	us	about	the	world,	every	system	we	had	in	place	for	dealing	with	what	we	might	encounter,	fails	catastrophically.	At	such	a	moment,	we	suddenly	find	that	we	stand	(or	sit)	very	differently	in	the	world	than	moments	before.	All	of	this	happens,	of	course,	in	microseconds.	That	highly	unwelcome	event	just	doesn’t	fit	into	any	system	for	understanding	
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we	possess!	All	of	our	internal	alarm	lights	and	bells	are	now	flashing	bright	red,	ringing	very	loudly!		Of	course,	in	the	case	I	speak	of	now,	one	from	my	own	experience,	mere	moments	later	my	state	of	highest	alarm	was	thankfully	downgraded	when	the	train	had	moved	a	bit	further,	and	I	could	see	that	what	I	had	seen	a	moment	before	was	in	fact	two	cows,	one	standing	behind	the	other.	The	internal	alarm	bells	went	off,	the	lights	stopped	flashing,	my	calm	returned,	and	all	of	my	systems	were	thankfully,	once	again	‘go’.	I	have	thought	about	that	experience	and	what	it	meant	many	times	since.	What	happened,	I’ve	concluded,	was	that	for	a	few	moments	I	simply	had	no	system	or	category	to	which	I	could	relegate	what	I	was	experiencing.	In	the	course	of	that	short	time,	I	had	no	other	option	than	to	conclude	that	everything	I	had	ever	experienced,	thought	and	learned,	was	invalid,	because	none	of	it	could	possibly	encompass	or	explain	what	I	saw.	In	other	words,	I	was	forced,	very	uncomfortably	and	highly	unwillingly,	to	completely	suspend	all	belief.		We	construct	systems	of	belief	to	explain	to	ourselves	what	we	experience	so	that	we	are-,	or	at	least	we	may	feel	less	threatened	by	new	experiences.	The	degree	to	which	we	can	believe	in-	and	will	continue	to	adhere	to	those	systems	is	determined	directly	by	the	extent	to	which	they	consistently	prove	sufficient	to	explain	our	experience.	Many	of	us	hold	spiritual	beliefs,	others	scientific	ones,	while	for	others,	political	or	economic	theories	provide	the	primary	basis	for	understanding	and	dealing	with	what	we	encounter	in	life.	Usually	though,	we	develop	some	mixture	of	beliefs	derived	from	several	of	those	categories	which	then	forms	the	framework	for	how	we	gather,	explain	to	ourselves,	and	categorize	our	experiences.	Experiences	that	fall	outside	the	encompassing	capacities	of	our	theories	are	ones	we	very	often	either	consciously	or	unconsciously	ignore,	in	large	part	precisely	because	of	the	threat	they	represent	for	continuing	to	believe	in	our	systems.	I	related	this	incident,	my	
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short-lived	but	very	memorable	confrontation	with	a	6-legged	cow,	as	an	example	of	the	enormously	important	influence	that	the	categories	we	both	create	and	unthinkingly	resort	to,	has	on	our	experience	of	reality.	I	hope	it	will	by	now	also	be	clear	why	I	believe	that	the	absence	of	category	at	times,	is	a	precious	and	useful	state	of	being.	It	is	from	that	position,	whether	or	not	it	is	comfortable,	that	we	sometimes	acquire	seminally	useful	points	of	view.		That	is	I	think,	art’s	job.	And	that	is	why	I	am	critical	of	blind	faith	in	the	assumption	that	‘organized	categorical	thinking’	is	always	a	good	thing.	In	my	view	and	experience,	it	is	often	a	very	serious	hindrance	to	alternative	ways	of	seeing	things,	ones	that	offer	us	inspiring	and	highly	valuable	new	vantage	points	and	insights.		Art	and	Philosophy	when	they	are	practiced	well,	never	offer	us	simple	answers.	Instead	they	very	much	more	often	give	form	to	inspiring	and	fundamental	musings	and	questions.	They	do	not	recall-,	paraphrase-	or	repeat	for	us	what	we	already	knew.	Instead	they	work	to	effectively	stimulate	curiosity	with	respect	to	all	that	we	don’t	yet	know.	History,	Philosphy	and	Art,	when	driven	by	a	passion	for	discovery	and	accompanied	by	a	readiness	to	suspend	belief,	accomplish	far	more	than	merely	confirming	facts	or	existing	theories.	They	motivate	us	to	explore-,	i.e.	both	to	discover	and	create	fascinating	and	important	new	facts	and	theory.	Perhaps	in	that	sense,	both	art	and	science	should	be	regarded	as	attempts,	albeit	by	very	different	means	altogether,	to	get	at	fundamental	truths	that	hold	great	importance	for	us.		Both	are	directed	at	discoveries	about	ourselves,	and	the	universe	we	live	in.	And	both	are	achieved	through	study	and	recording	the	results	of	our	experiments.	Science	generally	investigates,	understands	and	explains	the	universe	by	presuming	causality,	linear	time,	and	the	existence	of	persistent	hidden	rules	or	patterns	that,	if	diligent	enough,	we	can	discover	and	come	to	understand.		Art,	very	differently,	understands	and	explains	the	universe	intuitively,	emotionally,	
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sometimes	one	could	perhaps	even	say		‘magically’.	Science	relies	on	the	genius	of	our	intellect,	Art	on	the	genius	of	our	spirit.		Art	is	the	Jester	at	the	Court	of	Science.	
	
GRIOTS	AND	HISTORY		There	is	an	important	form	of	culturally	esteemed	learning	whose	guardians	and	authorities	in	Western	Africa	are	called	griots.	Below,	is	a	definition	of	
‘griot’.		
Griot-	West	African	troubadour-historian.	The	griot	profession	is	hereditary	and	
has	long	been	a	part	of	West	African	culture.	The	griots’	role	has	traditionally	
been	to	preserve	the	genealogies,	historical	narratives,	and	oral	traditions	of	their	
people;	praise	songs	are	also	part	of	the	griot’s	repertoire.	Many	griots	play	the	
kora,	a	long-necked	harp	lute	with	21	strings.	In	addition	to	serving	as	the	
primary	storytellers	of	their	people,	griots	have	also	served	as	advisers	and	
diplomats.	Over	the	centuries	their	advisory	and	diplomatic	roles	have	diminished	
somewhat,	and	their	entertainment	appeal	has	become	more	widespread.			-Online,	Encyclopaedia	Brittanica,	January	18,	2014	
	The	griot	was	traditionally	both	the	repository	and	the	guardian	of	the	most	important	knowledge	his	society	believed	it	crucial	to	conserve	and	to	pass	on	to	succeeding	generations.	In	order	to	accomplish	that	task,	a	young	boy	was	trained	from	very	early	childhood	by	his	father	(also	a	griot),	to	record	and	recite	those	stories	deemed	important	for	succeeding	generations	to	understand	and	remember.	This	was	in	fact,	verbal	history	in	its	purest	form.	Not	one	word	or	detail	of	the	stories	taught	to	the	aspiring	griot	by	his	father	for	later	retelling	could	be	changed	or	omitted.	While	a	griot	commanded	very	considerable	respect	within	his	society,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	
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paradoxically,	in	many	places	in	Western	Africa,	when	a	griot	died,	he	was	not	accorded	a	respectable	formal	burial.	Instead	his	remains	were	placed	upright	inside	the	hollow	trunk	of	a	baobab	tree.	The	reason	for	this	was	that	the	griot	was	not	considered	deserving	of	the	same	formal	burial	accorded	all	others	in	his	society.	One	explanation	for	this	surprising	paradox	was	that	griots	never,	as	all	others	in	his	society	did,	worked	the	soil	to	grow	food	for	the	community.	For	this	reason	it	was	believed	that	they	had	not	earned	the	right	to	be	buried	in	that	ground.	It	was	even	feared	that	if	a	griot	should	ever	be	buried	in	the	ground	used	to	grow	food,	a	terrible	drought	would	follow!			In	Western	Africa,	just	as	it	is	in	all	societies	to	the	present	day,	what	history	can	offer	succeeding	generations	is	considered	highly	valuable.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	not	normally	expected	or	required	of	any	member	of	society	who	is	not	a	griot,	that	they	should	remember,	recite,	or	repeat	history	as	the	griot	can	and	must.	For	me,	the	parallels	this	story	suggests	between	what	griots,	historians,	and	artists	must-,	can-	or	should	do	are	quite	interesting	to	consider!			
MAGISTER	LUDI	In	his	book	xxxivDas	Glasperlenspiel,	Herman	Hesse	describes	a	noble	game.	That	game	requires	that	starting	at	a	very	young	age,	the	future	contestants	spend	a	great	number	of	years	in	intense	training,	during	which	time	they	must	become	familiar	with	and	conversant	in	almost	all	human	knowledge.	The	founding	principle	of	that	game	they	will	later	play	is	that	there	exist	central	concepts	across	all	the	domains	of	human	knowledge	whose	essence	is	essentially	identical.	Accordingly	it	thereby	becomes	possible	to	relate	for	example,	a	passage	of	music	directly	to	a	philosophical	argument,	or	to	a	mathematical	principle,	because	there	is	an	element	or	elements	common	to	them	that	is	both	essential	and	definitive	for	each.	To	these	central	essential	components	of	
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knowledge	across	different	domains,	symbols	were	then	assigned,	a	bit	similarly	to	the	way	we	use	symbols	to	write	down	musical	passages.	The	goal	of	the	game	played	by	those	highly	trained	adepts	was	to	create	the	most	‘beautiful	symphony	or	passage’,	one	composed	of	and	encompassing	knowledge	across	a	great	number	of	very	different	domains.		Referring	to	this	noble	game	they	played	offers	me	one	final	way	to	clarify	why	I	have	here	tried	to	both	describe	and	to	argue	against	the	current	trends	to	‘define’	works	of	art	in	terms	of	concrete	meanings,	and/or	to	inextricably	link	or		relate	them	to	exact	pursuits	like	science.	In	the	‘glass	bead	game’,	the	goal	is	to	create	a	‘symphony,	or	passage	of	music’,	wherein	each	note	composing	it	has	specific	meanings,	i.e	connotes	very	exact	concept.	But	it	is	important	to	realise	that	when	that	symphony	or	passage	is	performed,	all	of	the	domains	that	share	those	notes/concepts,	as	well	as	their	subtle	interconnectedness,	are		simultaneously	evoked.		Conversely	though,	if	a	specific	note/concept	is	extracted	from	that	symphony	or	passage		and	heard	alone	or	considered	in	isolation,	the	simultaneous	evocation	of	all	realms	that	share	that	concept	is	no	longer	actuated,	cannot	and	does	not	occur.	In	other	words,	something,	something	in	fact	highly	important	is	lost.	What	is	then	lost	is	precisely	that	thing	I	argue		that	we	urgently	need	to	both	recognise	and	strongly	defend	as	the	primary	goal	of	the	entire	exercise	of	making	art	.		
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CONCLUSIONS	Meaning	in	art	is	not	the	linear	product	of	the	artist’s	intentions,	nor	is	it	contained	in	the	physical	material	that	constitutes	his	artwork.	Meaning	is	in	fact,	not	an	intrinsic	quality	of	artworks	at	all,	but	is	instead	an	emergent	entity.	Artworks	don’t	have	meaning;	they	‘take	on	meaning’.	That	meaning	is	not	singular	in	nature,	it	is	instead	xxxvpluriform,	being	neither	persistent	for	any	one	viewer,	nor	consistent	across	different	viewers.	Making	art	can	be	thought	of	as	a	procreative	act	rather	than	a	reproductive	deed.		Something	new	comes	into	existence	and	begins	to	take	on	life,	doing	so	oftentimes	in	ways	and	directions	very	different	from	those	intended-	or	expected	by	anyone.	Art	shows	and	tells	us	things	we	are	often	familiar	with,	but	in	other	than	the	usual	ways.	When	an	artist	creates	a	new	work,	it	can	be	likened	to	an	act	of	God,	the	creation	of	a	new	reality.	The	artist	causes	a	new	order	to	come	into	existence.	He	adds	his	work	to	the	world,	one	very	small	thing	he	has	created	so	that	he	can	then	consider	that	world	anew.	Something	has	been	added	to	‘the	landscape’,	changing	it,	and	the	artist	then	perceives	an	altered	reality.	In	this	way	the	artist	is	enabled	to	ask	himself:	“what	if	the	world	were	everything	it	was	yesterday,	but	WITH	this	small	thing	added?”,	and	then	to	answer	that	question.	Does	something	change	for	him	when	he	looks	at	things	anew	in	this	way?	What	changes?	Will	others	notice	this	change,	and	if	so,	how	will	it	affect	them?	How	will	their	reactions	in	turn,	affect	the	artist?	If	making	art	is	imagined	in	that	very	simple	and,	I	believe,	quite	practical	way,	it	will	be	clear	that	considerable	difficulties	are	likely	to	arise	if	the	artist	is	asked	what	this	new	thing	means.	The	only	honest	answer	he	can	then	offer	is:			“…Well,	I	don’t	
know	yet.	I	am	interested	to	find	out	what	adding	this	thing	to	everything	else	in	
the	world	means	for	me.	Finding	that	out	was	the	very	reason	I	had	for	making	it.	
In	all	honesty,	I	did	not	make	it	in	order	to	answer	that	question	for	you!	I	made	it	
because	I	wanted	to	pose	the	question	to	myself.	However,	if	you	are	prepared	to	
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be	patient,	if	and	when	I	can	answer	your	question	for	you,	I’ll	be	happy	to	let	you	
know”!		The	meaning	an	artwork	acquires	for	the	artist	can	be	described	as	a	number	of	very	subtle,	sometimes	quite	gradual	changes	that	take	place	in	him	as	a	result	of	his	act	of	creation.	Those	have	to	do	with	how	he	comes	to‘understand’	movement	in	space,	colors	together,	materials,	textures,	and	a	host	of	other	things	that	he	deals	with	both	consciously	and	unconsciously	when	creating	his	work.	He	learns	things,	and	that	will	inevitably	change	the	way	he	sees	things.		What	he	accomplishes	by	doing	this	can	perhaps	be	likened	to	creating	a	tiny	new	‘island’.	That	new	island	will	then	sit	for	a	time	at	the	center	of	the	sea	formed	by	all	of	his	previous	experience.	The	tides	flowing	in	the	sea	will	gradually	become	subtly	changed	by	the	presence	of	that	new	island.	But	their	strength	and	direction	will	take	some	time	to	settle	into	any	recognizable	and	persistent	pattern.	The	same	will	also	be	true	for	the	winds.	Eventually	however,	all	the	different	inhabitants	of	the	sky,	the	land,	and	the	waters	in	contact	with	that	small	new	island	will	become	familiar	with-,	understand-,	and	adapt	to	those	new	facts,	each	of	them	in	their	own	way.	At	the	deepest	and	most	important	level	of	both	the	motivations	and	the	goals	of	making	art,	I	cannot	formulate	these	in	words	better	than	I’ve	just	tried	to	do	that.	There	are	of	course	very	many	other	levels	of	significance	we	attach	to	artworks,	ones	that	are	far	more	easily	described	and	discussed.	But	I	suggest	that	the	one	I’ve	just	tried	to	sketch	is	by	far	the	most	important	one,	for	the	artist	himself,	and	for	all	the	rest	of	us.	In	addition	to	suggesting	that	the	meaning	art	holds	for	us	may	be	different	than	we	seem	currently	often	to	imagine,	I	have	argued	that	the	process	by	which	we	arrive	at	meaning	in	art	is	a	very	different	one.	Hidden	under	some	of	what	we	currently	teach	in	art	education,	I	suggest	that	there	are	some	false	
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narratives,	ones	with	important	consequences.	When	we	train	students	to	understand	and	explain	artmaking	largely	as	a	progression	of	analytical	thoughts	and	considerations,	we	support	those	false	narratives.	I	have	suggested	that	our	choices	in	making	art	are	not	logical	deductions	at	all,		but	instead	are	decisions	rooted	directly	in	intuition	and	emotive	concerns.	With	that	I	means	knowledge	informed	by	all	our	previous	experience,	and	triggered	by	similarities	we	sense	across	very	different	realms	of	that	experience.		I	think	it	critically	important	to	realise	that	those	sensed	connections	I	speak	of	are	primarily	unconsciously	accessed.	Those	are	almost	invariably	felt	rather	than	
known	in	first	instance.		I	have	additionally	argued		that	it	is	only	after	acting	on	those	intuited	connections	in	artmaking	that	we	are	in	any	position	to	analyze	what	we’ve	done,	to	consider	the	results	of	our	actions,	or	draw	any	conclusions	from	them.	Serious	problems	inevitably	result	when	we	claim	or	suggest	that	conscious	analysis	and	conclusions	reached	by	that	means	was	the	basis	of	the	processes	by	which	we	acted.	I	submit	that	that	is	very	definitely	not	the	case,	and	that	theories	based	on	that	assumption	will	inevitably	prove		inadequate.		If	I	am	a	cook	wanting	to	create	a	new	dish,	I	must	rely	very	largely	for	my	choice	of	ingredients	not	on	what	my	thinking	tells	me,	but	on	what	my	body,	c.q.	my	taste	buds	tell	me.	The	basis	on	which	I	proceed	is	then	not	what	I	can	conclude	or	reason	from	memory,	but	first	and	foremost	my	tongue’s	ability	to	recall	and	to	recreate	past	experience.	A	decision	for	example,	to	include	nutmeg	in	my	new	dish,	is	not	one	I	make	because	I	conceive	of	nutmeg	as	a	sweet-,	aromatic-,	but	every	so	slightly	bitter	addition	I	could	make	to	the	overall	taste.	It	is	instead	because	of	my	tongue’s	memory	of	that	taste,	directly	informing	me	what	the	results	of	adding	nutmeg	might	be.	In	other	words,	when	creating	a	new	dish	and	also	when	making	art,	we	are	instituting	processes	that	are	in	first	instance	related	to	body	and	intuition	rather	than	to	
	 171	
brain	and	thinking.	While	it	is	certainly	true	that	we	both	can-	and	very	often	do	intuit	our	way	to	thinking,	we	do	not,	indeed	cannot	possibly	think	our	way	to	intuiting.		If	we	wish	to	come	to	better	understand	what	art	making	is,	and	in	so	doing,	better	understand	how	should	teach	it,	I	think	that	we	urgently	need	to	change	a	few	things.	Less	time	and	energy	should	be	focused	on	searching	for	art’s	purpose	on	the	many	levels	of	the	societal	significances	we	imagine	for	it.	And	far	more	effort	needs	to	be	devoted	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	nature	and	importance	of	its	individual	meaning	for	the	artist,	as	well	as	for	a	viewer	who	finds	himself	moved	by	art.	All	other	ways	of	regarding	art	are	in	my	view	abstractions,	mere	derivatives.	We	cannot	come	to	understand	and	share	our	knowledge	about	trees	if	we	continue	to	limit	our	study	and	discussions	only	to	the	forest.	In	Art,	the	individual	maker/creator,	i.e.	the	“I”,	really	must	be	understood	as	the	main	character	in	the	story.	In	other	words,	Art	for	the	artist,	is	not	constituted	by	history,	instead	it	IS	quite	literally	HIS	STORY.			
	fig.	20			“History	Too”	–	2009	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
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						THE	BRIDGE		Returning	once	last	time	to	the	scene	I	sketched	at	the	beginning	of	this	text,	I	think	we	will	still	find	Pedro,	Fernando	and	a	donkey	standing	on	that	rural	bridge.	The	focal	point	of	that	scene	was	on	the	need	Fernando	apparently	felt	to	demand	another’s	attention	by	brute	force.	It	now	occurs	to	me	that	I	only	named	and	gave	voice	to	two	of	the	three	actors	on	that	stage,	i.e.	Pedro	and	Fernando,	those	two	actors	able	to	use	words	to	communicate	and	express	intentions.		I	am	now	imagining	that	if	the	remaining	actor,	that	lone	donkey	could	also	speak,	he	might	perhaps	say	some	of	the	same	things	I’ve	tried	to	say	here.	And	I	then	become	curious	to	find	out	whether	or	not	his	listeners	would	attend	to	what	he	said.					-R.	Meitner	–December	2014	(revised	version	October	2016)		
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											fig.	21			“In	Other	Words”		2014	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	R.	Meitner		
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fig	22	“Nuts”		2014		by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		
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											fig.	23		“Capped	Engram”	2013	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		
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fig	.24		“F	Cushion”	2014		by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		
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fig.	25	“	Not	a	Peep	(ceci)”	2014		by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©			
	 179	
	
fig	26	“	The	Flyer”	2014	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©			
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fig.	27	“Are	you	Talking	to	ME!?”		2015	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		
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	fig.	28		“Blow”	2016		by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
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fig.	29	“Strike	While	the	Iron’s	Hot”	-2016		by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		
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	 fig.	30		“Recent	Additions,	(+1,	+2,	+3	and	+4)		2016	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©	
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fig.	31		“Wurst	that	could	happen”			2016	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by		Ron	Zijlstra©		
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fig.	32		“Ready	to	Roll”			2016	by	Richard	Meitner,	photo	by	Ron	Zijlstra©		
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ENDNOTES																																																									i		Quantum	mechanics-http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/quantum-theory		-16/08/2014	-	In	1927,	Werner	Heisenberg	proposed	that	precise,	simultaneous	measurement	of	two	complementary	values	-	such	as	the	position	and	momentum	of	a	subatomic	particle	-	is	impossible.	Contrary	to	the	principles	of	classical	physics,	their	simultaneous	measurement	is	inescapably	flawed;	the	more	precisely	one	value	is	measured,	the	more	flawed	will	be	the	measurement	of	the	other	value.	This	theory	became	known	as	the	uncertainty	principle,	which	prompted	Albert	Einstein's	famous	comment,	"God	does	not	play	dice."	
The	Copenhagen	Interpretation	and	the	Many-Worlds	Theory	The	two	major	interpretations	of	quantum	theory's	implications	for	the	nature	of	reality	are	the	Copenhagen	interpretation	and	the	many-worlds	theory.	Niels	Bohr	proposed	the	Copenhagen	interpretation	of	quantum	theory,	which	asserts	that	a	particle	is	whatever	it	is	measured	to	be	(for	example,	a	wave	or	a	particle),	but	that	it	cannot	be	assumed	to	have	specific	properties,	or	even	to	exist,	until	it	is	measured.	In	short,	Bohr	was	saying	that	objective	reality	does	not	exist.	This	translates	to	a	principle	called	superposition	that	claims	that	while	we	do	not	know	what	the	state	of	any	object	is,	it	is	actually	in	all	possible	states	simultaneously,	as	long	as	we	don't	look	to	check..	The	second	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	is	the	many-worlds	(or	multiverse	theory.	It	holds	that	as	soon	as	a	potential	exists	for	any	object	to	be	in	any	state,	the	universe	of	that	object	transmutes	into	a	series	of	parallel	universes	equal	to	the	number	of	possible	states	in	which	that	the	object	can	exist,	with	each	universe	containing	a	unique	single	possible	state	of	that	object.	Furthermore,	there	is	a	mechanism	for	interaction	between	these	universes	that	somehow	permits	all	states	to	be	accessible	in	some	way	and	for	all	possible	states	to	be	affected	in	some	manner.	Stephen	Hawking	and	the	late	Richard	Feynman	are	among	the	scientists	who	have	expressed	a	preference	for	the	many-worlds	theory.	
Quantum	Theory's	Influence	Although	scientists	throughout	the	past	century	have	balked	at	the	implications	of	quantum	theory	-	Planck	and	Einstein	among	them	-	the	theory's	principles	have	repeatedly	been	supported	by	experimentation,	even	when	the	scientists	were	trying	to	disprove	them.	Quantum	theory	and	Einstein's	theory	of	relativity	form	the	basis	for	modern	physics.	ii	Feynman,	Richard-The	Pleasure	of	Finding	Things	Out	pg	104-Perseus	Books,	1999	iii		Feynman,	Richard-The	Pleasure	of	Finding	Things	Out	pg	187-Perseus	Books,	1999	iv		Feynman,	Richard-The	Pleasure	of	Finding	Things	Out	pg	184,	Perseus	Books,	1999	v	online	form	for	application	for	membership	on	evaluation	committee-	https://inqueritos.fccn.pt/index.php?lang=en&sid=97413&token=yr8s5x3xu4y74my	06/08/1980	
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																																																									vi	Evaluation	Guide-FCT	Evaluation	of	R&D	units	2013-http://www.fct.pt/apoios/unidades/avaliacoes/2013/docs/GuiaoAvaliacao_AvaliacaoUnidades2013.pdf	-19/08/2014	vii	Feynman,	Richard-The	Pleasure	of	Finding	Things	Out	pg	194,	Perseus	Books,	1999	viii“Embodied	Cognition”	Wilson,	Robert	A.	 and	Foglia,	 Lucia,	The	 Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	Fall	2011			http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodied-cognition/-	Cognition	is	embodied	when	it	is	deeply	dependent	upon	features	of	the	physical	body	of	an	agent,	that	is,	when	aspects	of	the	agent's	body	beyond	the	brain	play	a	significant	causal	or	physically	 constitutive	 role	 in	 cognitive	 processing.	 In	 general,	 dominant	 views	 in	 the	philosophy	 of	 mind	 and	 cognitive	 science	 have	 considered	 the	 body	 as	 peripheral	 to	understanding	the	nature	of	mind	and	cognition.	Proponents	of	embodied	cognitive	science	view	this	as	a	serious	mistake.	Sometimes	the	nature	of	the	dependence	of	cognition	on	the	body	 is	 quite	 unexpected,	 and	 suggests	 new	 ways	 of	 conceptualizing	 and	 exploring	 the	mechanics	 of	 cognitive	 processing.	 Embodied	 cognitive	 science	 encompasses	 a	 loose-knit	family	 of	 research	 programs	 in	 the	 cognitive	 sciences	 that	 often	 share	 a	 commitment	 to	critiquing	and	even	replacing	traditional	approaches	to	cognition	and	cognitive	processing.	Empirical	 research	 on	 embodied	 cognition	 has	 exploded	 in	 the	 past	 10	 years.	 As	 the	bibliography	 for	 this	 article	 attests,	 the	 various	 bodies	 of	 work	 that	 will	 be	 discussed	represent	a	serious	alternative	to	the	investigation	of	cognitive	phenomena.	Relatively	recent	work	 on	 the	 embodiment	 of	 cognition	 provides	 much	 food	 for	 thought	 for	 empirically-informed	philosophers	of	mind.	This	is	in	part	because	of	the	rich	range	of	phenomena	that	embodied	cognitive	science	has	studied.	But	it	is	also	in	part	because	those	phenomena	are	often	 thought	 to	 challenge	 dominant	 views	 of	 the	 mind,	 such	 as	 the	 computational	 and	representational	theories	of	mind,	at	the	heart	of	traditional	cognitive	science.	And	they	have	sometimes	been	taken	to	undermine	standard	positions	 in	the	philosophy	of	mind,	such	as	the	idea	that	the	mind	is	identical	to,	or	even	realized	in,	the	brain.  
ix	 In	the	mid-1990s,	scientists	studying	Area	F5	 in	the	ventral	premotor	cortex	of	monkeys	found	that	certain	neurons	in	this	area	sent	out	action	potentials	not	only	when	the	monkeys	were	 moving	 their	 hands	 or	 mouths,	 but	 also	 when	 they	 were	 simply	 watching	 another	animal	 or	 a	 human	 being	 who	 was	 making	 such	 a	 gesture.	 These	 neurons	 were	 dubbed	
mirror	 neurons	 because	 of	 the	 way	 that	 a	 visually	 observed	 movement	 seemed	 to	 be	reflected	in	the	motor	representation	of	the	same	movement	in	the	observer.		In	addition	to	mirror	neurons,	which	 are	 activated	both	when	you	perform	an	 action	yourself	 and	when	you	 see	 someone	 else	 performing	 it,	 another	 kind	 of	 neurons,	 called	 canonical	 neurons,	become	 activated	 when	 you	 merely	 see	 an	 object	 that	 can	 be	 grasped	 by	 the	 prehensile	movement	of	 the	hand	whose	movements	they	encode—as	if	your	brain	were	foreseeing	a	possible	interaction	with	this	object	and	preparing	itself	accordingly.			What	these	two	types	of	 neurons	 have	 in	 common	 is	 that	 they	 are	 both	 activated	 by	 an	 action	 regardless	 of	whether	you	are	carrying	that	action	out,	anticipating	carrying	it	out,	or	watching	someone	else	 carrying	 it	out.	Because	mirror	neurons	 thus	help	us	 foresee	 the	consequences	of	our	own	 actions,	 some	 have	 argued	 that	 these	 neurons	may	 be	 the	 cellular	 substrate	 for	 our	ability	also	to	understand	the	meaning	of	other	people's	actions.		This	understanding	of	other	people's	actions	 is	 the	 foundation	for	all	social	relations,	and	especially	 for	communication	between	 individuals.	 The	 discovery	 of	mirror	 neurons	may	 thus	 be	 particularly	 useful	 for	
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																																																								explaining	how	we	can	imagine	other	people's	intentions	and	state	of	mind.	Lastly,	the	fact	that	Area	F5	in	monkeys	is	regarded	as	the	homologue	for	Broca's	area	in	humans	suggests	that	mirror	neurons	also	are	involved	in	human	communication.	http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/a/a 06/a 06 cl/a 06 cl mou/a 06 cl mou.html	19/02/2013		x	Motion,	emotion	and	empathy	in	esthetic	experience-David	Freedberg	and	Vittorio	Gallese-Department	 of	 Art	 History	 and	 Archeology,	 Columbia	 University,	 Department	 of	Neuroscience,	University	of	Parma,	Parma,	Italy-Trends	in	Cognitive	Sciences		 Vol.11	No.5		xi	3.5.	Regime	especial	de	apresentação	da	tese	3.5.1.	Os	que	reúnam	as	condições	para	acesso	ao	ciclo	de	estudos	conducente	ao	graude	doutor	em	Artes	(Artes	Performativas	e	da	Imagem	em	Movimento)	podem	requerer	aapresentação	de	uma	tese	nos	termos	do	n.º	4	do	artigo	39.º	do	Regulamento	deEstudos	Pós-Graduados	da	Universidade	de	Lisboa,	ou	dos	trabalhos	previstos	nas	alíneas	a)	e	b)	do	n.º	3	do	artigo	36.º	do	mesmo	Regulamento,	ao	acto	público	de	defesa	sem	inscrição	no	ciclo	de	estudos	e	sem	designação	de	orientador.	3.5.2.	A	Comissão	Científica	deste	Curso	de	Doutoramento	pode	também	autorizar	que,	em	condições	de	exigência	equivalentes,	devidamente	justificadas,	a	elaboração	de	uma	tese	original	seja	substituída	pela	apresentação	e	defesa	dos	trabalhos	previstos	no	artigo	31.º	do	Regime	Jurídico	dos	Graus	e	Diplomas	do	Ensino	Superior,	a	saber:	
a)	Pela	compilação,	devidamente	enquadrada,	de	um	conjunto	coerente	e	relevante	de	trabalhos	de	investigação,	já	objecto	de	publicação	em	revistas	com	comités	de	seleção	de	reconhecido	mérito	internacional;	ou	
b)	Por	uma	obra	ou	conjunto	de	obras	ou	realizações	com	carácter	inovador,	acompanhada	de	fundamentação	escrita	que	explicite	o	processo	de	concepção	e	elaboração,	a	capacidade	de	investigação,	e	o	seu	enquadramento	na	evolução	do	conhecimento	no	domínio	em	que	se	insere.	Regulamento-Doutoramento	em	Artes,	Pg	6	-Universidade	de	Lisboa 
xii	Letter	from	Isaac	Newton	to	Robert	Hooke,	5	February	1676,	as	transcribed	in	Jean-Pierre	Maury	(1992)	Newton:	Understanding	the	Cosmos,	New	Horizons xiii	 “Also	 called	 proprioceptive	 sense,	 proprioception	 is	 the	 sense	 of	 body	 movement	 and	position.	This	 sense	 comes	 from	stimulation	of	 proprioceptors	 in	 the	muscle,	 tendons	 and	joints	 in	 the	 skeletal/muscular	 system	 and	 also	 the	 vestibular	 receptors	 in	 the	 inner	 ear.	Even	 without	 visual	 clues,	 Proprioception	 enables	 the	 body	 to	 determine	 its	 spatial	orientation”.-	From	Psychology	Dictionary	Online	
	http://psychologydictionary.org/proprioception/	-	ixzz2sX7B02wI	-	12/06/2013	
xiv	 The	 aesthetic	 senses	 are	 the	 senses	 by	 which	 we	 experience	 beauty,	 grace,	 and	 other	aesthetic	properties.	Vision	and	hearing	are	commonly	recognized	as	aesthetic	senses,	while	smell,	taste,	and	touch	are	not.	Proprioception	is	the	sense	by	which	we	acquire	information	about	the	positions	and	movements	of	our	own	bodies,	via	receptors	in	the	joints,	tendons,	ligaments,	muscles,	and	skin.	My	claim	is	that	proprioception	is	an	aesthetic	sense	and	that	one	can	make	aesthetic	judgments	based	on	proprioceptive	experience.	I	will	argue	that,	just	
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																																																								as	one	can	deem	a	painting	beautiful	based	on	one’s	visual	experience	of	 the	painting,	one	can	 deem	 a	 certain	 movement	 beautiful	 based	 on	 one’s	 proprioceptive	 experience	 of	 the	movement.	In	addition,	I	posit	that	in	a	certain	sense	an	observer	can	propriocept	the	beauty	of	another’s	movement.	Although	this	may	sound	surprising,	I	argue	that	recent	discoveries	about	the	function	of	mirror	neurons—neurons	that	are	activated	both	when	one	performs	a	task	and	when	one	sees	that	task	performed—as	well	as	other	empirical	studies	illustrating	that	when	 seeing	others	move	we	kinesthetically	 represent	 their	motion,	 support	 the	 case	and	 potentially	 pave	 the	 way	 toward	 a	 third-person	 proprioceptive	 aesthetics.-Proprioception	as	an	Aesthetic	Sense-Barbara	Montero,	2006-	Journal	Of	Aesthetics	And	Art	Criticism	64	(2):231-242.		xv	Gibson,	J.J.	(1977).	The	Theory	of	Affordances	(pp.	67-82).	In	R.	Shaw	&	J.	Bransford	(Eds.).	Perceiving,	Acting,	and	Knowing:	Toward	an	Ecological	Psychology.	Hillsdale,	NJ:	Lawrence	Erlbaum	
xvi		A	very	great	deal	has	been	written	about	what	creativity	is	thought	to	mean	and	how	it	may	be	understood	to	emerge.	A	very	usable	account	of	the	latter	is,	I	think,	offered	by	Arne	Dietricht’s	tract,		The	Neuroscience	of	Creativity,	the	Psychonomic	Bulletin	&	Review,	2004		http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/BF03196731#page-1,	06/08/2014	xvii	Antonio	Damasio:	The	quest	to	understand	consciousness-FILMED	MAR	2011	•	TED	TALK	2011	http://www.ted.com/talks/antonio_damasio_the_quest_to_understand_consciousness,			
xviii	 Antonio	Damasio:	 This	 Time	With	 Feeling	 –Interview-The	Aspen	 Institute-July	 4,	 2009	06/08/2014,	http://fora.tv/2009/07/04/Antonio_Damasio_This_Time_With_Feeling	
xix	 A	 Second	 Chance	 for	 Emotion-Antonio	 Damasio-Cognitive	 Neuroscience	 of	 Emotions-Oxford	Press	2000	
xx	 Philosophy	 is	 an	 academic	 discipline	 that	 exercises	 reason	 and	 logic	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	understand	 reality	 and	answer	 fundamental	questions	 about	knowledge,	 life,	morality	 and	human	nature.	The	ancient	Greeks,	who	were	among	the	first	to	practice	philosophy,	coined	the	 term,	 which	 means	 “love	 of	 wisdom.”	 Those	 who	 study	 philosophy	 are	 called	philosophers.	Through	the	ages,	philosophers	have	sought	to	answer	such	questions	as,	what	is	the	meaning	and	purpose	of	life?	How	do	we	know	what	we	know?	Does	God	exist?	What	does	 it	 mean	 to	 possess	 consciousness?	 And,	 what	 is	 the	 value	 of	 morals?	http://www.whatisphilosophy.net/	-	21/09/2013 xxi	Arnold	van	Gennep,	The	Rites	of	Passage,	London	1960	
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																																																								xxii	Synchronicity	is	a	concept	developed	by	psychologist	Carl	Jung	to	describe	a	perceived	meaningful	coincidence.	Jung	described	synchronicity	as	an	"acausal	connecting	principle"	in	which	events,	both	large	and	small,	in	the	external	world	might	align	to	the	experience	of	the	individual,	perhaps	mirroring	or	echoing	personal	concerns	or	thoughts.	http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/synchronicity	15/6/14	xxiii		One	of	the	oldest	observations	in	the	psychology	of	creativity	is	that	a	creative	idea	is	often	preceded	by	a	period	of	unconscious	incubation	(Hadamard,	1945;	James,	1880;	Poincaré,	1913/1982).	Contemporary	creativity	researchers	have	often	studied	incubation	and	its	role	in	creative	insight	(Beeftink,	van	Eerde,	&	Rutte,	2008;	Ellwood,	Pallier,	Snyder,	&	Gallate,	2009;	Kohn	&	Smith,	2009;	Patrick,	1986;	Sternberg	&	Davidson,	1995).	The	majority	of	studies	has	confirmed	the	existence	of	an	incubation	effect,	although	the	exact	nature	of	the	associated	unconscious	processes	remains	uncertain.	Hypotheses	include	mental	relaxation,	selective	forgetting,	random	subconscious	recombination,	and	spreading	activation.	Cognitive	neuroscientists	have	studied	a	closely	related	mental	phenomenon:	mind	
wandering,	when	thoughts	drift	away	from	the	task	at	hand	to	something	completely	unrelated.	Mind	wandering	involves	a	shift	away	from	a	primary	task	to	process	some	other,	personal	goal,	but	in	a	way	that	is	not	obviously	goal-directed	or	intentional.	Some	neuroscientists	have	hypothesized	that	people	prone	to	mind	wandering	may	score	higher	on	tests	of	creativity	(Hotz,	2009;	Tierney,	2010).	Recent	studies	of	the	brain's	idle	states	can	potentially	help	researchers	identify	what	brain	regions	are	associated	with	the	mind	wandering	state,	and	potentially	have	implications	for	the	understanding	of	the	role	of	incubation	in	the	creative	process.-Mind	Wandering	and	Incubation	–the	cognitive	neuroscience	of	creativity-keith	sawyer-creativity	research	journal,	vol	23,	2011	http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10400419.2011.571191#.U-CMTijjI8F	(August	5,	2014)		Many	psychological	theories	of	problem	solving	and	reasoning	have	highlighted	a	role	for	implicit	cognitive	processes	(e.g.,	Evans,	2006;	Reber,	1989;	Sun,	1994;	Sun	&	Zhang	2004).	For	instance,	implicit	processes	are	often	thought	to	generate	hypoth-	eses	that	are	later	explicitly	tested	(Evans,	2006).	Also,	similarity	has	been	shown	to	affect	reasoning	through	processes	that	are	mostly	implicit	(Sun,	1994;	Sun	&	Zhang,	2006).	Yet	most	theories	of	problem	solving	have	focused	on	explicit	processes	that	gradually	bring	the	problem	solver	closer	to	the	solution	in	a	deliberative	way	(Dorfman,	Shames,	&	Kihlstrom,	1996).	How-	ever,	when	an	ill-defined	or	complex	problem	has	to	be	solved	(e.g.,	when	the	initial	state	or	the	goal	state	can	lead	to	many	different	interpretations	or	when	the	solution	paths	are	highly	complex),	the	solution	is	often	found	by	sudden	insight	(Pols,	2002;	Reber,	1989;	Schooler	&	Melcher,	1995;	Schooler,	Ohlsson,	&	Brooks,	1993),	and	regular	problem-solving	theories	are	for	the	most	part	unable	to	account	for	this	apparent	absence	of	deliberative	strategy	(Bowden,	Jung-Beeman,	Fleck,	&	Kounios,	2005).	Sebastien	He	́lie,	Ron	Sun	Incubation,	Insight,	and	Creative	Problem	Solving:	A	Unified	Theory	and	a	Connectionist	Model-	Hélie	and	Sun,Psychological	Revue,	vol	117,	nr	3,	2010	(August	5,	2014)	http://alpha.tmit.bme.hu/speech/docs/education/IncubationInsightSun.pdf 
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																																																									xxiv	selective	perception		https://explorable.com/selective-perception	06/08/2014	
There	are	two	types	of	selective	perception:	perceptual	vigilance	and	perceptual	defense.	The	low	level	of	selective	perception,	perceptual	vigilance	refers	to	the	process	in	which	the	individual	notices	and	recognizes	the	stimuli	that	may	be	significant	to	him	at	some	degree.	On	the	other	hand,	perceptual	defense	occurs	in	an	attempt	of	a	person	to	create	a	barrier	between	him	and	the	stimuli	so	that	he	could	protect	himself	from	having	awareness	of	it.	More	often	than	not,	these	stimuli	are	perceived	to	be	threatening	or	unpleasant,	such	as	obscene	words	and	violent	actions.	This	is	the	high	level	of	selective	perception	wherein	violent	actions	are	not	accurately	seen	or	foul	words	are	not	precisely	heard.	Researchers	say	that	people	with	high	level	perceptual	defense	have	a	strong	"perceptual	wall"	which	serves	as	the	filtering	mechanism,	making	them	unable	to	perceive	unwanted	stimuli.	
Selective	perception,	when	done	consciously,	may	lead	to	"seeing"	things	that	the	person	wants	to	and	disregarding	the	opposite	of	such.	A	classic	research	on	selective	perception	included	subjects	from	Princeton	University	and	Darthmouth	University.	The	respondents	were	asked	to	watch	a	film	of	a	football	game	between	Princeton	and	Dartmouth.	The	results	showed	that	the	Dartmouth	subjects	reported	noticing	almost	twice	as	much	infraction	in	the	rules	by	the	Princeton	team	as	that	which	was	perceived	by	the	Princeton	viewers	regarding	the	Dartmouth	team.	In	this	case,	the	subjects	experience	selective	perception	relative	to	the	opposing	team	
Since	the	early	21st	century,	many	researchers	performed	experiments	and	studies	to	develop	more	knowledge	regarding	the	concept	of	selective	perception.	In	1999,	psychologists	Daniel	called	"The	Invisible	Gorilla	Test",	which	revealed	that	people	can	be	concentrated	on	one	stimulus	or	situation	and	become	"blind"	to	an	incoming	or	unexpected	situation.	This	effect	was	termed	as	"inattentional	blindness".	Watch	the	test	here.	
xxv	_http://www.thefreedictionary.com/conceive	-04/05/2013	xxvi	The	quote	referred	to	is:	“Writing	about	art	is	like	dancing	about	architecture’.	The	original	quote	seems	variously	attributed,	depending	on	which	reference	source	one	refers	to,	to	Frank	Zappa,	Steve	Martin,	and	to	others.	xxvii	-From	a	letter	from	Voltaire	to	Frederick	William,	Prince	of	Prussia	(28	November	1770)		xxviii	 Wave	 function	 collapse	 In	 quantum	mechanics-	wave	 function	 collapse	 (also	 called	
collapse	of	the	state	vector	or	reduction	of	the	wave	packet)	is	the	phenomenon	in	which	a	 wave	 function—initially	 in	 a	 superposition	 of	 several	 different	 possible	 eigenstates—appears	to	reduce	to	a	single	one	of	those	states	after	interaction	with	an	observer.[1]	It	 is	the	 essence	 of	measurement	 in	 quantum	mechanics,	 and	 connects	 the	wave	 function	with	classical	observables	like	position	and	momentum.	In	classical	terms,	it	is	the	reduction	of	all	possible	physical	states	to	a	single	possibility	which	is	measured	by	the	observer-	Wikipedia		
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																																																								xxix		On	the	intuitive	Understanding	of	non-locality	as	implied	by	quantum	theory-D.	Bohm	and	J.	Hiley-1975-Foundations	of	Physics-vol	4,	nr	1,	p	4	xxx	http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/outlier  06/07/2013	xxxi	Nicholas	Nassim	Taleb-The	Black	Swan,	Random	House,	N.Y.	2007-ISBN 9781400063512		xxxii	“The	Ambiguity	of	Play,	Brian	Sutton	Smith,	3d	edition,	Harvard	University	Press	2001	Publisher’s	preface:	“Every	child	knows	what	it	means	to	play,	but	the	rest	of	us	can	merely	speculate.	Is	it	a	kind	of	adaptation,	teaching	us	skills,	inducting	us	into	certain	communities?	Is	it	power,	pursued	in	games	of	prowess?	Fate,	deployed	in	games	of	chance?	Daydreaming,	enacted	in	art?	Or	is	it	just	frivolity?	Brian	Sutton-Smith,	a	leading	proponent	of	play	theory,	considers	 each	 possibility	 as	 it	 has	 been	 proposed,	 elaborated,	 and	 debated	 in	 disciplines	from	biology,	psychology,	and	education	to	metaphysics,	mathematics,	and	sociology.	Sutton-Smith	focuses	on	play	theories	rooted	in	seven	distinct	"rhetorics"--the	ancient	discourses	of	Fate,	Power,	Communal	Identity,	and	Frivolity	and	the	modern	discourses	of	Progress,	the	Imaginary,	and	the	Self.	In	a	sweeping	analysis	that	moves	from	the	question	of	play	in	child	development	to	the	implications	of	play	for	the	Western	work	ethic,	he	explores	the	values,	historical	sources,	and	interests	that	have	dictated	the	terms	and	forms	of	play	put	forth	in	each	discourse's	"objective"	theory.”	xxxiii	On Creativity-David Bohm-2004 Routledge ISBN 
0415336406 	xxxiv	Hesse,	Herman,	Das	Glasperlenspiel,	publ.	Fretz	u	Wasmuth,	Zurich		1943	
xxxv	"One's	conduct	of	 inquiry	is	 largely	shaped	by	one's	answer	to	the	question	of	whether	there	 must	 always	 be	 a	 single	 admissible	 interpretation	 …	 Must	 there	 be	 a	 single	 right	interpretation	 for	 such	cultural	entities	as	works	of	art,	 literature,	music,	or	other	cultural	phenomenon?"-	Michael	Krausz,	Ithaca,	N.Y.:	Cornell	University	Press,	1993,	chap.	2.	
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